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I. Introduction
Impeachment-the procedure through which the House of
Representatives accuses and then prosecutes a federal official in the Senate
with the aim of removing him or her from office-has historically had
either of two purposes. One has been to oust in a nonpartisan or bipartisan
manner a corrupt official who abuses power and thereby damages the
country. The other has been to inflict, for partisan reasons, a political blow
on an official whose conduct the impeaching Representatives simply
dislike. Because the second purpose is much less acceptable, the
impeaching Representatives attempt to disguise their purpose even when
voting on strictly party lines. Together, these two purposes represent the
dual personality of impeachment.
Beginning soon after the formation of the federal government,
impeachment was used as a partisan political weapon. After the failed
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in 1868, a long period of
largely nonpartisanship and bipartisanship in impeachments ensued.1 But
since 1968, some elements in the Republican Party have been willing to
use impeachment as a partisan weapon; to inflict political damage on their
opponents and as part of a campaign to control the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts. For example, in 1969, Republican President Richard
Nixon's Administration built a case against Justice Abe Fortas that it would
have submitted to the House of Representatives for impeachment if Fortas
had not made that unnecessary by resigning. Then, in 1970, Nixon's
Administration built an impeachment case against Justice William 0.
Douglas. Gerald Ford, then House Republican Minority Leader,
introduced an impeachment resolution on the floor of the House. But
House Democrats outmaneuvered Ford by creating a committee to
investigate the charges, which found no grounds for impeachment.3
Abundant historical evidence demonstrates that the Nixon Administration's
purpose in each instance was to create a Supreme Court vacancy for Nixon
to fill.
4
Those events were seen at the time as aberrations peculiar to the
Nixon Administration. But in 1997, House Republican Majority Whip
Tom DeLay began threatening to impeach judges who decided cases
1. See infra text accompanying notes 497-705.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 732-781.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 811-846.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 707-718, 740, 750-758, 823-826.
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contrary to his beliefs. "I advocate impeaching judges who consistently
ignore their constitutional role, violate their oath of office and breach the
separation of powers," wrote DeLay in the New York Times. "The framers
provided the tool of impeachment to keep the power of the judiciary in
check.".5 "The judges need to be intimidated," DeLay said a few months
later; "[t]hey need to uphold the Constitution;" if they don't, "we're going
to go after them in a big way."6
In 1998, House Republicans impeached President Bill Clinton. This
was the second time that a president, and the first time that an elected
president, had been impeached. In the trial that followed, the House
impeachment managers failed to persuade even a simple majority of the
Senate to convict, much less the two-thirds required by the Constitution.'
In 2005, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich wrote that "the Ninth
Circuit judges who found the motto 'one nation under God'
unconstitutional could be considered unfit to serve and be impeached."8
Republican Representative Tom Feeney, a co-sponsor of a House
resolution that would denounce judges who cite foreign law in interpreting
U.S. law, said that a judge who persisted in citing foreign sources may be
subject to the "ultimate remedy" of impeachment.9
Later in 2005, after Congressional Republicans enacted legislation
intended to cause federal courts to order the reinsertion of Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube, some Republicans threatened to impeach the judges who
declined to do so. DeLay, who had become House Majority Leader,
cautioned that "[t]he time will come for the men responsible for this to
answer for their behavior." DeLay went on to complain of what he called
"an arrogant and out of control judiciary that thumbs its nose at Congress
and the president."10 Senator Tom Colburn's chief of staff told a meeting
of Jerry Falwell and other activists, "I'm in favor of mass impeachment if
5. Tom DeLay, Letter to the Editor, Impeachment Is a Valid Answer to a Judiciary Run
Amok, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1997, at A18.
6. Joan Biskupic, Hill Republicans Target "Judicial Activism, " Conservatives Block
Nominees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at Al.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 849-997.
8. NEWT GINGRICH, WINNING THE FUTURE: A 21ST CENTURY CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
78 (2005) (referring to Newdow v. United States Cong., 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub
nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)).
9. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2005, at A10.
10. Id.; see also Jonathan Ringel, 11th Circuit's Birch Keeps Them Guessing, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 11, 2005 (discussing how Judge Birch was "the subject of
impeachment calls from angry lawmakers").
that's what it takes."" Similarly, DeLay talked of Congress removing
judges who lacked "good behavior."12
Still later in 2005, some Republicans began to threaten to impeach
Justice Anthony Kennedy.13  At the time, Republicans had become
increasingly nervous that Kennedy, like Justices Harry Blackmun, Lewis
Powell, John P. Stevens, Sandra Day O'Connor, and David Souter before
him, 14 was evolving from the right wing toward the center or further. This
evolution had been evidenced by his opinions for the Court holding
unconstitutional the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who
committed the crime while under the age of eighteen,15 the criminalization
of gay or lesbian sex,16 the prohibition of local governments from enacting
ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination,17 and the
incorporation of prayer into a public school graduation,18 as well as his
concurrence in decisions holding the execution of a mentally ill murderer
to be unconstitutional 9 and reaffirming a constitutional right to abortion.2
This might seem like the talk of Jacobins. But the Republican use of
impeachment-actual impeachment against Clinton in 1998-1999,
threatened impeachment to create Supreme Court vacancies in the Nixon
Administration, and threatened impeachment to intimidate judges more
recently-is well supported by precedent in American history.
Historically, there have been four great confrontations between or
among branches of the federal government: (1) the struggle between the
Federalist-dominated judiciary on one hand, and the Jefferson
11. Ruth Marcus, Booting the Bench: There's New Ferocity in Talk of Firing Activist
Judges, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2005, at A19; see also Nina J Easton, Rift Emerges in GOP after
Schiavo Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2005, at Ai.
12. Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2005, at AI.
13. Ann Althouse, Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25 (noting that
Kennedy "endured calls for his impeachment" because he cited foreign law); DeParle, supra note
12 ("[S]ome notable conservatives are calling for his impeachment."); Jesse J. Holland, DeLay
Criticizes Justice Kennedy, 'Activist' Republican Judges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 21, 2005,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1113987908498; Dana Milbank, And the
Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at A3; Marcus, supra note 11
("What started as 'Impeach Earl Warren' ... has now become 'Impeach Tony Kennedy'....").
14. See Jon D. Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court Makes
Justices More Liberal', BOSTON REv., Jan.-Feb. 2006, available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR31.1/hansonbenforado.html.
15. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
17. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
18. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
19. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
20. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Administration and Jeffersonian Congress on the other in the early years of
the nineteenth century; (2), from 1865 to 1869, the confrontation between
President Andrew Johnson and the Radical Republican Congress over
Reconstruction; (3) the conflict, which peaked in 1937, between the
Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Supreme Court that
repeatedly struck down his New Deal legislation as unconstitutional; and
(4) the on-going struggle, which began in 1968, in and between the two
elected branches on several issues but, most particularly, over the
composition of the Supreme Court. Impeachment as a highly partisan
exercise of legislative power, in which one branch of government attacks
another, played a central role in all of these confrontations except the
struggle between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court.
This article compares the use of impeachment in each of these
confrontations as well as other uses of impeachment. Part II describes how
delegates at the Constitutional Convention understood English
impeachment and why they drafted the constitutional impeachment
provisions as they did. Part III explains how, from the first impeachment
in 1797 through the trial of Andrew Johnson in 1868, impeachments, actual
and threatened, were based on reasoning and rhetoric very much like those
expressed and acted upon by Republicans since the Fortas episode in 1969.
Part III also explains how, after 1868, a parallel tradition of impeachment
evolved through mundane procedures-nonpartisan and bipartisan-for
separating corrupt judges from their constitutional lifetime tenure, and how
impeachment practice is now evolving further to incorporate both the
partisan and the nonpartisan. Parts IV and V consider the effects of the re-
emergence of partisan impeachment since 1969. Part IV explores whether
the use of impeachment and impeachment threats as a partisan political
strategy is likely to continue. Part V concludes that, despite its superficial
strategic appeal, partisan political impeachment for the most part fails to
produce the results its advocates seek.
Some of what occurred during earlier eras of partisan impeachment
will seem familiar to us today. For example, during the Adams and
Jefferson Administrations, attack politics like those we experience now,
including accusing political opponents of treason and near-treason,
dominated the political culture, and partisan impeachments were an
inherent part of that culture. 21 Some historical figures, on the other hand,
behaved in surprising ways. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example,
feared impeachment by Thomas Jefferson's party in Congress. Marshall
routinely behaved in ways that would violate modem judicial ethics, and
21. See infra Parts III(A)-(B).
would have been required, under modem conflict-of-interest law, to recuse
himself from some of the foundational cases in constitutional law.22
Jefferson's letters to his subordinates during the most partisan disputes of
his Presidency reveal obsessions on his part similar to those expressed by
President Nixon on the White House Watergate tapes (though without
Nixon's dishonesty, vulgarity, and lack of imagination).23 And during the
trials of Aaron Burr, Jefferson invented transactional immunity, by plea
bargaining directly with some potential witnesses and by providing the
prosecutor with blank signed presidential pardons to be given to any
witness the prosecutor wished separately to immunize.24 Several decades
later, immediately before President Andrew Johnson was impeached, he
tried to form a large army unit that would bypass the ordinary chain of
command and be answerable personally to him so that he could use it
against his political opponents if he wished.25
Some aspects of the Clinton impeachment have not commonly been
understood. For example, the procedural safeguards observed by the
House Judiciary Committee and the special prosecutors to prevent
partisanship in the impeachment of President Nixon were ignored during
the Clinton impeachment.26 The evidence of a right-wing campaign to
destroy the Clinton Presidency, beginning almost immediately after his
inauguration in 1993 and culminating in impeachment in 1998, is
abundant, though much of it became available only after Clinton left
office. 27  And the evidence that Justice Clarence Thomas committed
perjury during his confirmation hearings compares favorably with the
perjury case against Clinton.28
Compared with the past, the political context in which we live today is
not quite what it appears to be. Although the Republicans controlled both
Houses of Congress almost continually from 1995 to 2007, they did so
through margins that are razor-thin by historical standards-thinner by far
than those of any other party during any period of comparable length in
American history.29 For example, in the elections that produced the Senate
that confirmed Chief Justice John Roberts in 2005 and Justice Samuel Alito
in 2006, more votes were cast for Democratic candidates than for
22. See infra Part 111(B).
23. See infra Part 111(B).
24. See infra Part 111(B).
25. See infra Part 111(D).
26. See infra Parts I1l(E)(5), I1I(F)(2), and IV(B).
27. See infra Part III(F)(2).
28. See infra Parts 1Il(F)(2) and IV(A).
29. See infra Part IV(C).
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Republican candidates. In essence, the public voted for a Democratic
Senate but got a Republican one.3° Party insecurity produced by situations
like this has a substantial role in encouraging partisan impeachments. The
Jeffersonians who impeached Justice Chase, the Radical Republicans who
impeached Andrew Johnson, and the Republicans who impeached Clinton
were all new to power, insecure about their ability to hold on to it, and
driven to use what power they had while they had it. In contrast, the
Democrats in the constitutional confrontation of 1937 had some of the most
massive congressional majorities in American history, could look toward
the future with confidence that problems could be solved without assaults
on individual judges, and therefore did not consider impeaching anybody.
II. The Adoption and Meaning of Constitutional
Provisions on Impeachment
Historically, impeachment had a significant role in the diminution of
monarchical power in England and imperial power in the American
colonies. In England, impeachment was a tool through which "Parliament,
after a long and bitter struggle, made ministers chosen by the King
accountable to it rather than the Crown."'" In the struggle between
monarch and legislature, "Parliament indulged in the fiction that the King
could do no wrong but was mislead by his ministers. 3 2 Against that
background, impeachment was understandably considered by the drafters
of the Constitution to be an ordinary political device, consistent with
reasonable government.
Although the House of Commons was at times eager to use
impeachment as a weapon to depose officials it did not like, or even to
punish private citizens who held no office, it tended not to impeach
"without evidence of some wrongdoing, negligence, or betrayal of public
trust. '33 If the House of Commons set the bar of impeachment any lower
there was no chance of conviction in the House of Lords, where
"proceedings were more often than not fair, dignified, and learned," though
30. See infra Part IV(C).
31. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 1 (1973); see, e.g.,
id. at 2-3, 7-53. Berger's analysis of impeachment history in general has been criticized,
sometimes with sound reason. See, e.g., PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL,
IMPEACHMENT 1N AMERICA, 1635-1805, at 266-70 (1984). Where his views are idiosyncratic,
they are ignored here or are reported along with contrary opinions.
32. BERGER, supra note 31, at 2.
33. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 6.
there were ample instances of abuse.34 For example, the House of
Commons impeached an Anglican priest named Sacheverell, who held no
government office but criticized the Glorious Revolution of 1689 from the
pulpit.35 The public reaction was so negative that the Whigs, who
prosecuted Sacheverell, were turned out in favor of the Tories.36
In the colonies, impeachment, like the common law jury, acquired an
honorable reputation because it offered a tool for resistance to the Crown.
Although not legally authorized to do so, colonial assemblies at times
impeached offensive colonial officials. The impeachments might have
been technically without effect, but they represented such an extreme form
of protest that the impeached officials often resigned or the Crown
withdrew them.37 The last of the colonial impeachments occurred in 1774,
the year before Lexington and Concord, when the Massachusetts General
Court-a legislature, despite its name-impeached the Crown's chief
justice in the colony38 for "obeying a directive from the crown," which
began the collapse of British government in Massachusetts.3 9
During the Revolution of 1775-1783, the new state governments
began to use impeachment as a vehicle to remove officials for routine
abuse of their offices.4  Having used it as a tool of rebellion, "the
Revolutionaries had absorbed impeachment into a republican system" and
made it an ordinary facet of government. 41 At this point impeachment had
already acquired its dual personality: it could be a non-partisan device for
removing officials or it could be a partisan political weapon. At the time
the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia in 1787, most of the
thirteen original states had impeachment provisions in their own
constitutions. 4 The constitutional provisions spread to newly admitted
states and were frequently used. "From 1776 to 1805, New Jersey had nine
[impeachment] trials, Vermont six, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania four
apiece, South Carolina and Kentucky three each, Tennessee two... , and
34. Id.
35. Id. at 7-8.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6-56.
38. Id. at 49-55.
39. Id. at 59.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 64, 68.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34:2
Winter 2007] IMPEACHMENT AS A PARTISAN POLITICAL WEAPON 169
Georgia one. ' 43 Today, every state constitution except Oregon's contains
impeachment provisions."
When the Constitutional Convention met in Philadelphia, British
impeachment abuses were on the delegates' minds, 4 and they methodically
added restrictions to prevent such abuses. For example, in England, a
judgment of conviction on an impeachment could include criminal
penalties, including imprisonment,46 but at the Constitutional Convention,
the delegates limited the judgment of conviction to "removal from office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit
under the United States., 47 Although in England anybody except a member
of the royal family could be legislatively tried and punished through• 48
impeachment, the Constitutional Convention limited the jurisdiction of
impeachment to "[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States. 4 9 And while the House of Lords could convict by a
simple majority, 0 the Constitutional Convention decided to permit
conviction in the Senate only by a two-thirds super-majority."5  The
Constitutional Convention also rejected some other aspects of English
impeachment. For example, the head of state is impeachable in the United
States (the president),52 but was not in England (the monarch).,3  And
43. Id. at 77; see also id. at 78-95.
44. Keith A. Scarborough, Comment, "The Awful Discretion": The Impeachment
Experience in the States, 55 NEB. L. REv. 91, 91 n.2 (1975); see also N.E.H. Hull & Peter
Charles Hoffer, Historians and the Impeachment Imbroglio: In Search of a Serviceable History,
31 RUTGERS L.J. 473, 481-82 (2000); Impeachment can still play an important role in state
government. See Robert Jerome Glennon, Impeachment: Lessons from the Mecham Experience,
30 ARiZ. L. REv. 371 (1988); Scarborough, supra at 93.
45. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton).
46. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 97; Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of
Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 603, 605 (1999).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
48. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 4-5; Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 605.
49. U.S. CONST. art II, § 4. It was not immediately clear what categories of persons in the
pay of the United States were "civil Officers," except that military officers were not included.
The first impeachment decided whether a Senator is a "civil officer." See infra text
accompanying notes 91-150.
50. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 97; Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 605.
51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
53. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 605. This is different from a bill of attainder, which the U.S.
Constitution forbids in Article I, Section 9. A bill of attainder punishes a specific person through
a statute-for example, Congress passing a statute requiring that the artist sometimes known as
Prince shall pay a fine of a million dollars unless he uses, for the rest of his life, a first and a last
name. An impeachment, on the other hand, is a trial conducted by a legislature. Because the
English Parliament refused to limit its jurisdiction to officeholders and to pre-defined offenses,
and because English impeachments could lead legislatively to criminal penalties, the House of
although the English monarch could pardon an impeachment conviction,5
the American president cannot. 5
Perhaps the most perplexing issue for the delegates concerned a
definition of the offenses for which a "civil Officer" could be impeached.
There was no limitation in English law: anything could be an impeachable
offense." The delegates vacillated on this issue. On August 20, 1787, the
Committee of Five recommended that officials be removable through
impeachment for "neglect of duty malversation or corruption. '7  On
September 8, when it was proposed to limit impeachment to cases of
treason or bribery, George Mason objected that:
Treason as defined in the Constitution58 ] will not reach many
great and dangerous offences. Hastings591 is not guilty of
Treason. Attempts to subvert the Constitution may not be
Treason as above defined. As bills of attainder which have
saved the British Constitution are forbidden,E601 it is the more
necessary to extend the power of impeachments.61
Mason moved to add "maladministration" as an impeachable
offense. 62 James Madison countered that "[s]o vague a term will be
equivalent to a tenure during pleasure of the Senate. 63 Mason "withdrew
'maladministration' [and] substitute[d] 'other high crimes [and]
misdemesnors [sic] ag[ainst] the State,"' and the amended motion was
adopted by a vote of eight states to three.64 Almost immediately, the
Commons was free to impeach, and the House of Lords to convict and imprison, an ordinary
person for using only one name, even if no one had previously thought that wrong. No English
impeachment had ever gone anywhere near such an extreme, but the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention instinctively distrusted this kind of open-ended power in English
government.
54. Id.
55. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
56. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 605.
57. JAMES MADISON, THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, VOLUME IV 244 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1903).
58. "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1. Mason
spoke on the grounds for impeachment on September 8, 1787, and the definition of treason had
been settled on August 20. MADISON, supra note 57, at 246-52, 407 (detailing the proceedings
on Aug. 20 and Sept. 8, 1787).
59. Warren Hastings, Govemor General of the East India Company, whose tortuously
complicated impeachment trial lasted from 1788 to 1795. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 96-97.
60. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9; supra note 53 (discussing bill of attainders).
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delegates voted to change "State" to "United States ... in order to remove
ambiguity."65  The result was the list of impeachment grounds in the
Constitution today: "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors."'
The phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" was not invented in
Philadelphia. It had been part of English impeachment practice for
centuries, having first appeared as a ground for impeachment in 1386.67 It
was the ground for the Warren Hastings impeachment,68 which was
contemporaneous with the Constitutional Convention.69 And it accounted
for twenty-six of the fifty-six 70 English impeachments from 1642 to the
time of the Constitutional Convention.71
But the phrase did not come into the Constitution with its meaning
clear. Part of the problem was contextual: in this new form of government,
what characteristics would make a crime "high?" The English
impeachment precedents provide no clear guidelines, and the words were
often used as rhetoric rather than to communicate actual meaning.
"Sometimes the English cases seem to prove too much, treating as 'high
Crimes and Misdemeanors' petty acts of maladministration which no
sensible person could think impeachable offenses in a president, or in
anybody."72 This seems nonsensical until one recalls that at that time the
modern parliamentary method of dislodging an unacceptable minister-the
vote of no confidence-had not yet been invented, and the English
Parliament was reduced to using accusatory formats to remove appointees
of the Crown.73
The Constitutional delegates did not work out a definition in
Philadelphia. Their drafting style, which produced by far the shortest
constitution of any modern country, was to sketch out a general outline,
add a few specifics about which they felt strongly, and leave it to
65. Id. at 409.
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
67. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT, A HANDBOOK 49 (1974); ALEXANDER
SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 86 (1916) (Partially published in two
parts as Alex Simpson Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REv. 651, 803 (1916); citations
here are to the book rather than to the articles, which are incomplete).
68. P.J. MARSHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS, at xiv (1965).
69. SIMPSON, supra note 67, at 167.
70. Of the remaining impeachments, eighteenwere for "high treason," and eight used a
combination of the two phrases, leaving only four impeachments based on grounds that did not
make their way into the Constitution. Id. at 117-67.
71. Id.
72. BLACK, supra note 67.
73. See BERGER, supra note 31, at 2.
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interpretation to fill in the rest. But a consensus of scholars74 and the
federal impeachment precedents agree that, as Michael Gerhardt puts it:
The phrase "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" consists of
technical terms of art referring to "political crimes" . . . [which]
were not necessarily indictable crimes. Instead, "political
crimes" consisted of the kinds of abuses of power or injuries to
the Republic that only could be committed by public officials by
virtue of the public offices or privileges they held. Although the
concept "political crimes" uses the term "crimes," the phrase did
not necessarily include all indictable offenses. Nor were all
indictable offenses considered "political crimes."75
A second part of the problem is that over time words tend to acquire
new meanings. The drafters did not require "high felonies or
misdemeanors," although the modem ear might hear something like that
when "high Crimes or Misdemeanors" is said. It was not unknown in the
eighteenth century to refer to crimes less serious than felonies as
misdemeanors. Blackstone did.76 But modem criminal codes, with finely
worked out differentiations among degrees of criminality, came only later,
giving us today the impression that a misdemeanor could only be a crime.
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, "demeanor" meant what it
still means today on elementary school report cards: behavior.
"Misdemeanor" was misbehavior.7 7 Sound evidence that this is what the
delegates meant in Article II appears in the Article III provision creating
lifetime tenure for federal judges: "The Judges, both of the supreme and
inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour., 78 Even
though a misdemeanor in the criminal sense would always be a low offense
and never a "high" one, twentieth century folklore assumed that "high
crimes and misdemeanors" was a quaint way of saying "felonies and
misdemeanors"-which would limit impeachment to crimes. That,
however, has never been true.
74. BLACK, supra note 67, at 35, 39-40; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 101; CHARLES
E. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928); JOHN R. LABOVITZ,
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 27-31 (1978); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 796-800 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 1891); John D.
Feerick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1, 47-58 (1970); Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 NW. U. L. REV.
719, 726-28 (1970); Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 609-10.
75. Gerhardt, supra note 46, at 610 (footnotes ommitted).
76. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 n.6 (1769).
77. BERGER, supra note 31, at 53-102.
78. U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
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A third part of the problem is the appearance, although not necessarily
the reality, of textual inconsistency. The grounds for impeachment-
"Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors"-are set out
in Article II of the Constitution,7 which creates and governs the executive
branch. The sentence begins "The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of," and then the grounds are given.8°
Placement of this sentence in Article II and the manner in which officials
are listed both suggest that it applies only to the executive branch, and that
judges are not "civil Officers." Article III, the Judicial Article, provides
that "Judges... shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour. 81  If
judges have "Offices," they might reasonably be considered "civil
Officers" and subject to the same impeachment grounds as other
impeachable officials, despite the placement of the Impeachment Clause in
Article II. In fact, when judges have been impeached, the House of
Representatives always accuses them of bribery or other high crimes and
misdemeanors.82
What then does the phrase "during good Behaviour" mean in Article
III? The drafters intended "Misdemeanor" in the Impeachment Clause to
mean the opposite of "good Behaviour,"83 and treason, bribery, and high
crimes are, of course, all bad behavior by any form of measurement. But,
it has often been argued that judges can be impeached and removed on
lesser grounds than would be needed to remove a president or a vice
president.
Both structural and textual justifications have been offered to support
this view. One structural justification is that the removal of a president-
though not of a lesser executive official--disrupts the country, which
would care less about removal of a Supreme Court Justice and hardly care
at all when a lesser judge is removed. Another structural justification is
that federal judges have life tenure and can be removed from office only by
impeachment, while presidents and vice presidents serve four-year terms;
presidents are subject to term limits under the Twenty-second Amendment;
and other executive branch officers can be dismissed by the president.
Gerald Ford, among others, made this argument during his unsuccessful
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
80. Id.
81. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
82. See EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL F1NKELMAN, IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT passim (1999).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
attempt to have Justice Douglas impeached. 8 The textual justification is
that the Impeachment Clause in Article II (the Executive Branch Article)
requires especially egregious misbehavior ("high... Misdemeanors") and
not just misbehavior, which is all Article III (the Judicial Article) requires.
There is no way to know whether the Framer left a loose end or made a
conscious distinction. The records of the Constitutional Convention
contain no debate on the subject. It is true that two judges (Archbald and
Ritter)"5 have been impeached and removed for conduct that was only
partly criminal. But that proves little. It is easy to imagine noncriminal
conduct that could quickly lead to impeachment of a president, such as a
flat-out refusal to do the job combined with a refusal to resign from it.
Even with the limitations imposed by the Constitutional Convention,
impeachment remained a partisan political weapon as well as a means of
removing the unfit from office. In The Federalist, Alexander Hamilton
described impeachment as "a method of NATIONAL INQUEST [sic] into
the conduct of public men. ' 86  Because the circumstances of such an
inquest cannot be predicted in advance, impeachment "can never be tied
down by ... strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the
prosecutors [House managers who prosecute impeachments] or in the
construction of it by the judges [Senators who decide both law and fact] as
in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal
security. 8' This is exactly the justification Congress would offer if it were
to respond to criticism over its failure, explained in Part IV(B) of this
article, to adopt burdens of production and persuasion."
Hamilton, in fact, frankly admitted that impeachment would be seen
as a partisan political weapon. Because a bill of impeachment would allege
"abuse or violation of some public trust," it would be political by nature, its
prosecution, as Alexander Hamilton explained:
[W]ill seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole
community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or
inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with
the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other;
and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that
84. 116 CONG. REC. 11913-14 (1970); VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 59.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 518-523, 612-653.
86. THE FEDERALISTNO. 65, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
87. Id. at 398.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 1071-1092.
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the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength
of parties than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.89
III. The Evolution of Impeachment Practice
From the first impeachment in 1797 to the most recent one in 1998-
1999, impeachment practice has gradually evolved, although in the process
it has, in recent decades, circled back toward its starting point. The most
recent impeachment (Clinton) has more in common with some of the
earliest impeachments (Blount and Chase) and with the 1868 impeachment
of Andrew Johnson than it does with any of the impeachments that
occurred between 1868 and 1998. During those 130 years impeachments
were mostly nonpartisan or bipartisan-although since 1968 some
threatened impeachments and attempts at impeachment have been
extremely partisan.
A. The First Two Impeachments: Blount and Pickering
In the early years of the federal government, "Congress briefly
experimented with using impeachment to remove political opposition.
The first three impeachment trials all fit this pattern.
Senator William Blount of Tennessee was the first person impeached
by the House. Blount was elected to the Senate in 1796 and took his seat in
March 1797.91 "In the fall of 1796 Blount secretly plotted with
frontiersmen and Eastern speculators to wrest Louisiana"--the huge
territory later purchased by Jefferson, not the modest-sized modern state-
"from Spain in order to open the Mississippi Valley to settlers eager to
purchase acres of his vast land holdings."92 To accomplish this, Blout
organized a private expedition into Spanish territory west of the
Mississippi River,93 and hoped for aid from the British, who at the time
were fighting a war against Spain in Europe. 94 In July 1797, evidence of
the plot became public, and immediately the Senate, on its own initiative,
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 65 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 86, at 380-81.
90. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 10.
91. Id. at 86.
92. BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION FRAMERS
AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 3 (1998); see also ELEONORE BUSHNELL,
CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 26-27 (1992);
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at
275-76 (1997).
93. BUSHNELL, supra note 92; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 87.
94. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 27; MELTON, supra note 92; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN,
supra note 82, at 87.
expelled him.95 At the same time, the House separately impeached him.
96
The impeachment trial, however, did not begin until December 1798.97
Those managing the case against Blount lost interest in prosecuting the
case until the election of 1800 approached.
Blount's conspiracy seemed to have had two purposes. First, Blount
simply hoped to make money in land sales.98 Second, many Westerners, as
those who lived in Kentucky and Tennessee were called at the time, viewed
such an expedition with sympathy. 9 Western ambitions looked across the
Mississippi, where the vacuum of weak Spanish administration seemed to
invite American infiltration.'0°  In politics, the Jeffersonian party
represented, among other groups, these Western interests, while the
Federalists, who controlled all branches of the federal government, were
hostile to them. At various times, the Jeffersonians were called the Anti-
Federalists, the Democratic-Republicans, and the Republicans-even
though they were the ancestors of what we now call the Democratic Party.
All these names can be confusing to the modern reader. Here, it will be
called the Jeffersonian party. What matters most in this context, and what
is most easily remembered today, is that it was led by Jefferson. Blount
started out as a Federalist but switched to the Jeffersonian party shortly
before his election.10 1
To modern sensibilities, Blount's conspiracy seems like a fantasy, but
intrigues like his were not rare in the Mississippi Valley of his time. °J It
was a frontier, without settled borders.1 3 The governments that claimed the
land were far away, and they had few, if any, forces on site to enforce their
claims."'4 People on the frontier were not shocked at Blount's actions; in
95. The expulsion was an exercise of the Senate's power to expel a Member for misconduct
under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2, and had nothing to do with impeachment.
96. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS
125-28 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS]; CURRIE, supra
note 92, at 277; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 86.
97. IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERRORS 27 (1972).
98. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 87.
99. Id.
100. Id. France was the first European power to claim the Louisiana territory. MELTON,
supra note 92, at 69. In 1763, Spain acquired it. Id. Westerners feared that, to get French aid in
their war against England, the Spanish would redeed Louisiana back to the French. VAN TASSEL
& FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 87. That later happened, and when the French treasury needed
replenishing to support Napoleon's wars, the French sold Louisiana to Jefferson, who by then had
become President.
101. MELTON, supra note 92, at 76-77.
102. Id. at 78-93.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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fact, after leaving the Senate he was popular, even revered in Tennessee.' 5
But a Senator should not have done it: his conspiracy could be imputed
internationally to the United States government, giving Spain solid grounds
for grievance.
The Federalists in the House of Representatives continued to
prosecute the impeachment case against Blount even though the Senate had
expelled him. Their motives were not to remove him from the Senate (he
was no longer there) but to disqualify him from taking any future seat in
Congress or any other position in the federal government.'06  The
Federalists also wanted to establish the principle that anybody, even
someone not currently holding any office, could be so disqualified. The
English House of Commons could impeach its own members and members
of the House of Lords, as well as citizens holding no office at all,' but the
words of the Constitution-"The President, Vice President and all civil
Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment... and Conviction ... ."'0--limited that expansive concept
of the impeachment power.
Short, capsule descriptions of the Blount impeachment tend to treat it
as a simple, though odd, case in which Blount's conduct and status were
the only issues.'9 The picture presented is of a somewhat confused, if not
naive Senate, in the early days of the Republic, trying earnestly to resolve
an ambiguity in the Constitution on the question of whether a legislator
could be impeached and convicted. In-depth scholarly analysis, on the
other hand, tends to treat it as an example of one party (in this case, the
Federalists) using impeachment as a calculated partisan political weapon
against the other party."0
The roll call votes in the Senate certainly support the scholarly
analysis. There were a number of them in 1798 and 1799, some procedural
and others substantive. Of twenty-seven Federalist Senators, twenty-five
voted against Blount most of the time; eighteen of them voted against him
105. Id at 37, 235.
106. CURRIE, supra note 92, at 280; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 151.
107. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 4-5; Gerhardt, supra note 46.
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
109. See VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 86-90.
110. BRANT, supra note 97, at 24-45; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 151-63; MELTON,
supra note 92, at 104-74.
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all of the time."' Of eleven Senators from the Jeffersonian party, eight
voted for Blount most of the time." 2
Perhaps even more corrobative are the other things Congress was
doing while it was impeaching Blount. In July 1798, Congress passed the
Sedition Act "subjecting all Americans (but especially newspaper editors)
to prison terms for libeling the President and Congress. ' 3 And "[t]he
same two [Federalist] congressmen who actively managed the Blount
impeachment trial... were in the forefront of the drive for the Sedition
Act. In the newspaper campaign for its passage, Federalist editors
concentrated on Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin as traitorous
Americans ...... 114 This was an era of hardball politics not unlike our
own. The Sedition Act criminalized the Federalists' adversaries by turning
criticism of the Federalists into a crime. It certainly reflected the
Federalists' "disposition to interpret political opposition as treason."'15 The
first person convicted under the Sedition Act served a year in prison for
publishing the opinion that President Adams was "swallowed up in a
continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp,
foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.""' 6
There is some evidence that the Federalists tried to use the Blount
impeachment for similar ends. Federalist Senator Jacob Read introduced a
resolution that would end the Blount impeachment trial with a finding that
a Senator is not liable to impeachment more "than any citizen of the United
States not a member of either House of Congress.''.. In other words, every
ordinary citizen (and every Senator) could be impeached "8 and punished,
on conviction, by "disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor,
Trust or Profit under the United States." 9 Although that would have been
unconstitutional, as the Constitution limits the reach of impeachment to
"[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States,"' O the Federalists had nothing to fear except popular opinion. They
controlled the federal judiciary as well as Congress, and the Sedition Act-
111. MELTON, supra note 92, at 273-74. Congressional records were not well kept at the
time, and not all tallies are included. Id. at 273.
112. Id. The total number of Senators listed exceeds the membership in the Senate during the
period because of changes in personnel due to the 1798 elections.
113. BRANT, supra note 97, at 33.
114. Id.
115. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 26.
116. BRANT, supra note 97, at 46.
117. Id. at 28; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 158; MELTON, supra note 92, at 170.
118. CURRIE, supra note 92, at 279.
119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
120. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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also plainly unconstitutional-was eagerly enforced by the courts. The
point of impeachment would thus not be limited to removing undesirable
people from office. It would be extended to preventing undesirable people
from ever assuming office. Candidates for any federal office from the
Jeffersonian party could be eliminated from the ballot in this way."'
Jefferson and Madison were sufficiently worried about this prospect to
write anxious letters to each other immediately after the Read resolution
was introduced.'
The Federalists did not bring the Read resolution to a vote.
"Presumably the Federalists thought it unwise to confront the American
people with a declaration of the absolute immunity of senators from
impeachment, coupled with the universal liability of private citizens to
exclusion from office by that process.' 23 The Read resolution, enunciating
a doctrine of universal impeachment, represents not what the Federalists
succeeded in doing, but instead what at least a faction within them would
have liked to have done, if they had thought they could get away with it.
In the impeachment trial, Blount's lawyers offered several defenses:
that he was no longer a Senator; that Senators are not "civil Officers"
124
subject to impeachment; that whatever he did was not done in the
execution of his official duties-and that therefore he was not within the
jurisdiction of an impeachment proceeding. 25  In response, the House
managers made Senator Read's argument: "That all persons, without the
supposed limitation [to President, Vice President, and civil Officers of the
United States], are liable to impeachment.'
26
Certainly, there was no nonpartisan reason to prosecute an
impeachment, since Blount was no longer in office. One of the House
managers, James A. Bayard, who was "in the forefront of the drive for the
Sedition Act,', 27 made it clear in his closing argument to the Senate that the
real purpose of the Blount impeachment trial was to establish the principle
of universal liability to impeachment and disqualification from future
office-holding:
121. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 158.
122. BRANT, supra note 97, at 30-3 1.
123. Id. at 31; accord HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 158.
124. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
125. BRANT, supra note 97, at 36.
126. Id. at 37; see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 158; MELTON, supra note 92, at 210.
The House managers also argued that a Senator is a civil Officer, but they "placed all their emphasis
upon the first point" that anybody can be impeached. BRANT, supra note 97, at 37. The details can
be found in BRANT, supra note 97, at 37-39, and MELTON, supra note 92, at 210-14.
127. BRANT, supra note 97, at 33.
Let us suppose that a citizen, not in office, but possessed of
extensive influence, arising from popular arts [ability to speak to
the people], from wealth or connexions, actuated by strong
ambition, and aspiring to the first place in the Government,
should conspire with the disaffected of our own country, or with
foreign intriguers, by illegal artifice [criticizing the president and
Congress, which were crimes under the Sedition Act],
corruption, or force, to place himself in the Presidential chair. I
would ask, in such a case, what punishment would be more
likely to quell a spirit of that description, than absolute and
perpetual disqualification .... 28
John Adams, the president and a Federalist, had a year left in his term
of office and was not confident of reelection. At the time these words were
spoken, Madison held no federal office,1 29 though, nine years later, he was
elected president, succeeding Jefferson. Jefferson was in federal office,
although Brant speculates that if impeached before the next election, he
might have resigned to avoid a trial, and thus these words were aimed at
him as well as Madison.1 3 Jefferson was vice president and heard Bayard's
speech in the Senate chamber, where he was presiding'31(before vice
presidents became so busy that they delegated this duty132 to others). The
Federalists controlled all three branches of government, and Jefferson was
vice president only because he lost the presidential election of 1796 to John
Adams. Until the Twelfth Amendment was adopted in 1803, the vice
presidency went to the losing presidential candidate with the largest
number of electoral votes. 133
According to Brant, "[h]ere was a clear revelation of Federalist party
strategy to control the presidential election of 1800 by combining
impeachment with the Sedition Act": prosecuting anti-Federalist editors
under the Sedition Act while threatening anti-Federalist candidates with
impeachment, whether or not they were currently "civil Officers."1"
Melton, who wrote the most exhaustive study of the Blount impeachment,
holds a similar view, though less vividly expressed. 135 He reports that,"[d]uring the proceedings against Blount, the Federalists had never
128. Id. at 44; MELTON, supra note 92, at 211.
129. BRANT, supra note 97, at 44.
130. Id.
131. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 181.
132. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; see also U.S. CONST. amend XIX.
134. BRANT, supra note 97, at 44.
135. MELTON, supra note 92, at 237.
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concealed their desire to establish impeachment as a weapon that could
reach any person, public or private, and deprive him of office; on the
contrary, they were quite vocal about it."'3 6 Because the Constitution does
not limit impeachment to criminal acts, Congress could permanently
disqualify from federal office any citizen whose politics Congress did not
like. 37 "With this power a determined Congress could virtually guarantee
permanent Federalist ascendancy.'
38
There is much plausibility in these theories, but perhaps one
exaggeration. Universal impeachment was probably only a strategy
preferred by a faction within the Federalist Party. The Federalist Party was
not monolithic. Like most political parties, it had both extremist and
moderate elements. The moderates tended to cluster around Adams and
Alexander Hamilton 9  The extremists-called High Federalists 1 -were
owners of substantial property, who also felt they owned the government;
they considered democracy "to be the government of the worst," in the
words of George Cabot.14' Among their leaders was Justice Samuel
Chase, 142 whom the Jeffersonians later impeached for expressing and acting
on exactly that sentiment from the bench. 4 3 Hoffer and Hull, who wrote
the most thorough study of the uses of impeachment just before and after
adoption of the Constitution, concluded that although the Federalists used
the Blount impeachment as a partisan political weapon against Jefferson's
party, it was an aberration and not part of a grand strategy.'" Perhaps the
strongest evidence is that the Blount experience was not repeated. The
House made no serious efforts to impeach Jefferson, Madison, or other
prominent members of their party.
136. Id.; see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 158.
137. Disqualification from future federal office is one of the punishments that stem from an
impeachment conviction, but it is not automatic. After convicting, the Senate votes separately on
collateral punishments. During this vote, a simple majority is sufficient (rather than the two-
thirds needed to convict). Sometimes, a convicted official is removed from his current office but
not barred from future federal offices. That happened after the convictions of Ritter and
Hastings. See infra text accompanying notes 612-653, 671-676; see also VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 158, 173.
138. MELTON, supra note 92, at 211; see also HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 151.
139. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 252 (1996).
140. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG
REPUBLIC 53-54, 57-58 (1971); SMITH, supra note 139, at 234.
141. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 53.
142. Id. at 54.
143. See infra text accompanying notes 211-246. Cabot's family was the Boston Cabots,
who, according to Massachusetts folklore, spoke only to the Lodges, who spoke only to God.
144. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 162-63.
At the end of Blount's impeachment trial, "[t]he plan failed, obviously
because a count of heads in the strongly Federalist Senate showed that
fewer than two thirds were brave enough to go through with it"' 45-
probably because of popular hostility already building up over the Sedition
Act. A motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was approved by a vote of
fourteen to eleven.'4 Although scholars disagree about the exact party
division in the vote, 147 they agree that "a composite portrait of the senator
who wanted to assert Senate jurisdiction over Blount shows him to be a
Federalist from the Northeast.,
148
Blount's impeachment is remembered for establishing that a legislator
is not subject to impeachment. 49  But it did not actually do that. The
grounds in the motion to dismiss were not specified, and a Senator could
have voted for it on the theory that Senators are not impeachable or on the
theory that private citizens are not impeachable (Blount no longer being a
Senator).5 Nor was Blount's impeachment needed to establish the
unimpeachability of legislators. The Constitution had done that already.
Article II, Section 4 makes liable to impeachment the president, vice
president, "and all civil Officers of the United States." Article I, Section 6,
forbids appointment of a Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives to "any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States" while still serving in Congress. Thus, a legislator cannot be a "civil
Officer" since they are prohibited from assuming "any civil Office."
In the 1800 election, Jefferson was elected president, defeating the
incumbent Federalist John Adams, and Jefferson's party took over both
Houses of Congress.' In its last weeks in office, the lame-duck Federalist
Congress created sixteen new judgeships as well as a number of justices of
the peace, by passing the Judiciary Act of 1801 (sometimes called the
Midnight Judges Act)' 52 These judgeships and other reforms in the statute,
145. BRANT, supra note 97, at 45.
146. CURRIE, supra note 92, at 280-81; MELTON, supra note 92, at 232; VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 86-87.
147. Compare MELTON, supra note 92, at 231-32, with BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 36.
Congressional record-keeping then was much more haphazard than it is now.
148. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 36; see also MELTON, supra note 92, at 231-32.
149. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 88.
150. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 16; MELTON, supra note 92, at 232.
151. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT: THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 243 (1999).
152. BRANT, supra note 97, at 47; NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE
LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 248 (1987); ELLIS, supra note 140, at 32; ROBERT M. JOHNSTONE,
JR., JEFFERSON AND THE PRESIDENCY: LEADERSHIP IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 171-72 (1978); 4
DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 113 (1970); VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note
82, at 91.
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such as the elimination of circuit-riding by Supreme Court Justices, were
needed, but the Federalists' dominant purpose was to appoint as many of
their own people to the bench as possible before the Jefferson
Administration took office.153 This was a court-packing plan packaged as a
reform to enhance judicial efficiency, a tactic that Franklin Roosevelt tried
unsuccessfully in 1937. The statute was also intended to deprive Jefferson
of a Supreme Court appointment; it reduced the Court from six Justices to
five, effective with the next vacancy.154
In his last hours in office, by candlelight on the night before Jefferson
took the presidential oath, Adams signed commissions appointing
Federalists to the positions created by the Judiciary Act of 1801."
Madison, Jefferson's new Secretary of State, refused. to turn over these
commissions to the appointees,"' setting in motion the train of events that
led to Marbury v. Madison.57 Even without these appointments, the
Federalists had a solid grip on the judiciary, occupying virtually every
federal judgeship, although they had lost the two elected branches."'
The Federalists used their grip in partisan ways. While acting as trial
judges when riding circuit, Justices William Patterson and James Iredell of
the Supreme Court "made partisan statements from the bench" in trials of
members of Jefferson's party under the Sedition Act,"9 doubtless for the
purpose of inflaming juries. Although every Justice on the Supreme Court
was a Federalist, Samuel Chase, in particular, was "intensely partisan. ' ' 6
He was so partisan, in fact, that the Supreme Court's August 1800 term had
to be postponed because Chase was out of town campaigning for the
reelection of Adams as president.' The Sedition Act expired in 1801,'62
but "nearly all the men who had ruthlessly enforced [it] were still on the
153. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 15; JOHNSTONE, supra note
152; 4 MALONE, supra note 152.
154. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152; 4 MALONE, supra note 152.
155. BRANT, supra note 97, at 47; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 113-14; VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 91.
156. BRANT, supra note 97, at 47.
157. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
158. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 114.
159. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 3 1, at 190.
160. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 10.
161. William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85
NW. U. L. REv. 903, 905 (1991).
162. MELTON, supra note 92, at 237.
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bench."' 63 Jefferson and his party felt under attack from "an antagonistic
and politically active judiciary,"' 64 and they counter-attacked.
Just as the Federalists had used impeachment as a partisan political
weapon, so, too, would Jefferson's party-but this time to dislodge
Federalists from the judicial branch. John Randolph,16 a leader among
Jefferson's party in the House of Representatives, initially "popularized the
idea that the lower house could define impeachable offenses as it
wished"167-a concept later pushed aggressively by Gerald Ford, Bob
Barr,16 and Tom DeLay. When trying to get William 0. Douglas
impeached in 1970, Ford, then House Minority Leader, claimed that "an
impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of
Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction
results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body [the
Senate] considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the
accused from office."' 69  During the Clinton impeachment, DeLay, the
House Majority whip, took the same position: that a high crime or
misdemeanor is "whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers it to be at a given moment in history.,
170
There was ambivalence in Jefferson's party about using impeachment
against the judiciary,1 7' but by 1804, Jefferson had become "the nominal
leader of the most sweeping impeachment movement in American
history. 17'  According to Dumas Malone, the most prominent of
Jefferson's biographers:
[p]olitical enemies of Jefferson in his lifetime and numerous
later writers contended that he planned a 'campaign' against the
judiciary from the very start, but that as a cautious politician, he
put this into effect only step by step lest he jeopardize the
163. BRANT, supra note 97, at 58.
164. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 25; accord 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 114.
165. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 44-45.
166. John Randolph is not to be confused with Edmund Randolph, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, and Attorney General and Secretary of State in George Washington's
Administration. Edmund Randolph was widely respected for, among other things, his
nonpartisanship.
167. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 189.
168. Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore Scandals and the
Question ofImpeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 9-20 (1997).
169. 116 CONG. REC. 11913-14 (1970); VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 59.
See infra text accompanying notes 823-846.
170. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 9.
171. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 206.
172. Id. at 182.
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popularity of his party. It seems more likely that he took one
step without being sure of or necessarily committed to the next
173
one.
Ten days after taking office as president, Jefferson said of the
Federalists, "The principal of them have retreated into the judiciary as a
stronghold, the tenure of which makes it difficult to dislodge them." But he
did nothing in particular to plan a strategy of impeachment, leaving that to
members of his party in Congress. 174 One of them, Congressmen (later
Senator) William Branch Giles, wanted to abolish the entire judicial branch
and create a new one, without any judges belonging to the Federalist Party.
Jefferson, according to Malone, "never advocated that degree of
demolition.'1
75
John Pickering was a Federalist and a district court judge in New
Hampshire.176 He had written New Hampshire's state constitution in
1784.'" But even before Jefferson was elected president, Pickering had
become undeniably incompetent due to drunkenness and insanity 78 and
"was making a daily spectacle of himself on the bench.' ' 79 The Federalists
themselves had actually managed to remove him from the courthouse
temporarily. Using a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1801,' 8 the circuit
court had delegated a circuit judge to substitute for Pickering on the ground
that he was incapacitated. But when the Jeffersonians repealed the Act,
they "inadvertently forced Pickering to resume his position. ' 8' The last
straw was a case in which the owner of a ship seized by the government
sued for its return, which Pickering ordered. "When the district attorney
reminded him that he had heard no witnesses for the Government,
Pickering jeeringly replied: 'You may bring forty thousand and they will
173. 4 MALONE supra note 152, at 115-16.
174. Id. at 116.
175. Id.; see also id. at 472.
176. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 180; MELTON, supra note 92, at 238.
177. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 69.
178. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 180; VAN TASSEL & F1NKELMAN, supra note 82, at 91.
In 1794, when he was Chief Justice of the New Hampshire State Supreme Court, he had nearly
been removed from office by the state legislature for similar reasons. HOFFER & HULL, supra
note 31, at 207.
179. BRANT, supra note 97, at 48.
180. A modem replica of the statute can be found at 28 U.S.C. § 372.
181. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 70.
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not alter the decree..".2 In 1804, the House impeached him, and the Senate
convicted.
18 3
It was a strange impeachment, and some basic ingredients of a trial
were missing. Pickering did not attend the proceedings, and nobody
appeared to represent him.84 Federalist Senators conducted his defense.1
8
1
When Pickering was served with Senate subpoenas, he "demanded 'trial by
battle' and challenged Jefferson to a duel."' 86 Pickering's son submitted a
petition arguing that his father was "insane, his mind wholly deranged,"
and thus "incapable of corruption of judgment, not subject to
impeachment, ... and his disorder has baffled all medical aid."',,,
Pickering should have been removed from the bench. But he also fit
conveniently within the agenda of the Jeffersonian party. When Jefferson
became president in 1801, "the national judiciary, one hundred per cent
Federalist, amounted to an arm of that party."' 88 If removing Federalists
was the goal, Pickering seemed a good place to start because it was
impossible to defend him. 89 There were only about two dozen federal
judges at the time,19' and none of them was truly obscure.
In the House and Senate, the Federalists, now a minority, fought back
bitterly.' 9' The House voted to impeach by forty-five to eight, and all of the
nay votes were Federalists.'9 The Senate convicted nineteen to seven on a
straight party-line vote and then voted twenty to six to remove Pickering. 93
182. CLAUDE G. BOWERS, JEFFERSON IN POWER: THE DEATH STRUGGLE OF THE
FEDERALISTS 270 (1936); ELLIS, supra note 140, at 70.
183. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829,
at 23-31 (2001); IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 96, at 129-3 1; VAN TASSEL
& FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 93-94.
184. BRANT, supra note 97, at 49; accord ELLIS, supra note 140, at 72; MELTON, supra note
92, at 238.
185. BRANT, supra note 97, at 49.
186. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 212.
187. BRANT, supra note 97, at 49; CURRIE, supra note 183, at 25; HOFFER & HULL, supra
note 31, at 214; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 95-96.
188. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 458; accord VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82,
at 91.
189. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 44-45; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 91.
190. Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial
Service-and Disservice-] 789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 370 (1993).
191. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 270-71; BRANT, supra note 97, at 49-57; CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 152, at 273; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 208-19.
192. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 45.
193. BRANT, supra note 97, at 56; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 52; JOHNSTONE, supra note
141, at 182; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 91. On the motion to convict, all the
yeas were from Jefferson's party, and all the nays were cast by Federalists, but on the subsequent
motion to remove Pickering from office, one Federalist switched and voted yea. VAN TASSEL &
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What should have been nonpartisan and a sad duty was instead a vitriolic
pitched battle-not because of anything peculiar to Pickering, but because
of what the political parties had to gain or lose on the outcome. Jefferson
"rewarded three of the principal prosecution witnesses with lucrative
posts," and appointed the local federal prosecutor-the one who initially
alerted Jefferson about Pickering-to Pickering's judgeship.'94 Pickering
was merely a trial court judge, but both parties saw him as first blood in a
campaign to oust Federalists from the judiciary. Hoffer and Hull call
Pickering's impeachment a "dress rehearsal" for the impeachment of
Federalist Supreme Court Justice Chase. 95 In fact, in the same month
Pickering was convicted (December 1804), Chase was impeached by the
House.1
96
B. The Chase Impeachment, Its Context, and Its Aftermath
By December 1804, the Jeffersonians had held the elected branches
for almost four years. Why did they wait so long before convicting
Pickering and impeaching Chase? There are two reasons. The simpler one
is that for the first two years it would not have been possible to get a
conviction in the Senate. After the elections of 1800, the Jeffersonians
lacked the two-thirds majority needed to convict if the voting followed
party lines. After the elections of 1802, however, the Senate could much
more easily support a conviction, with twenty-five Jeffersonians and only
nine Federalists (73.5%). In fact, from March 1803, when the Congress
elected in 1802 was sworn in, until the end of Jefferson's Presidency, his
party's strength in Congress was overwhelming.
1 97
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 92. Seven Senators (five of them Jeffersonians) attended the trial
but declined to vote, perhaps uncomfortable convicting a person in an accusatory procedure for
acts that seemed to be caused by insanity. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 74; JOHNSTONE, supra note
152, at 181-82.
194. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 75; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 182.
195. HOFFER& HULL, supra note 31, at 206; accord BOWERS, supra note 182.
196. MELTON, supra note 81, at 240; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 101.
Chase and Jefferson had been two of the three members of the committee that drafted the
Northwest Ordinance. CALEB PERRY PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 162 (1953).
197. See infra tbl. 1.
Table 1
Congressional Party Divisions After
the Elections of1798 Through 1808
1798 1800 1802 1804 1806 1808
Senate9"
Jeffersonians 10 17 25 27 28 27
Federalists 22 15 9 7 6 7
Vacant 2
House' 9
Jeffersonians 46 68 103 114 116 92
Federalists 60 38 39 28 26 50
Vacant 1
The more complex reason is that the Jeffersonians, like the
Federalists, were divided into extremists and moderates, and as long as the
judiciary did not interfere with Jefferson's goals, he was himself
instinctively a moderate. 2°° And the Supreme Court had not interfered. A
good illustration would be the companion cases of Stuart v. Laird°' and
Marbury. Decided six days apart, Stuart and Marbury together constitute
the Supreme Court's reaction to the Jeffersonians' treatment of the
Judiciary Act of 1801. The Court held in Stuart that Congress could
constitutionally repeal the Act and thus abolish the judgeships the Act
created and terminate the appointments of the judges involved (all
Federalists), despite the Constitution's guarantee 20 2 of lifetime tenure for
federal judges. Although in Marbury, the Court postulated in dicta that as
long as the Act was in effect, the executive branch was required to deliver
the paperwork needed by nominated and confirmed judges so they could
198. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one item and teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2007) [hereinafter Senate Party
Divisions].
199. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present),
http://clerk.house.gov/art-history/house-history/partyDiv.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007)
[hereinafter House Party Divisions].
200. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 19-35, 83-95. Hamilton, Marshall, and Adams all agreed with
this assessment. Id. at 26-27. "[A]lmost all key appointments on the federal level during
Jefferson's administrations went to people who were aligned with the moderates ... , while the
radicals were generally proscribed." Id. at 234. "None of the judges that Jefferson appointed to
the Supreme Court did anything to weaken the independence or influence of the national
judiciary or to espouse a radical brand of Jeffersonianism." Id. at 241.
201. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 308 (1803).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 1.
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assume their offices, and that a Cabinet officer such as the Secretary of
State could be compelled by mandamus to do so, the Court refused to grant
a writ of mandamus because the statute providing the Court with original
(as opposed to appellate) jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The Supreme
Court thus surrendered to the Jeffersonians on the point of the lawsuit, even
if Marshall used the occasion to enunciate judicial power to mandamus
Cabinet officers and to nullify congressional statutes inconsistent with the
Constitution. This was "exceptionally adroit" on Marshall's part, "leaving
no target for [Jeffersonian] retaliation beyond frustrated rhetoric."20 3
Jefferson was outraged. On the day Marbury was decided, he wrote
that the Federalists "have retired into the Judiciary as a stronghold... and
from that battery, all the works of' his party "are to be beaten down and
erased."2°" To some extent, this was an exaggeration. Unlike the Supreme
Court of the 1930s, which struck down New Deal legislation vitally
important to the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 25 the Court had
not in Marbury held unconstitutional a statute enacted by a Jeffersonian-
dominated Congress. The statute struck down in Marbury was an obscure
provision of the original Judiciary Act of 1789.206 And in earlier decisions,
the Supreme Court2 7 and Justices of the Supreme Court, sitting as circuit
judges,20" had assumed they could hold federal statutes unconstitutional. In
Marbury, Marshall only enunciated that power more clearly and supported
it with extensive arguments. There is some historical evidence that what so
angered Jefferson and his party was not the assertion of a power of judicial
review of legislation for constitutionality, but instead Marshall's assertion,
in dicta, that if the Court had actually had jurisdiction, it would have had
the power to order a Cabinet officer, through mandamus, to take action the
Court considered legally required.209 That might seem today to be the
reaction of politicians who think of themselves as imperial and beyond
objective constraints such as those embodied in law. But the Federalist
judiciary had so abused its power under the Sedition Act that the
mandamus discussion in Marbury could have been perceived as laying a
foundation for future abuses. Marbury was thus seen by Jefferson and his
203. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION 77 (1988).
204. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 44.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 556-570.
206. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73.
207. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
208. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
209. See ELLIS, supra note 140, at 65-66; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1789-1835, at 232, 244, 248 (2d ed. 1926).
allies, and could still be seen today, as "one of the most flagrant specimens
of judicial activism.210
Against this background, Pickering was impeached and convicted
because the radical and moderate Jeffersonians came to agreement,
although based on different reasoning. On ideological grounds, the
radicals were willing to impeach any Federalist judge whose conduct was
egregious enough to make a conviction feasible. The moderates, on the
other hand, could not imagine leaving a judge as incompetent as Pickering
on the bench; they might have felt the same way even if he had been a
Jeffersonian. Why, then, were the radicals able to get Chase impeached?
Of the first three impeachment defendants, Blount, Pickering, and
Chase, "Chase was clearly the most partisan., 21' He lectured jurors on why
Jefferson and his party were evil. He helped arrange an indictment under
the Sedition Act and then made out-of-court statements that the defendant
should be convicted, after which he presided over the defendant's trial .
Although he signed the Declaration of Independence and was second only
to John Marshall as an intellectual leader of the Supreme Court, Chase
was a generally abusive judge as well. "Essentially a bully, he loved
nothing better than insulting witnesses and lawyers with sarcasm, knowing
they dare not reply in kind.
2 14
He acted as though virtually everyone brought before him on a
criminal charge was guilty. He did not truly accept the
adversarial process in criminal trials [and] was impatient with
defense counsel not just because they represented radicals and
democrats, but because he had not [really accepted] the idea of
defense counsel conducting the defendants' cases.215
Because Chase's "turbulent disposition made him an ally who often proved
more of a liability than an asset," Washington nominated him for a
Supreme Court vacancy only when he could not get others to take the
job-the Supreme Court had very little prestige in the 1790s-and the
Senate "reluctantly confirmed his appointment., 216  Eventually, Chase
became "the most hated member of the Federal judiciary.2 17  Oddly
210. LEVY, supra note 203, at 75.
211. MELTON, supra note 92, at 240.
212. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 228-32.
213. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 76; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 464.
214. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 273.
215. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 232.
216. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 76-77.
217. Id. at 79.
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enough, Chase had opposed adoption of the Constitution while a member
of the Maryland Convention called to consider whether to ratify it.218
Chase was accused of misconduct not in the Supreme Court, but
instead while riding circuit and presiding as a trial judge (at the time, a
significant part of a Supreme Court Justice's work).2"9 The articles of
impeachment alleged that in one case he tried to persuade a jury to convict
and refused to allow defense counsel to argue the law. The articles alleged
that in another case, he refused to excuse a juror who admitted prejudging
the defendant guilty; excluded evidence illegally; harassed defense
counsel; and otherwise acted improperly. In a third case, the articles
alleged that he pressured a grand jury to indict and, when they did not,
pressured a district attorney to prosecute anyway. In a fourth case, the
articles alleged that he made a partisan political speech from the bench to a
grand jury,22° The last was the immediate provocation for the
impeachment."' Chase had lectured the grand jurors that, among other
things, allowing all white males to vote was "mobocracy"; that the
Jefferson Administration held "unfairly acquired power"; and that it was
evil to repeal the Judiciary Act of 180 1.222
On five of the eight articles of impeachment, a Senate majority voted
to acquit.2 3  On the remaining three, only a simple majority voted to
convict, not the two-thirds constitutionally required224-"thanks in part to a
few" from Jefferson's party "who consistently sided with the Federalists.
Chase thus escaped... , but the episode had a sobering effect on him, and
218. LEVY, supra note 203, at 65.
219. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 102. "At this time, and for many years
thereafter, the justices of the Supreme Court... performed two separate roles. For a small part of
the year, they were appellate judges sitting together in [the national capital]. But for the rest of
the year they were circuit justices assigned to" one or another region of the country. WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 21 (1992).
220. 1 TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, IMPEACHED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 5-9 (1970) (1805) [hereinafter
TRIAL OF CHASE]; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 60-61; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 77-80; HOFFER
& HULL, supra note 31, at 236-37; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 103-07.
221. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 79-80; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 183.
222. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 79-80; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 183.
223. 2 TRIAL OF CHASE, supra note 220, at 485-93; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 84-85; VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 102.
224. 2 TRIAL OF CHASE, supra note 220, at 485-93; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 85; VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 102.
he was never the same man afterwards. '25 All of the Federalist Senators
voted not guilty on every impeachment article."' On each article, at least
six members of Jefferson's party-and often more-voted to acquit.
27
The House managers were furious at the result. Senator John Quincy
Adams (John Adams' son and a future president) wrote that he "had some
conversation.., with Mr. Madison, who appeared much diverted at the
petulance of the managers on their disappointment., 2 ' Back in the House,
John Randolph introduced an amendment to the Constitution that would
provide for removal of judges by a simple majority in each House of
Congress; another manager introduced a Constitutional amendment that
would permit a state legislature to recall and replace a Senator.2 29 But this
was venting and came to nothing.3°
What caused the defections in the Senate is not clear. Most scholars
ascribe at least part of it to senatorial resentment at the conduct of the
House managers--especially Randolph-both during the impeachment
trial, and in another controversy involving land in Georgia and unrelated to
Chase.Hl Randolph had bragged that this was to be his impeachment to
accomplish, 32 and his "invective, his dramatic but often irrelevant
harangues, 233 unsettled the Jeffersonian moderates in the Senate. Other
causes might have been sympathy for an "old and feeble" revolutionary,
however obnoxious he might have been;"4 uncertainty about whether what
Chase had done was really illegal at the time;2" and ambivalence by
Jefferson and his party as they became comfortable in power and came to
225. MELTON, supra note 92, at 241. "Chase... never again dashed off a vitriolic political
charge for a grand jury or used a courtroom as a forum for his politics." HOFFER & HULL, supra
note 31, at 254; accord BOWERS, supra note 182, at 292; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 105.
226. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 85; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 101.
227. BRANT, supra note 97, at 82; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 85-86,
228. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 86.
229. Id; EDWARD CHANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN SYSTEM, 1801-1811, at 122 (1906);
ELLIS, supra note 140, at 106-07; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 254. Until the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, Senators were elected by state legislatures, rather than by the people
directly. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
230. CHANNTNG, supra note 229; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 254.
231. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 291; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 87; ELLIS, supra note
140, at 83-95, 103-04; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 254; Michael J. Gerhardt, Chancellor
Kent and the Search for the Elements of Impeachable Offenses, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 91, 105
(1998). The Senate verdict "wreck[ed] the political future of John Randolph," the most visible of
the House managers. CHANNING, supra note 229.
232. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 106; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 186.
233. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 186.
234. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 291.
235. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 102.
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experience judicial opposition more as a receding nuisance than a threat,
due to the judicial self-restraint (compared to the late 1 790s) superintended
by Marshall.236 Perhaps most importantly, Jefferson took no public position
on whether Chase should be impeached or convicted, and he did nothing to
persuade Senators to vote one way or the other.237
Irving Brant concluded that "Chase had made himself unfit for his
,,238Bposition, and Raoul Berger considered Chase to be "an implacably
prejudiced judge" and his acquittal to be "a miscarriage of justice. '239 The
evidence easily supports Berger's opinion. If a modem judge were to
behave as Chase did, it would cause a bipartisan uproar. However, the
historical evidence also supports a contrary opinion. Our sensibilities
today are more refined than those of Chase's contemporaries and measured
against his contemporaries, he was a severely flawed but not incompetent
judge. Remembering that, as a tribunal, the Senate was hostile to Chase to
begin with, one is tempted to conclude that the acquittal had little to do
with the merits of the case against him. The Jeffersonian party was using
impeachment as a partisan political weapon, and the real issues in Chase's
trial were not limited to his conduct. Aside from the power struggle
between two political parties and the dispute about whether a party
victorious at the polls could reach into the judiciary through impeachment
and threaten judicial independence, perhaps the most important (and least
understood) issue was whether people were tired of hyper-partisanship and
wanted politics to operate in a more civilized way.24°  Even within
Jefferson's party, there was some fear that overreaching might lead to
defeat at the polls, 41 and that if the Federalists ever regained Congress, they
would again use impeachment as a partisan political weapon unless some
limits were observed in the meantime.242
Afterward, Jefferson grumbled that "impeachment is not even a
scarecrow. ' 243 But despite Chase's acquittal, Jefferson had won at least
part of his point-not as much as he wanted, but probably as much as he
needed.
236. Id. at 102-03.
237. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 274; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 104; JOHNSTONE,
supra note 152, at 183-84.
238. BRANT, supra note 97, at 59.
239. BERGER, supra note 31, at 224.
240. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 260.
241. Id. at 254.
242. Id. at 262.
243. 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 256 (H.A. Washington ed., 1859); 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 170 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
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Jefferson had challenged [the Federalist judicial] arrogance and
humbled it. Chase's lawyers had pleaded for mercy. Marshall,
appearing for the defense, had seemed frightened. Not until the
impeachment of Chase had Federalist politicians conceded
openly that prostitution of the judiciary to the purposes of party
was even questionable .... But when Jefferson challenged these
practices in the impeachment of Chase, the defense had been
forced to admit their impropriety .... [and the result lifted the
judiciary] above the hog wallow of politics to the decent dignity
it has since maintained.244
When Chief Justice John Marshall testified, his answers showed "a desire
to please the prosecution. 2 45 He had reason to be afraid. If the Senate
convicted Chase, Marshall could have been the next impeacheda.2 4  The
radical Jeffersonians thus got exactly the scene they wanted: a frightened
John Marshall, currying their favor in an attempt to avoid being himself
purged.
History concentrates on federal impeachment. But Hoffer and Hull
collected extensive evidence showing widespread use of impeachment in
state legislatures during Adams and Jefferson's time.147 At the time, the
states were treated as the basic unit of sovereignty, and the federal
government was a novel contraption to hold the states together. For that
reason, state impeachments were at least as immediately significant as the
federal ones. The use of state impeachments as partisan political weapons
was so widespread that "[t]he same characteristics that were coming to
mark major electoral campaigns-hoopla, press coverage, popular rhetoric
preached to the mass of voters-appeared at the trial of [state]
impeachments .... Conviction was rare in such carnival cases because the
objective of proving a charge became less important than the objective of
discrediting an entire party., 248  And, both state legislatures and state
judiciaries were getting worn out from these struggles.249 "No officeholder,
244. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 292.
245. LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAW 434 (1974); accord HOFFER &
HULL, supra note 31, at 260; DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE'S PROGRESS: JOHN MARSHALL
FROM REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME COURT 277-78 (2000). Contra SMITH,
supra note 139, at 344-45.
246. BAKER, supra note 245at 432. Or at least among the next impeached. HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 31, at 190.
247. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 78-95, 146, 164-77, 191-205, 219-27, 256-61;
see also BRANT, supra note 97, at 60.
248. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 261.
249. Id.
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whatever his status, was truly safe from impeachment" when the opposing
party controlled the legislature .
The Pennsylvania legislature's impeachment, conviction, and removal
from office of a state court judge named Alexander Addison in 1803 is
often considered a rehearsal for the Pickering and Chase impeachments.2 1
The same key elements were present: a Federalist judge who used his
office for partisan purposes, a Jeffersonian majority in the legislature, and a
Federalist minority that unanimously defended its judge.252 Moreover, the
Pennsylvania Jeffersonians were, like the party in Congress, split between
radicals and moderates.2 ' And Addison, like Chase, liked to lecture juries
on politics: for example calling protests against the Sedition Act "a
declaration of war against the government of the United States.
254
Although, under Pennsylvania law, a judge could be removed by the
Governor without a trial on demand of both Houses of the legislature (a
procedure called a joint address), the radical Jeffersonians preferred
impeachment because the joint address procedure, though simpler, was not
sufficiently accusatory and did not provide the same opportunities to flail
and embarrass the Federalists. 256 Addison was convicted because even the
moderates thought him incorrigible: after the state supreme court had held
that Addison could not legally prevent judges over whom he presided from
charging grand juries, he did so anyway.257
Another Pennsylvania impeachment started in the spring of 1804,258
about the same time that Pickering's impeachment began in Washington,
and the result in the state senate predicted the verdict in Chase's trial.
Three state supreme court judges-Edward Shippen, Jr., Thomas Smith,
and Jasper Yeats-all Federalists, were impeached for imprisoning a
litigant for thirty days on the ground of contempt, for reasons that were
250. Id. at 262.
251. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 180; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 459.
252. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 459. Federalists cast all the votes to acquit. HOFFER &
HULL, supra note 31, at 204.
253. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 192.
254. Id. at 196-97.
255. Id. at 197. Some other states provided for removal by joint address, as well as by
impeachment. Id. at 197; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 462. The Jeffersonians in Congress liked
to propose it, ELLIS, supra note 140, at 72, although the Federalist minority there was still large
enough to prevent adoption of a constitutional amendment. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 462.
256. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 459.
257. CHANNING, supra note 229, at 113-14; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 164; HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 31, at 196.
258. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 168.
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arguably partisan."' The remaining state supreme court judge, a
Jeffersonian, specifically requested that he too be impeached because,
although not involved in the contempt ruling, he agreed with it.26° That
should have been a signal to the radicals in the legislature that they had
gone too far. The Jeffersonians ignored the hint and through joint address
asked the Governor to remove the Jeffersonian judge, which the Governor
refused to do.26 In January 1805-after Pickering had been convicted and
Chase had been impeached, and just before Chase's trial-the state senateS 262
acquitted the three Federalists. Just as it would happen a few weeks later
in Chase's trial in Washington, a majority, but not the two-thirds needed,
voted to convict. 263  Moderate Jeffersonians defected, and although the
reasons are not clear, the extreme positions taken by the impeachers were a
factor.264
The Chase impeachment trial was presided over by Vice President
Aaron Burr, who at the time was under indictment in two states for themurdr o Alxandr . ... 261
murder of Alexander Hamilton, leading to contemporary jokes about the
judge being tried by the murderer, rather than the other way around.266
Burr, a fugitive in fear of extradition, had not presided over the Senate
since Hamilton's death.267  To induce Burr to return to Washington and
preside favorably, both the extremists and the moderates in Jefferson's
party flattered him with attention. The Jefferson Administration gave
government jobs to Burr's relatives and friends, and Jeffersonian Senators
asked New Jersey to drop the murder indictment. The motives of the
extremists were obvious, but those of the Administration were not.
Channing concluded that Jefferson was trying to increase the odds of
conviction, while Richard Ellis thought the opposite. 69
259. CHANNrNG, supra note 229, at 114; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 165-66; HOFFER & HULL,
supra note 21, at 189, 221; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 474.
260. CHANNING, supra note 229, at 114; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 168; 4 MALONE, supra
note 152, at 474.
261. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 168-69; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 474.
262. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 169-70; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 474.
263. CHANNING, supra note 229, at 114; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 31, at 226; 4 MALONE,
supra note 152, at 474.
264. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 474.
265. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 92; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 103; John
C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1435, 1437 (1999).
266. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 476; Yoo, supra note 265, at 1439.
267. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 278, 366-67; CHANNING, supra note 229, at 123; ELLIS,
supra note 140, at 92.
268. CHANNING, supra note 229, at 123-24; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 92-93, 106.
269. CHANNING, supra note 229, at 123-24; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 92-93.
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No one took any action to impeach Burr. He belonged to Jefferson's
party, which had no intention of impeaching its own vice president.2 70 The
Federalists, with only about a quarter of the seats in each House of
Congress, 271 had no hope of winning anything in either chamber.
Jefferson's party pointedly did not renominate Burr for vice president,
although Burr's murder of Hamilton was not the only reason. The original
constitutional plan for electing presidents and vice presidents called for
electors to cast two votes for president; the candidate with the largest
electoral vote became president, and the runner-up became vice
president.272  This was perhaps the only truly naive provision in the
Constitution, and it was replaced in 1804, through the Twelfth
Amendment, with the system used today. In the first two presidential
elections, 1788 and 1792, political parties did not participate, and
Washington was unanimously elected president and John Adams vice
president. Both were Federalists. The 1796 election produced a president
(Adams) and vice president (Jefferson) of opposing political parties
because presidential and vice presidential candidates did not run together
on tickets.
In 1800, to avoid this kind of result, the parties ran tickets, Jefferson's
party supporting him for president and Burr for vice president. Because
there was no way to vote separately for vice president, every one of
Jefferson's electors voted for both him and Burr for president, producing a
tie and throwing the election into the House of Representatives.273 The
House that decided the election was not the newly elected one, dominated
by Jeffersonians, but instead the lame-duck Federalist House, whose
leaders plotted to stop Jefferson by electing Burr.274 The task of electing a
president after the Electoral College fails to do so no longer falls on a
lame-duck House because the Twentieth Amendment moved the beginning
of presidential terms of office from March 4 to January 20 and the
beginning of congressional terms of office from March 4 to January 3-the
latter in part to prevent a lame-duck House from choosing a president.275
When the House elects a president, voting is tallied by states, each state
having one vote. Although the Federalists had a majority of the
membership of the House, they did not control a majority of state
270. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 103.
271. See STEPHENSON, supra note 151, at 243-44.
272. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
273. 2 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 532-33 (1916); 3 MALONE,
supra note 152, at 492-502; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 231.
274. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 232; 3 MALONE, supra note 273, at 497-504.
275. S. REP. NO. 72-26, at 5 (1932).
delegations in the House.2 76 After thirty-five ballots produced exactly the
same tally-eight states for Jefferson, six for Burr, and two split and not
voting, thus failing to give any candidate a majority-a few of the
Federalists gave up and allowed Jefferson to be elected.277
Two aspects of this fiasco forever poisoned Jefferson's view of Burr.
First, the flaws in the original system of electing presidents required that
when a party ran presidential and vice presidential candidates as a ticket, at
least one of that party's electors had to vote for someone other than the
vice presidential nominee, or a tie would result. Some electors who
planned to do that were dissuaded on assurances from the Burr camp that
other electors would do so.278 The primitive communications of the time
mostly accounted for this lack of coordination, but it also appeared that
Burr was manipulating the situation to his own advantage. Second, once
the election was thrown into the House, Burr did not take himself out of the
contest, even though Jefferson was the party's nominee for president and
the voters who chose Jeffersonian electors thought they were electing
Jefferson.2 79 Had Burr announced that under no circumstances would he
take the presidential oath of office, the Federalist effort to elect him would
have been futile. Burr's refusal to make such an announcement led
Jefferson to conclude that Burr had conspired with the Federalists.
Jefferson never wavered from the belief that a conniving and self-dealing
Burr had almost succeeded in helping the Federalists steal an election from
him. We have no way of knowing whether Burr actually did what
Jefferson thought he did,2'8 though Burr's later behavior as vice president
seemed consistent with Jefferson's interpretation of the election fiasco. "It
was common knowledge in Washington that Burr was trying to build a
following loyal to him alone, and his rulings from the chair favorable to the
defense in the Pickering trial gave further evidence of his lack of scruples
in making overtures to the enemy for support."281
The Chase trial ended three days before Burr's term of office
expired.i Immediately afterward, Burr absconded into the frontier
276. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 232; 3 MALONE, supra note 273, at 502.
277. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 235-37; JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE
CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175 (1997); 3 MALONE, supra note 273, at 504; ROBARGE,
supra note 245, at 232.
278. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 231.
279. Id. at 232-33; J. ELLIS, supra note 277; 3 MALONE, supra note 273, at 498.
280. 3 MALONE, supra note 273, at 498.
281. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 190; accord ELLIS, supra note 140, at 47-48.
282. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 458.
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territories, apparently on a scheme not unlike Blount's. 283  Burr's
conspiracy was particularly far-fetched. He tried to induce the then
westernmost states and territories to secede from the Union and then invade
Mexico. 284 Burr intended to take most of what Jefferson had just acquired
for the United States in the Louisiana Purchase.285 When he was caught by
federal marshals two years later, he was taken to Richmond and tried in a
courtroom presided over by Chief Justice John Marshall, who was riding
circuit.i Burr was acquitted of treason in "one of the most spectacular
trials in American history. 287 Marshall both judged the admissibility of
evidence and instructed the jury according to a controversial definition of
treason "that essentially forced the jury to acquit Burr.' '28  The jury
foreman-who was Marshall's brother-in-law-announced the verdict
thus: "Burr is not proved guilty under this indictment by any evidence
submitted to us. We therefore find him not guilty." 289 Burr and his lawyers
angrily protested the form of the verdict and demanded that in the record it
be reduced to "Not guilty."2'9 Then a member of the jury said:
he would produce the same verdict if called upon to decide a
second time. He said that every member of the jury knew that
the verdict was not phrased in the usual form but that they had
all wanted it that way. ... And so the original Burr verdict
entered the record: an announcement by the jury that, in effect, it
considered him a guilty man but was unable to pronounce him so
because the rulings by the Chief Justice.2 91
Actually, there were two trials. In the second, which immediately
followed the treason proceeding, Burr was acquitted of the crime of waging
war against a friendly nation, Spain, which still claimed territories
bordering the United States.292 As in Marbury v. Madison, Marshall's goal
283. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1439-41.
284. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 286-88; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 191.
285. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 290.
286. BAKER, supra note 245, at 448-518; 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 274-545 (1919);
ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 280-82; SMITH, supra note 139, at 348-74; FRANCIS N. STITES,
JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION 97-109 (1981). After the acquittal, "Burr
retired to a life of exile and dissipation." STITES, supra, at 108.
287. STITES, supra note 286, at 97; accord Yoo, supra note 265, at 1439.
288. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 281; accord CHANNtNG, supra note 229, at 167;
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 293-94.
289. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 422 (emphasis added); BAKER, supra note 245, at 514;
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 294; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 281.
290. BAKER, supra note 245, at 515; BOWERS, supra note 182, at 422-23.
291. BAKER, supra note 245, at 515.
292. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1446.
in both trials was to craft rulings that advanced judicial power without
provoking impeachments or constitutional amendments that would humble
the judiciary, while. Jefferson tried to defeat what he perceived to be the
partisanship of Federalists, like Marshall, secure in the judicial branch.
The result set precedents that influenced the near-impeachment of Richard
Nixon as well as the impeachment and trial of Bill Clinton.
This was "the last major episode in the conflict between the executive
and judicial branches during Jefferson's presidency"293-the earlier battles
having included the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801,294 the Marbury
litigation, and the Chase impeachment. In both Houses of Congress, a
party-line vote brough about the repeal of the 1801 Judiciary Act.295
Immediately afterward, the Jeffersonian Congress restructured the Supreme
Court's schedule, delaying the Court's next session for fourteen months so
that the Court would not have an opportunity to declare the repeal
unconstitutional until after it had taken effect.2'9 In the end, the Court held
the repeal to be constitutional in a decision dated six days after Marbury.2
As Marbury itself was being litigated, the Federalists panicked, fearing that
"all members of the [Supreme] Court would be impeached., 29 The Court's
decision to adjudicate Marbury-the rough equivalent of today's granting
of a writ of certiorari-infuriated the Jeffersonians and hastened the repeal
of the Judiciary Act of 1801 .299  Before the Court decided the case,
Jefferson "had determined to ignore a writ of mandamus should one be
issued," and afterward he "took great pains ... to deny that Marshall's
dictum had any force in law. It stood in his mind as a bald assertion of
illegal power by an arrogant judge. . . ."'w It must have been obvious to
Marshall that "[i]f he were to issue a mandamus, he would have no way to
enforce it, and it would be ignored by the executive branch. 3..
Jefferson desperately wanted his former vice president convicted, and
was convinced that the Federalists, through Marshall, were contriving to
293. 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 309.
294. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 172.
295. Id. at 175.
296. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 59; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 175; 4 MALONE, supra
note 152, at 145.
297. Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 299, 308 (1803); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 153 (1803).
298. BRANT, supra note 97, at 47.
299. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 44; JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 172-75.
300. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 179.
301. 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at 148.
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acquit Burr to embarrass the Administration.3°2 "In fact, the President
appears to have hoped to use any acquittal of Burr as grounds to either
impeach Marshall or to introduce a constitutional amendment to allow the
President and Congress to remove federal judges., 303  Jefferson also
considered the Burr trial to be part of a personal struggle between himself
and Marshall. 3' "It is difficult to overstate the personal animus that
Jefferson and Marshall appeared to hold for one another .... "'0'
We will probably never know what caused their mutual animosity.
Marshall fought in Washington's army during the Revolution and shared in
its privations at Valley Forge and elsewhere, while Jefferson stayed home.
Beveridge, one of Marshall's biographers, believed that Marshall's
antipathy for Jefferson began then.3°6  But no evidence supports that. °
Another theory has it that Jefferson disliked Marshall because Marshall
married the daughter of a woman Jefferson had once courted. But this
theory, too, lacks evidence.i During the 1800 election, Marshall wrote
that Jefferson's "foreign prejudices" in favor of everything French, for
example, "seem to me totally to unfit him" for the Presidency.3°9 After
Jefferson and Burr tied in the electoral college, Marshall, unlike other
Federalists, declined to take sides between Jefferson and Burr.30 Although
Marshall wrote in a private letter that he considered Burr to be a "still
greater danger than even ... Mr. Jefferson," he added that "I cannot bring
myself to aid Mr. Jefferson., 311 When the election of 1800 was thrown into
the House and stalemated there, a rumor circulated that Marshall had
written an opinion to the effect that the Chief Justice (himself) should
succeed to the Presidency if the stalemate were to continue.3 2 Although
the effect of this rumor on Jefferson hardly needs to be imagined, Jefferson
and Marshall already had low opinions of each other before 1800.
302. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 385 (1919); SMITH, supra note 139, at 360; Yoo,
supra note 265, at 1441-42. "[T]he chief reason for Federalist attachment to Burr, despite the
fact that he killed Hamilton, was antipathy to Jefferson." 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 302.
303. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1441-42.
304. BAKER, supra note 245, at 477; SMITH, supra note 139, at 365; Yoo, supra note 265, at
1442.
305. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1442.
306. 1 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 126, 145.
307. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 46 n.27; SMITH, supra note 139, at 63-64, 549 n.197.
308. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 160-6 1.
309. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 537.
310. Id. at 537-41; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 231.
311. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 538; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 231.
312. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 541-43; 3 MALONE, supra note 152, at 496; ROBARGE,
supra note 245, at 231-32.
The most likely explanation is that Marshall and Jefferson became
political adversaries because of their differing political beliefs when parties
formed in the 1790s, and that the conflicts during Jefferson's Presidency
caused mutual suspicion to deepen into something close to hatred.1 3 As
president and chief justice, they were, after all, the highest government
officials of antagonistic political parties, during a period in which politics
was intensely personal and people assumed the worst character in their
opponents. "The relatively small and closed political communities of
Washington and Virginia did not keep personal secrets well, so Marshall
and Jefferson certainly knew what one thought of the other. 3 14 The steady
reporting of each insult to the insulted may have deepened the feeling of
grievance on both sides. If their personal rivalry predated the 1790s, it
might have come, at least in part, from over twenty years of lawsuits that
grew out of a 1773 inheritance in which Jefferson had an interest and
Marshall represented various parties, to Jefferson's dissatisfaction.315
Jefferson and Marshall were in fact cousins.t 6
Both Marshall and Jefferson behaved in surprising ways during this
confrontation. For example, Marshall taunted Jefferson by dining with
Burr and his lead defense lawyer at the latter's home immediately after
releasing Burr on bail.317  Today, that would require a judge to recuse
himself under the federal judicial conflict-of-interest statute.318 Even in the
context of his era, Marshall was remarkably casual about judicial
proprieties. By modern standards, Marshall would have been required to
recuse himself from adjudicating Marbury v. Madison. Marshall was
Adams's last Secretary of State. 3t 9 "Until nine o'clock of the night before
Jefferson's inauguration, Adams continued to nominate officers, including
judges, and the Senate to confirm them. Marshall, as Secretary of State,
signed and sealed the commissions. 3 20  Under the modern conflict-of-
313. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 160-61, 278-79.
314. Id. at279.
315. 1 MALONE, supra note 152, at 441-45; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 162.
316. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 176; PATTERSON, supra note 196, at 25, 123; ROBARGE,
supra note 245, at 160.
317. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 206; 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 302; ROBARGE,
supra note 245, at 281; Yoo, supra note 265, at 1444.
318. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2007) ("Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.").
319. BAKER, supra note 245, at 331-60; 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 485-564; JAMES F.
SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND THE EPic
STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 102-03 (2002); SMITH, supra note 139, at 268-81.
320. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 560; accord CHANNING, supra note 229, at 117;
ELLIS, supra note 140, at 32.
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interest statute, Marshall would be disqualified not only because of the
appearance of partiality, 32' but also because, in the words of the modem
statute, he "served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case in controversy. '322
In fact, when Marshall signed the commissions, he was both Secretary
of State and Chief Justice. The Senate confirmed his nomination for Chief
Justice on January 27, 1801.323 On February 4, Marshall received his own
commission for that position, and on the same day he took the Supreme
Court bench and presided.2  Nonetheless, Adams asked Marshall to
continue to serve as Secretary of State until the end of the Adams
Administration, a month later. 5 (The same thing had happened once
before. John Jay was both Secretary of State and Chief Justice for six
months during the Washington Administration.) 326 After working-as
Secretary of State-into the evening of March 3, 1801, to pack the
judiciary with Federalists, Marshall-as Chief Justice-administered the
oath of office to Jefferson at noon the next day.327 Adams had "taken the
four o'clock stage out of town that morning. 328
These were the "midnight judgeships" at issue in Marbury. When
James Madison, Jefferson's Secretary of State, assumed office the
following day, he found on his desk-which had been Marshall's desk
until midnight the evening before-four undelivered commissions for
Federalists nominated and confirmed by the Senate as justices of the peace
in the District of Columbia. Madison refused to turn them over to their
intended recipients, and they sued to get the commissions that would have
allowed them to take office.329
321. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
322. Id. § 455(b)(3).
323. BAKER, supra note 245, at 354; ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 234.
324. BAKER, supra note 245, at 355.
325. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 558-59.
326. Id at 559.
327. BAKER, supra note 245, at 359-60; 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 562;
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 239; ELLIS, supra note 277, at 174; SIMON, supra note 319, at
137, 173-75.
328. ELLIS, supra note 277, at 170; accord BAKER, supra note 245, at 359. It is not stated
how a stage coach would have been navigated before dawn in an era without electric lights,
although, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the moon had been
full three and a half days earlier, in the afternoon on February 28. See Moon Phases: 1801 to
1900, http://sunearth.gsfc.nasa.gov/eclipse/phase/phases 1801.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
329. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137-38 (1803); CHANNING, supra note 229, at
117; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 39, 43. A justice of the peace was not an Article III judgeship with
Under modem standards, Marshall also should have recused himself
in another landmark case, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,33° which held that
treaties entered into by the federal government supervene state law, and
that state courts must obey the Supreme Court in matters of federal law.
Marshall and his brother owned some of the land at issue in the litigation.33
The case came before the Supreme Court twice. The first time, Marshall
did recuse himself,332 and the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Story, issued an order that the Virginia courts refused to obey. Marshall
then wrote a petition for a writ of error-similar to, but not the same as the
modem petition for certiorari-to get the case back into the Supreme
Court. The modem federal judicial conflict-of-interest statute requires a
judge to recuse himself where "he served as a lawyer in the matter in
controversy, 333 or where he, or a person within a scope of relationships that
includes brothers, has "an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding. ' ,33 In the second appeal, Story again wrote
the Court's opinion. Marshall not only participated in the Court's decision,
but he wrote a memorandum on which Story relied.335
Compared to Marshall's participation in the adjudication of Marbury
and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Abe Fortas's offenses336 were but a trifle.
On the one hand, Fortas resigned from the Supreme Court after being
threatened with impeachment for creating an appearance of impropriety,
even though there was no evidence that any of his judicial decisions had
been improperly influenced. Marshall, on the other, sat in judgment on the
legality of his own actions as Secretary of State. In Marbury, he refers to
himself in the third person: "Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was
signed by the President, and sealed by the secretary of state, was
appointed . . . .,37 That he was not impeached-though the radicals in
Jefferson's party, and perhaps Jefferson, too, would have been delighted to
lifetime tenure. When the Supreme Court finally decided the case, Marbury's five-year term of
office was nearly half over. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 154, 162; 4 MALONE, supra note 152, at
145. The Federalists had created thirty justices of the peace for the District of Columbia, id., at a
time when Washington and Georgetown were villages, ELLIS, supra note 277, at 171-73, which
suggests that these positions were sinecures to reward the party faithful.
330. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
331. SIMON, supra note 319, at 268.
332. Id. at 269.
333. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) (2007).
334. Id. § 455(b)(4), (5)(iii).
335. SIMON, supra note 319, at 270.
336. See infra text accompanying notes 733-739, 766-781.
337. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803) (emphasis added).
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do so-speaks volumes about the casual judicial standards prevailing at
the time.
For his part, Jefferson "lost control of himself for a season. 338 He
sent a steady stream of correspondence to the lead prosecutor, George
Hay,339 "pepper[ing] Hay with instructions,"'3 4° that look like micro-
management, but on closer examination see to reflect obsession. "Stop...
citing Marbury v. Madison as authority," commanded Jefferson; "I have
long wished... to have the gratuitous opinion in that case... denounced
as not law." 34' And, along the way, Jefferson seems to have invented
transactional immunity as American criminal procedure now understands
it-something only a head of state could have contracted for before the
development of judicially enforceable plea bargaining agreements.
On the eve of the trial, Jefferson forwarded to Hay a sheaf of
blank pardons he had signed. Hay was instructed to fill them out
338. CHANNING, supra note 217, at 166.
339. Two decades later, Hay was appointed a U.S. district court judge by John Quincy
Adams, the sixth President and John Adams's son. 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 310. During
the crisis over the 1800 election, when a rumor circulated that Marshall thought himself entitled
to the Presidency, Hay, under a pseudonym, wrote an open letter in protest to Marshall, "which
was copied far and wide" in pro-Jeffersonian newspapers. 2 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 542-
43. "I understand that you, Sir... have given an opinion in exact conformity with the wishes of
your party," wrote Hay, daring Marshall to "come forward and defend it." Id. at 542. Marshall
said nothing. Id. at 543.
Burr's defense team "outnumbered and outweighed" the three prosecutors. 5 MALONE,
supra note 152, at 310. Among Burr's lawyers were Luther Martin, the attorney general of
Maryland who also defended Chase in his impeachment trial, and Edmund Randolph, former
Governor of Virginia, the first Attorney General of the United States, and a Secretary of State in the
Washington Administration. BOWERS, supra note 182, at 275, 279, 286, 403-04; 5 MALONE,
SECOND TERM, supra note 152, at 310; SMITH, supra note 139, at 90, 112. When Jefferson went
into politics in 1774, he turned his law practice over to Randolph, and when Randolph was elected
Governor of Virginia in 1786, he turned it over to Marshall. SMITH, supra note 139, at 90-91.
"Bizarre as it may seem, Jefferson's law practice ultimately became John Marshall's." Id at 91.
340. SMITH, supra note 139, at 361. The letters are published at 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 394-409 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
341. SMITH, supra note 139, at 361. Those few of Jefferson's letters to Hay that were
intended to be read into the record in Marshall's court appear as measured and precise position-
taking by a very intelligent and careful President. The rest-the overwhelming bulk of the
correspondence-are intense venting by a President focused on Burr's trial to the point of
obsession. According to Dumas Malone, Jefferson's leading biographer, "[s]trongly partisan
expressions are rare in Jefferson's public utterances, which were characteristically measured and
restrained. When he used extreme language it was nearly always in a private communication to
someone of whose loyalty to the party or to him personally he had no doubt." 5 MALONE, supra
note 152, at 304. Given Jefferson's historical image and his accomplishments in fields as
disparate as architecture, agronomy, education, and political philosophy, the effect of these letters
on the modem reader is not unlike the effect President Nixon's obscenities and paranoia, captured
on audiotapes, had on his supporters (although, throughout his correspondence with Hay,
Jefferson retains a mind and character many, many times the value of Nixon's).
"at discretion, if [he] should find a defect of evidence, and
believe that this would supply it." This was a carte blanche for
the prosecuting attorney to grant presidential pardons in order to
secure testimony against Burr.342
Jefferson also "took the extraordinary step of interrogating one of the key
witnesses, of striking a plea bargain with him that exchanged a pardon for
testimony, and then of instructing the prosecutor on how to examine him at
trial."343
To aid in his defense, Burr moved34 for an order compelling
production of a letter written to Jefferson by General Wilkinson, as well as
Jefferson's response and other documents. 34 The motion required only the
documents and not Jefferson's personal appearance in court. 46 Although
Jefferson's appearance might have been needed to supply the evidentiary
foundation for the letter's receipt into evidence, Burr did not insist on that,
as long as the papers were delivered and the Government would stipulate to
their foundation. 4 "Burr sought a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena
ad testificandum." 348  Jefferson did not refuse to supply the papers, 49
although twentieth-century advocates for what has now become the
doctrine of executive privilege3-among them President Nixon's
342. SMITH, supra note 139, at 360.
343. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1442.
344. Although he had assembled a team of first-class lawyers, Burr made the motion and took
the lead himself in arguing it. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No.
14,692d) ("Mr. Burr then addressed the court."); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694) ("Colonel Burr renewed his application for the production of the
two letters ."; "Mr. Burr said he could not be satisfied with a copy of part of the letter."); Yoo,
supra note 265, at 1447.
345. BAKER, supra note 245, at 477; 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 273, at 433, 443;
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 291; SMITH, supra note 139, at 362, 638; STITES, supra note
286, at 105; Yoo, supra note 265, at 1446-47. Although the sources speak of one letter, and
sometimes two, from Wilkinson to Jefferson, three such letters at issue, although not
simultaneously. They are reprinted at Yoo, supra note 265, at 1474-77.
346. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1447.
347. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 30-31 (No. 14,692d); Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 190 (No. 14,694); BAKER,
supra note 245, at 477-78; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 291-92; Yoo, supra note 265, at
1447; 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 321.
348. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1447.
349. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 292.
350. The term "executive privilege" was unknown before the Eisenhower Administration.
MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 44 (1994). George Washington was the first President to claim an embryonic
form of executive privilege, although Washington did not articulate the doctrine we have now
become familiar with. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical Comment on the
Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1177-85 (1999) (explaining the
Washington precedents).
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lawyers-later claimed otherwise.351  Instead, Jefferson warned that the
letter, in particular, could involve "state secrets," and asked Hay to prevent
disclosure of those parts of the letter not material to the issues."' In court,
Hay offered to supply the entire letter to Marshall; argued that a subpoena
would therefore be unnecessary; and asked Marshall to redact that which
was not material in order to protect state secrets. 3  Marshall, in turn,
committed himself to redact anything "which it would be imprudent to
disclose ... if it be not immediately and essentially applicable to the
point. 354 When the government produced the documents Burr wanted,355
"both Burr and Marshall considered the subpoena satisfied." '356 In the
second trial, Burr made another motion regarding a different letter, and this
time Jefferson's position hardened somewhat: he submitted a redacted copy
of the letter, and a certificate explaining his reasons for the redactions. 357
Again, Burr and Marshall "appear to have let the matter drop.,
358
In the most extreme claims of executive privilege, such as those
vigorously asserted by Richard Nixon, a president refuses to submit
evidence for judicial review. The Supreme Court, however, relying in part
on Marshall's rulings in the Burr trial, held in United States v. Nixon that
generalized claims of executive privilege that do not identify specific risks
to the country are overcome by, among other things, a grand jury
subpoena.359 When, at the Supreme Court's direction, Nixon complied with
such a subpoena, the audiotapes he turned over persuaded even the leaders
of his own party that he could not defend against impeachment, and he
resigned.)6
John Yoo argues that the Nixon Court misinterpreted both Jefferson's
positions and Marshall's rulings.361 In a letter to Hay, Jefferson offered to
provide the documents at issue in Burr's trial, while in principle
351. RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 188-89 (1974).
352. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31 (No. 14,692d). Throughout the trial, an extensive correspondence
occurred between Jefferson and Hay. To carry these letters between Washington and Richmond,
Jefferson used a courier, rather than the postal system. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1443.
353. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); STITES,
supra note 286, at 106; Yoo, supra note 265, at 1448, 1457-58.
354. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 37 (No. 14,692d).
355. Id. at 69-70.
356. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1453.
357. Id. at 1462.
358. Id. at 1463.
359. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-08, 713-15 (1974), (relying in part on United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 190-92 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)).
360. See infra text accompanying notes 683-690.
361. Yoo, supra note 265, at 1448, 1460-65.
"[r]eserving the necessary right of the president of the United States, to
decide, independently of all other authority, what papers coming to him as
president the public interest permits to be communicated. 3 62 Jefferson sent
this letter after the Government argued and submitted the issue to Marshall
363for decision. Hay then read Jefferson's letter into the record in open
court,3 4 which might have been what Jefferson wanted. Marshall decided
that documents in a president's possession could be subpoenaed, but he
added a qualification ignored by the Nixon court. Marshall held that if a
president's "duties as chief magistrate demand his whole time for national
objects ... at the time when his attendance on a court is required, it
would... rather constitute a reason for not obeying the process of the court
than a reason against its being issued., 365 In other words, the judiciary has
a right to issue such a subpoena, and the president has a right to ignore it.
Marshall might have been looking ahead to the type of problem that
supposedly later caused President Andrew Jackson to remark, after
Worcester v. Georgia,36 that "John Marshall has made his decision; now let
him enforce it." Although some historians doubt that Jackson actually said
that,367 "the evidence is that if Jackson did not say [it], he certainly meant
it.''368 In any event, it was the State of Georgia, not Jackson, who would
have to comply with the Supreme Court's judgment, and Georgia did
ignore it, which is the point of the supposed Jackson quote.369
At the time of the Burr trial, and for some decades afterward, the
popular prestige of the Supreme Court was so low that a president would
suffer little harm from ignoring a Supreme Court decision. Because
Federalists initially dominated the judiciary and misused it for partisan
political purposes-such as in prosecutions under the Sedition Act-much
of what the judiciary did was suspect in the popular mind. Part of
Marshall's genius was that he understood this and crafted decisions so that
they simultaneously claimed the largest reasonable amount of judicial
power while giving his enemies the smallest objective grounds for
grievance. The best known example is Marbury. There, Marshall claimed
362. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 65 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) (emphasis
added).
363. BAKER, supra note 245, at 484-85; SMITH, supra note 139, at 364-65; Yoo, supra note
265, at 1450.
364. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d).
365. Id. at 34.
366. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
367. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 299; SMITH, supra note 139, at 518.
368. BAKER, supra note 245, at 745.
369. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 299; SMITH, supra note 139, at 518.
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the Court's power to issue binding orders to executive branch officials and
the power to render statutes unenforceable if inconsistent with the
Constitution, while at the same time holding that the Court lacked the
jurisdiction to order Jefferson's Secretary of State to turn over a
commission to one of Adams's midnight judges. And, in Burr, he held that
a president, unlike a monarch, is subject to the process of a court, but that
Jefferson need not obey that process if he did not want to. After the
prestige and moral authority of the Supreme Court had grown to what it is
today, the Nixon court labored under no such disability and held,37° while
misciting Burr, that a president must obey a valid subpoena. "Marshall
always managed to cloak his personal feelings toward Jefferson behind an
elaborately constructed screen of impartial-sounding arguments that
invariably ended up leaving him no choice but to align himself with the
other side .... If Hamilton came at you with a saber, Marshall preferred the
stiletto."371
What Jefferson asserted more passionately was a privilege not to
testify himself-a privilege similar to the one that President Clinton later
claimed with as much vigor as Nixon asserted executive privilege.37  "To
comply with such calls," Jefferson wrote to the federal prosecutor, "would
leave the nation without an executive branch" because any litigant could
haul a president away to some far part of the country.373 But here, too,
Jefferson claimed a right smaller than one that a later president in trouble
would like to have had. Jefferson offered to testify "by way of
deposition. 3 74 In other words, he thought he should not have to go to
Richmond, but easily volunteered to put himself under oath if the lawyers
370. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974).
371. ELLIS, supra note 277.
372. Since 1993, the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations have made wide claims of
executive privilege-arguably wider than anything claimed by the executive branch since the
Nixon Administration. Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and Conflict
during the Bush Presidency, 52 Duke L.J. 403 (2002); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege and
the Modern Presidents: In Nixon's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1069, 1117-25 (1999); Mark J.
Rozell, A Response to Professor Johnsen, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1191-94 (1999). Contra
Dawn Johnsen, Executive Privilege since United States v. Nixon: Issues of Motivation and
Accommodation, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1127, 1130-33 (1999).
373. BAKER, supra note 245, at 485; 5 MALONE, supra note 152, at 322; Akhil Reed Amar &
Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701,
718 (1995); Yoo, supra note 265, at 1450-53. This was a personal rivalry, as well as a difference
of opinion about constitutional law. "Who was more powerful?... Who could command the
other's presence? Since 1801, when Thomas Jefferson had become President and John Marshall
had become Chief Justice, they had been heading toward this confrontation." BAKER, supra note
245, at 477.
374. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 69 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). Hay put this
letter into the record in open court.
and, presumably, the judge would come to him in Washington. Previously,
the federal prosecutor had conceded that Jefferson could be subpoenaed to
testify but had argued that he could not be subpoenaed duces tecum and
thereby required to supply the letter."' Marshall decided that Jefferson was
subject to both forms of subpoena,3 76 but in a later ruling added that "[i]n no
case of this kind would a court be required to proceed against the president
as against an ordinary individual. 377 In any event, the subpoena, as issued,
required only production of the documents; it specifically provided that
Jefferson need not come to court himself.
378
President Clinton asserted a right not to be required to defend a
private lawsuit while in office on the ground that the burdens of a litigant,
including the burden of being deposed, would interfere with the duties of
the Presidency. But the Supreme Court held in Clinton v. Jones,379 relying
in part on Marshall's rulings in Burr,3 s0 that a person can be both a
president and a private litigant at the same time. As a result, the lawyers
and the judge went to Washington so that Clinton could testify in a
deposition-just as Jefferson had volunteered to testify-and that
testimony led to Clinton's impeachment.3 '
In each of its first three uses, impeachment served as a partisan
political weapon. For a time afterward, a truce seemed to make further use
of that kind unnecessary. Although the judiciary remained vaguely
Federalist in its outlook, it abandoned much of the partisan behavior that so
incited the Jeffersonians, and Jefferon's presidential successors, James
Madison and James Monroe, were not innately hostile to the judiciary.383
The Chase impeachment, though unsuccessful, may have had an effect on
the federal judiciary similar to the one that the 1936 election and Franklin
D. Roosevelt's court-packing proposal may have had on the Supreme Court
375. Id. at 63.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 192.
378. The following appeared in the subpoena: "The transmission to the Clerk of this Court of
the original letter of General Wilkinson and of copies duly authenticated of the other papers and
documents . . .will be admitted as sufficient observance of the process, without the personal
attendance of any or either of the persons therein named." JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 203.
379. 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (relying in part on United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14,692d)).
380. Id. at 693-94, 703-04. And, as in United States v. Nixon, the Clinton Court once again
misinterpreted Burr. It is literally true, that "Chief Justice Marshall ... ruled that a subpoena
duces tecum could be directed to the President." Id. at 703-04. However, Marshall also ruled
that a President has a right to ignore such a subpoena. See Yoo, supra note 265, at 1466-68.
381. See infra text accompanying notes 917-920.
382. JOHNSTONE, supra note 152, at 208.
383. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 284-85.
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in 1937: it may have persuaded judges to avoid confrontation with the
other two branches.3 4 Both the Chase impeachment and the Roosevelt
court-packing plan certainly had a boomerang effect: each seemed, to a
crucial body of less partisan or nonpartisan thought, to have gone too far.
Moreover, Jefferson's party so dominated elections after 1800 that it
controlled the executive and legislative branches for a generation. After
Jefferson left office it became a consensus party and absorbed a fair
amount of the Federalist thought. When Monroe ran for reelection as
president in 1820, the Federalist Party had nearly disappeared, nobody was
left to oppose him,386 and the period became known as the Era of Good
Feeling. Thus, impeachment fell temporarily into disuse because the Chase
trial had left an unpleasant memory on all sides, and because, for a time
afterward, nobody needed impeachment as a partisan political weapon.
Chase's chief defense counsel during the Senate trial was Luther
Martin, one of the leading lawyers in the country and a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention-though he refused to sign the Constitution
because he had come to oppose the document the Convention produced.
Later, Martin became chief defense counsel in Aaron Burr's trials and
argued several cases to the Supreme Court, including the losing side in
M'Culloch v. Maryland17 He was also an alcoholic. Some years after
Chase's impeachment, Martin tried a case while drunk before Chase, who
was riding circuit. "I am surprised that you can so prostitute your talents,"
Chase said from the bench. "Sir, I never prostituted my talents except
when I defended you and Colonel Burr," replied Martin, who then faced
the jury and said: "A couple of the greatest rascals in the world.
388
Adams and Jefferson both died on July 4, 1826-50 years to the day
after the Declaration of Independence was purportedly signed. Adams and
Jefferson were not only the second and third presidents. They were also,
respectively, the chair of the committee appointed by the Continental
Congress to draft a document declaring independence, and the author of the
first draft of that document.389 In 1776, Adams was considered to have had
384. See HOFFER& HULL, supra note 31, at 257.
385. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 293. Even during Jefferson's Administrations, the
radicals in his party were complaining of this tendency to co-opt the Federalists by absorbing
some of their ideology. ELLIS, supra note 140, at 236.
386. ROBARGE, supra note 245, at 293. One elector in the electoral college voted against
Monroe on the sole ground that only George Washington should have the honor of a unanimous
election.
387. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
388. PAUL STEPHEN CLARKSON & R. SAMUEL JETT, LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 280
(1970).
389. ELLIS, supra note 277, at 48-49.
the more prestigious assignment: not only did he chair the committee, but
he was also expected to steer the proposal through the Congressional
debate.3'9 Jefferson was like the junior professor who gets stuck writing a
faculty committee report, although he did such a good job of it that, in
historical memory, his role almost completely eclipses Adams's. Adams
later recalled that he insisted that Jefferson write the draft because, among
other things, Jefferson was the better writer.3 91
When we read the Declaration's text today, we are reading Jefferson's
words, as altered by other people. Jefferson wrote the draft in a few days,
and Adams and Benjamin Franklin marked it up, changing, for example,
Jefferson's "sacred & undeniable truths" to "self-evident truths."'3 92 Then,
the Continental Congress debated the document line-by-line and deleted
about a quarter of Jefferson's draft, while he seethed.3 93 For decades
afterward, he felt the grievance of an author who thinks his best work has
been mangled through the editing of others.394 The great scene, where all
the Members of the Continental Congress signed the Declaration, did not
happen on July 4, 1776-and as it has been depicted in paintings, it
probably did not happen at all. On July 2, Congress voted, in principle, to
declare independence. On July 4, Congress approved, as amended, the
document that would communicate that declaration, and sent it out to a
printer, although approval was not unanimous until the New York
delegation received instructions from home on July 15, and most Members
signed it on August I"'
None of this denies Jefferson the achievement of converting what
could have been a mere statement of governmental separation into a
profound expression of what would in later years become the American
idea of a polity: "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" (surely, the first time in history that
the possibility of being happy became a political issue); "[t]hat to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed."
When it was learned that both men had died on the same day, and on
the fiftieth anniversary of the supposed signing of the Declaration, much of
the public saw in the event, in the words of John Quincy Adams-John
390. Id. at 49.
391. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 46-47.
392. Id. at 47; ELLIS, supra note 277, at 50.
393. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 47; ELLIS, supra note 277, at 50.
394. ELLIS, supra note 277, at 60.
395. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 47; ELLIS, supra note 277, at 50.
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Adams's son, the sixth president of the United States and a member of
Jefferson's political party-the "visible and palpable marks of Divine
favor.,
396
The Adams-Jefferson friendship, begun in 1776, had withstood
Adams's defeat of Jefferson in the presidential election of 1796, but each
was so offended by the conduct of the other in 1800 and 1801 that they
broke it off.397 In 1811, after Jefferson had left politics, Benjamin Rush,
who also signed the Declaration, visited Adams and provoked him into
saying, "I always loved Jefferson, and still love him., 398 Rush made sure
that Jefferson learned of this remark, and Jefferson wrote to Rush, "This is
enough for me. I only needed this knowledge to revive towards him all the
affections of the most cordial moments of our lives.,, 399 Adams wrote to
Jefferson, "You and I ought not to die before we have explained ourselves
to each other."' ' Thereafter, living 500 miles apart, Adams and Jefferson
communicated often through letters that constitute "one of the most
remarkable literary exchanges in American history." '° They argued as
friends about philosophy, metaphysics, religion, science, political theory,
and history-until they died on the same Fourth of July.
4 0 2
C. Between Chase and Andrew Johnson
The Chase trial was such a disagreeable and convoluted affair, tying
up the Senate and preventing legislation, that one Senator wrote that "[a]ll
parties appear to wish it had never been commenced-I believe we shall
not hear of another very soon.",403 Twenty-five years passed before the
House impeached another federal officeholder.
James H. Peck, a district court judge in Missouri, was impeached in
1830"4 after sustained lobbying by a lawyer he had held in contempt. 45 A
substantial part of Peck's docket was made up of lawsuits to settle
ownership of individual parcels within the Louisiana Purchase. The land
had been subject to three sovereignties (France, Spain, and the United
396. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 349.
397. Id. at 329.
398. Id. at 330.
399. Id.
400. SIMON, supra note 319, at 294.
401. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 331.
402. Id. at 331; ELLIS, supra note 277, at 235-51.
403. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 152, at 274; ELLIS, supra note 140, at 103.
404. IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 96, at 136-39; VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 107-14.
405. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 93-96; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 108.
States) as well as three different land tenure regimes, and in many cases
nobody really knew who owned what.4° In the first such lawsuit to go to
trial, Peck had made rulings suggesting that he was likely to decide most of
these cases contrary to the interests of certain claimants, who happened to
be wealthy and influential.47 The lawyer involved had represented the
losing party in that lawsuit and had appeared in a third of the cases yet to
be tried.4° Upset with the outcome of the first trial, the attorney published
an article criticizing Peck's rulings. On the ground that the article
misrepresented what Peck had decided,4° Peck held the lawyer in
contempt, had him incarcerated for twenty-four hours, and suspended him
from practice in his court for eighteen months. 40  The ostensible
controversy was whether Peck had abused his power, but the subtext was
the desire of influential and worried claimants to replace Peck with a judge
more to their liking.411
For the first time in a Senate impeachment trial, the House managers
were a bipartisan group-four Democrats and one Federalist.412 By this
time, Jefferson's party had evolved into the Democratic Party; Andrew
Jackson, considered the first Democratic president, held that office from
1829 to 1837. The Democrats dominated the Senate, with thirty-six of
forty-eight seats. 413  Twenty-one Senators voted to convict: eighteen
Democrats, two Whigs, and a Federalist. Twenty-two Senators voted to
acquit: fifteen Democrats, three Whigs, two National-Republicans, and two
Federalists.1 4 Although powerful interests worked to oust Peck, they were
economic interests and not partisan ones.
Not only were the Peck impeachment and trial nonpartisan, they were
also principled. Economic interests, which considered the accused judge
inconvenient, did not succeed in replacing him with someone more pliable.
At the same time, Peck had vindictively abused the contempt power, and
the law was immediately changed to prevent similar abuses in the future.
Future President James Buchanan led the House managers in the
impeachment process. Like the managers in the Chase impeachment,
406. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 91-92.
407. Id. at 92-93.
408. Id. at 92-96.
409. Id. at 93-95, 100.
410. BRANT, supra note 97, at 122; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 93; VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 108.
411. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 92, 96-97.
412. Id. at 14.
413. Id. at 14, 98.
414. Id. at 14.
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Buchanan returned to the House upset with the result. Unlike them, he did
not introduce legislation to punish the Senate or make it easier to remove
judges. Instead, he introduced legislation, still in effect today, restricting
federal civil contempt to conduct that more directly disrupts a court and its
authority.
45
In 1862, West H. Humphreys was impeached and convicted.416 A
federal district judge in Tennessee, Humphreys joined the rebellion after
the Civil War began and accepted a Confederate judgeship without
bothering to resign from the federal bench.4 " The fourteen other federal
judges who joined the Confederacy had resigned from the federal bench.418
In fact, Humphreys was "the only officer of the U.S. government who
failed to resign after shifting his allegiance to the Confederacy during the
Civil War."4' 9 A person in rebellion against the federal government cannot
be allowed to continue to hold a federal judgeship, and when the Union
armies recaptured Tennessee, Lincoln would not have been able to appoint
a replacement judge unless the Senate removed Humphreys from office.
420
He is the only impeachment defendant ever to be convicted by a
4211unanimous vote in the Senate.
During the period between the Chase impeachment and President
Johnson's impeachment in 1868, at least two and perhaps four federal
judges resigned to avoid impeachment trials. William Stephens, a district
court judge in Georgia, resigned in 1818 after a House Judiciary
Committee investigation into allegations, which are not specified in the
records available today.422 Thomas Irwin, a district judge in Pennsylvania,
resigned in 1859 during an impeachment investigation by the House
Judiciary Committee, also into allegations not specified in the records now
available.423  Replacements for two other judges were appointed in the
415. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2007); see also BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 112.
416. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 14; IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS, supra note 96,
at 140-42; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 115.
417. BRANT, supra note 97, at 129.
418. Van Tassel, supra note 190, at 408 (Appendix Table 1).
419. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 11.
420. Id. at 116.
421. On articles 1 and 5 of the impeachment, the Senate vote was thirty-nine to nothing to
convict, while on other articles there were scattered votes to acquit. Id. at 115. Instead of simply
charging Humphreys with accepting a Confederate judgeship, the articles of impeachment also
alleged, as separate grounds for removal, advocating secession from the Union, opposing federal
authority, failing to hold court, and so on. Id. at 117-19.
422. JOSEPH BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE: AN INQUIRY INTO BRIBERY AND OTHER HIGH
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS IN FEDERAL COURTS 200, 247 (1962); 3 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS'
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2489; (1907-08).
423. BORKN, supra note 422, at 235; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2500.
context of impeachment investigations, but it is not clear whether the
vacancies came about through death or resignation. A judge replacing
Peter B. Bruin of a Mississippi territorial court was appointed after the
House in 1808 authorized an investigation into allegations of drunkenness
and neglect of duty. 424 The president appointed another replacement judge
in 1841, to fill the Louisiana district court judgeship held by Philip K.
Lawrence, after a select House committee recommended impeachment on
grounds of drunkenness, corruption, and abuse of power.42 5  During the
same period, ten other judges were investigated, or referred for
investigation, by House committees without resulting impeachments. 26 In
all fourteen of these proceedings, the sketchy records available do not
contain any suggestion that the House utilized impeachment as a partisan
political weapon.
Although the period from 1805 to 1862 might seem to be one in which
the impeachment clauses in the Constitution were forgotten-with only
Peck's impeachment getting to the Senate in half a century-the picture
looks very different when one compares the number of House
impeachment investigations of federal judges, for example, with the size of
the federal judiciary at the time. Because the federal judiciary was tiny
compared with today's bench, a handful of investigations could have a
substantial impact. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, the
House conducted impeachment investigations involving 13% of the federal
424. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 225; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2487.
425. BORKiN, supra note 422, at 200-01, 237; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2494.
426. Harry Innis, a district court judge in Kentucky, in 1808; Harry Toulmin, a Mississippi
territorial court judge, in 1811-12; Mathias B. Tallmadge, a district court judge in New York, in
1818-19; William P. Van Ness, a district court judge in New York, in 1818-19; Charles Tait, a
district court judge in Alabama, in 1822-23; Joseph L. Smith, a Florida territorial court judge, in
1825-26; Buckner Thurston, a circuit judge in the District of Columbia, in 1825 and again in
1837; Alfred Conkling, a district court judge in New York, in 1829-30; Benjamin Johnson, an
Arkansas territorial court judge, in 1833; and John C. Watrous, a district court judge in Texas,
after a series of investigations from 1852 to 1860. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 227, 234-36, 248-
54; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, §§ 2488-99.
From the sketchy records now available, it is hard to tell which of these judges had done
nothing wrong and which had behaved in troubling but not impeachment-worthy ways. Judges
are in the constant business of making people unhappy-usually losing litigants but also, at times,
their lawyers as well-and it takes only one Representative to introduce an impeachment
resolution that the rest of the House, without any knowledge of the merits, might be persuaded to
refer to a committee. In Watrous's case, we know that the House Judiciary Committee more than
once recommended that he be impeached, but the House never did so, apparently on the ground
that the conflicts of interest alleged did not rise to the level of impeachable offenses. 3 HINDS,
supra note 422, §§ 2495-99.
Reminiscent of Blount in 1797 and Burr in 1807, the accusation against Innis in 1808
was of a "[p]lot with Spain to seduce Kentucky from the Union." BORKIN, supra note 422, at
234-35.
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judgeships, and during the 1820s, the House investigated 11% of the
judgeships.427 Except for the 1870s, when 11% of the judgeships again
were investigated, the figures for the other decades in the nineteenth
century never exceed 6%.428 But by modem standards, that was still high.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the House investigated, respectively, 4% and 3%
of the judiciary.429 In every other decade of the twentieth century, the rate
was less than 1%, and in several decades it was zero. Although it is
startling to contemplate decades in which one in every eight federal
judgeships was involved in an impeachment investigation, it is also
startling to contemplate decades in which the House did not investigate
anybody, though it is difficult to believe that corruption during those
periods had become extinct. Certainly, these figures illustrate how
erratically impeachment and impeachment investigations have been used-
or, more accurately, overused in some periods and underused in others.
D. Johnson
Although Abraham Lincoln is universally considered the greatest
president in American history, 430 his reelection in 1864 was very much in
doubt. The Civil War was marked with numbers of deaths unprecedented
in warfare as technology outpaced the ability of field commanders to use
new weapons decisively. Many newspapers mocked Lincoln as a tyrant for
suspending the writ of habeas corpus and as an ineffectual Commander in
Chief who could not find a way to end the war. Battles like Antietam,
where the two sides together suffered 3,600 deaths and over 17,000
wounded in a single day, staggered the public.
Lincoln did win the 1864 election, but only because he finally found
generals who could win, beginning with the capture of Atlanta in
September 1864.43' Uncertain of victory in June 1864, Lincoln and his
Republican Party decided to call its national ticket Unionist, and in order to
appeal to non-abolitionists in border states, nominated Andrew Johnson, a
Southern Democrat with a long record favoring slavery, for vice
president.432 Lincoln also hoped that having a Southern Democrat as vice
427. Van Tassel, Resignations, supra note 190.
428. Id. at 370-71.
429. Id. at 371.
430. Historians poll each other on this frequently, and Lincoln is always at the top of every
poll. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 373-76 (1999).
431. See T. HARRY WILLIAMS, LINCOLN AND HIS GENERALS (1952); T. HARRY WILLIAMS,
MCCLELLAN, SHERMAN AND GRANT (1962).
432. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 222.
president would be useful in persuading the South to reconcile with the
North. When Johnson's state, Tennessee, seceded from the Union in 1861,
Johnson, then a Senator, refused to secede with it. When Union troops
occupied most of Tennessee, Lincoln appointed Johnson military Governor
of the state, and Johnson was most conspicuous as a Southerner loyal to the
Union.433
Before the war, Johnson owned slaves.434 In personality, he was the
opposite of Lincoln in virtually every respect. Johnson thought and spoke
belligerently; could not tolerate disagreement; resented everything that
could conceivably be thought of as a slight; and was unable to find
common ground with or inspire others, listen with an open mind, or think
in subtleties and nuances. 35 When he and Lincoln were inaugurated in
436March 1865, Johnson was drunk. Five weeks later, John Wilkes Booth
shot Lincoln in Ford's Theater, and Johnson became president, inheriting
nearly the entirety of Lincoln's second term. "By any measure, he was
truly the wrong man, in the wrong place, at the wrong time. His presidency
was a catastrophe., 437 For both political and personal reasons, Johnson was
in constant conflict with Congress from the day he took the presidential
oath until the day he left office. He vetoed twenty-one bills compared to
thirty-six vetoes exercised by all the presidents who preceded him
combined, and Congress overrode fifteen of his vetoes, more than any
other president before or afterward.438
The Republicans were an insecure party, founded only six years
before Lincoln became president. He was elected in 1860 with only 40%
of the popular vote because the Democrats split and ran three separate
tickets. During and shortly after the Civil War, the Republicans were a
majority party only because whites in the Confederate states were not
voting because their states had seceded and were not readmitted for some
time after the end of the war. The party had been founded for the purpose
of abolishing slavery. A natural extension of that purpose would be to
make freed slaves citizens with the right to vote, and they would likely vote
for the Republican Party that had freed them. If that did not happen, the
Republicans would revert to a minority party because the substantial
433. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 128; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 222.
434. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 222.
435. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 5
(1973).
436. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 222.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 223.
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number of Northerners who were Democrats greatly exceeded the few
white Southerners who considered themselves Republicans.
In two of the eleven Confederate states-South Carolina and
Mississippi-African Americans had been a majority of the population in
the 1860 census, although in that year they were still slaves. 39 In five
more-Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Louisiana-African
Americans had been between 43% and 49% of the population.44° After the
Confederacy surrendered in 1865 and the rebellious states began to rejoin
the Union, the white vote in many of those states was depressed, as many
white voters had not yet been requalified to vote. As they were requalified,
the surge in Republican Congressional seats during and after the war would
be drastically reversed unless African Americans in the same states were
freely voting. The results of Congressional elections preceding the 1868
Johnson impeachment illustrate the point.441
439. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT,
1-213 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds., millennial ed. 2006) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
440. Id.
441. See infra tbl 2.
Table 2
Congressional Party Divisions After
the Elections of 1856 Through 1866
1856 1858 1860 1862 1864 1866
Senate
442
Republicans 20 26 31 33 39 57
Democrats 41 38 15 10 11 9





Republicans 90 116 108 86 136 173
Democrats 132 83 44 72 38 47
Unionist 26 25 18
Other 15 39 5 2 1 4
Vacant 2
For both parties, the struggle over who would vote in the South was a
struggle not just for principles but also for power. Through violence, fraud,
and repressive state statutes enacted soon after the war, white Southerners
were preventing African Americans from voting. The Union army still
occupied much of the South, and Congressional Republicans intended to
use it to guarantee that African Americans could vote. Johnson, a racist,
opposed this. In one message to Congress, he called African Americans
unfit to be voters, "corrupt in principles and enemies of free institutions,"
and "inferior. " 44
The result was a struggle between Johnson, who was still a Democrat
and who favored readmitting the rebellious states more or less
unconditionally, and Congress, which was dominated by Radical
Republicans determined to change the South fundamentally in order to
protect newly freed slaves. Johnson frustrated congressional goals at every• "45
opportunity. In 1866, Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill, a veto
Congress overrode. 446 The bill extended citizenship to freed slaves and
442. Senate Party Divisions, supra note 198.
443. House Party Divisions, supra note 199.
444. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 75.
445. Gerhardt, supra note 231, at 103.
446. JAMES E. SEFTON, ANDREW JOHNSON AND THE USES OF CONSTITUrTONAL POWER 130-
31 (1980).
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guaranteed them the right to vote, make contracts, sue, and testify."
7
Johnson also opposed adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8 He and
his Democratic allies tried to demonize his opponents in Congress by
calling them Radical Republicans; but they wore the phrase as a badge of
honor."49
In 1866, Congress reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices to
450eight, apparently to deprive Johnson of an opportunity to fill a vacancy -
roughly the reverse of Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan 45' To
prevent Johnson from replacing Radical Republican officers in the
executive branch with persons more amenable to his philosophy, Congress
passed the Tenure of Office Act in 1867.452 The act provided that no
executive branch official confirmed by the Senate could be dismissed
during the term of the president who appointed him and for thirty days after
that term ended without the consent of the Senate.453 If a president
dismissed an official covered by the Act without the Senate's consent, the
president was guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment for up to five
years as well as a fine. The Act also declared that such a dismissal would
be considered a "high misdemeanor"-clear warning of what Congress
intended to do if Johnson removed any of his Cabinet members from
office.
Johnson inherited his Cabinet from Lincoln. Congressional
Republicans intended to limit Johnson's power by restricting his ability to
replace subordinates. They were most concerned about Edwin Stanton,
Lincoln's and Johnson's secretary of war and the leading Radical in the
Cabinet, whose department controlled the Union army still in the South.
Stanton was a complex person who had Lincoln's trust and Johnson's
447. Id. at 130; HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT: ANDREW JOHNSON,
THE BLACKS AND RECONSTRUCTION 26 (1999).
448. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 28-29; Gerhardt, supra note 231, at 103.
449. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 8.
450. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 43. The Radical Republicans had some other problems
with the Supreme Court. In March 1868, Congress took the extraordinary step of abolishing the
Court's jurisdiction to decide appeals growing out of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 508 (1869); see also STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS (1968).
451. See infra text accompanying notes 571-578.
452. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (amended 1869, repealed 1887).
453. Id.
454. Id. On the history of the Act, see JAMES HART, TENURE OF OFFICE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 230-32 (1930).
respect but did not believe he needed to take orders from Johnson.455 The
Tenure of Office Act made him unsuperviseable. Because Lincoln
appointed Stanton during his first term, Johnson argued, as a matter of
ordinary statutory interpretation, Stanton was not protected by the Act.456
"The whole Cabinet, especially Stanton, called the act
unconstitutional and advised Johnson to veto it," which he did, on the
ground that a president cannot satisfy his constitutional duty to faithfully
execute the law if he is prevented from dismissing unsatisfactory
subordinates. Congress overrode his veto by very large margins in both
Houses.4 8 The Tenure of Office Act was a large step in the direction of
parliamentary government, in which the executive branch as a whole (a
Cabinet) and individuals within the executive branch (a minister, for
example) serve at the pleasure of the legislative branch. The Act did not
give Congress the power to remove officials, although Congress could have
used the power of impeachment for that purpose, as the British House of
Commons did until it acquired the power of removal through a vote of no
confidence.
Johnson knew the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional, but he
made that point in a manner guaranteed to inflame Congress. First, in
summer 1867, Johnson suspended Stanton, which the Act permitted him to
do when Congress was not in session, and he appointed General Ulysses S.
Grant as acting secretary of war. 459 Both the North and Congressional
Republicans viewed Grant as the general who had saved the country, but he
was far less of a Radical than Stanton. The Act gave the Senate the
authority to disallow a suspension when it came back into session. When
the Senate reconvened on January 13, 1868, it did so.46° Grant immediately
resigned as Acting Secretary, and gave the office keys back to Stanton,
who barricaded himself there for weeks. 461
455. FLETCHER PRATT, STANTON: LINCOLN'S SECRETARY OF WAR ix (1953). See generally
BENJAMIN P. THOMAS & HAROLD M. HYMAN, STANTON: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LINCOLN'S
SECRETARY OF WAR (1962).
456. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 45.
457. SEFTON, supra note 446, at 149.
458. Id.
459. LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 57; TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 99; VAN TASSEL &
FrNKELMAN, supra note 82, at 224.
460. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 136; LABOVITZ, supra note 63, at 57; TREFOUSSE, supra
note 447, at 125.
461. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 125-27. Though it is hard for us to imagine today, the
federal government in 1868 was so small that the War Department, the predecessor to the
Department of the Army, could be administered from office space with a single door.
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Johnson then tried to create an army unit, located in and around
Washington, that he could control directly himself. On February 6,
Johnson ordered Grant, who had reverted to his role as the highest general
in the army, to form an Army of the Atlantic under the command of
General William T. Sherman.46' Sherman was a solid racist and
463sympathetic to Southern whites despite his tactics during the war. On
February 13, Johnson sent the Senate a nomination to promote Sherman toS 464
the rank of General of the Army, the same rank as Grant' s. "Sherman
was thunderstruck" and declined the command.4 6' He wrote to his brother,
a Republican Senator from Ohio, that "[t]he President would make use of
,,466461me to begat violence."466 On February 21, Johnson fired Stanton.
Three days later, the House impeached Johnson by a vote of 126 to
47. 6  With one exception, the articles of impeachment charged him with
violating the Tenure of Office Act. 469 The exception accused him of trying
"to impair and destroy the regard and respect of all the good people of the
United States for the Congress... and to excite the odium and resentment
of all good people of the United States against Congress" and of "mak[ing]
and deliver[ing], with a loud voice, certain intemperate, inflammatory, and
scandalous harangues [with] loud threats and bitter menaces . . . against
Congress" and the statutes it had recently enacted.470
462. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 100; B.H. LIDDELL HART, SHERMAN: SOLDIER, REALIST,
AMERICAN 409-10 (1930); TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 128.
463. MICHAEL FELLMAN, CITIZEN SHERMAN: A LIFE OF WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN 242-
43 (1995) (quoting Sherman, in a letter to a Radical Republican: "I am not yet prepared to receive
the negro on terms of political equality .... ); JAMES MERRILL, WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN
142 (1971) (Sherman, in a letter to his wife: "Niggers won't work unless they are owned .... ");
GEOFFREY PERRET, ULYSSES S. GRANT: SOLDIER AND PRESIDENT 413 (1997) ("Sherman did not
believe in Reconstruction.... He opposed nearly every Reconstruction measure.").
464. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 100; TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 128.
465. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 100; accord HART, supra note 462; TREFOUSSE, supra
note 447, at 128.
466. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 100.
467. Id; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 137; TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 133-34; VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 224.
468. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 137; LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 57.
469. BRANT, supra note 97, at 137; LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 58-59; 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW
JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
IMPEACHMENT BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 6-
10 (1868) [hereinafter TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON]; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note
82, at 227-36.
470. A. Johnson Impeachment Articles, http://www.vw.vccs.edu/vwhansd/HIS269/
Documents/ImpeachArticles.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007); see also BRANT, supra note 97, at
137; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 232; see also LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 61.
Radical Republicans in the House had been itching to impeach. They
actually tried to impeach Johnson in 1867, but failed by a vote of fifty-
seven to one hundred and eight.4 71 And on January 30, 1868-a little more
than three weeks before they actually did impeach Johnson-the House
ordered an impeachment inquiry concerning a Supreme Court Justice who
could not, from the evidence before the House, be identified.4  The totality
of the evidence, in fact, was the following paragraph published in a
newspaper story:
At a private gathering of gentlemen of both political parties, one
of the justices of the Supreme Court spoke very freely
concerning the reconstruction measures of Congress, and
declared in the most positive terms that all these laws were
unconstitutional, and that the court would be sure to pronounce
them so. Some of his friends near him suggested that it was
quite indiscreet to speak so positively, when he at once repeated
473the views in a more emphatic manner.
This was hardly an impeachable offense. If it were, Justice Scalia
would have been impeached after he publicly took a position concerning
the 2004 Pledge of Allegiance case before it had been argued in the
Supreme Court.4  Even if a Justice had in fact prejudged an issue in this
way, the proper remedy would have been recusal from cases where that
issue arose. No such cases had reached the Supreme Court, and thus no
opportunity to recuse had arisen. But the House voted to investigate
anyway, by a vote of ninety-seven to fifty-seven.475 On June 18-after
Johnson had been acquitted in the Senate-the relevant House committee
asked for authorization to terminate the investigation into the unidentifiedSuprme Curt ""476
Supreme Court Justice. The House agreed by voice vote and without
debate.477 The available records do not reveal whether the committee was
unable to learn the Justice's identity (thought to be Justice Stephen
Field),478 or the accuracy of the newspaper story, or whether, after
Johnson's acquittal, the House had tired of impeachment, or whether the
471. LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 49-56; TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 98-114.
472. 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2503.
473. Id.
474. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); Charles Lane & David
Von Drehle, Is Scalia Too Blunt To Be Effective? Justice Out of Case About Which He Cares,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2003, at A27.
475. 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2503.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. BRANT, supra note 97, at 137.
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House was no longer worried about whether Reconstruction legislation
might be declared unconstitutional.
Johnson's Senate trial began on February 25 . Johnson's lawyers
provided several key defenses: (1) that the Tenure of Office Act was
unconstitutional; (2) that it did not protect Stanton (who was appointed
during Lincoln's first term); (3) that Johnson fired Stanton to test the
constitutionality and interpretation of the statute in court; and (4) that the
impeachment article that complained about his views of Congress violated
his First Amendment rights.4 In May, the trial adjourned for a few weeks
to permit Senators to attend the Republican Convention, which nominated
Grant for president.481 On May 26, the Senate reconvened and acquitted
Johnson by a vote of thirty-five for conviction to nineteen against, one vote
short of the two-thirds necessary to convict. All the votes to convict were
Republican, although seven Republicans voted to acquit.483 "The closeness
of the vote may be deceiving," according to Trefousse, a leading historian
of Johnson's impeachment. "Considerable evidence exists that other
senators [who voted to convict] stood ready to vote for acquittal [instead] if
their votes had been needed." 84
Johnson's impeachment is remembered as the ultimate use of the
procedure as a partisan political weapon. It took to extremes tendencies
that dominated three of the five impeachments that preceded it. And some
of the participants had much to gain personally from the outcome.
Throughout, everyone expected Grant to be a candidate for president in
1868. Because Johnson became president on Lincoln's death, and because
no procedure existed for filling a vice-presidential vacancy (later supplied
by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment), under the law of presidential succession
at the time, the president pro tempore of the Senate, Benjamin Wade,
would become president if Johnson were convicted. Although the
propriety of Wade's sitting with the other Senators as a judge in Johnson's
trial was questioned at the time, he was permitted to do so. 485 When a
president is impeached, the chief justice presides at the Senate trial, and
Chief Justice Salmon Chase did so in this instance, even though it was well
479. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 151.
480. SEFTON, supra note 446, at 177.
481. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 170.
482. BRANT, supra note 97, at 137; TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 170-7 1.
483. BUSHNELL, supra note 92 at 159-60.
484. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at 169.
485. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 139; Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional
Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 DUKE L.J. 1, 87 n.412 (1999).
known that he wanted to run for president.48 Chase had even tried to
outmaneuver Lincoln and gain the presidential nomination in the 1864
Republican Convention.'
It was obviously in Wade's interest that Johnson be convicted because
that would make Wade president immediately. But it was in Grant's and
Chase's interest that he be acquitted. If Wade became president, he would
be in a much stronger position to win the 1868 presidential election. But at
the same time, both Grant and Chase had to avoid alienating the Radicals
because neither could be nominated for president by the Republican Party
if the Radicals opposed them. It is unclear how many of the seven
Republicans who voted to acquit Johnson did so in order to prevent Wade
from gaining this advantage. If that was their motive, they would have
needed to hide it because Wade would remain a powerful Senator with
whom they would have to work.4 8 Similarly, it is unclear to what extent
House Republicans who voted to impeach Johnson were motivated by a
desire to give Wade a position of strength over Grant and Chase in the
1868 presidential election.
Later in 1868, after his acquittal, Johnson tried but failed to get the
Democratic nomination for president. 489 He returned to Tennessee and
failed to be elected Senator in 1869. 490 He ran unsuccessfully for other
offices until he was elected Senator and returned briefly in 1875 to the
body that nearly convicted him seven years before.4 ' He died later that
492
year.
Grant was elected president as a Republican in November 1868.
Immediately after taking office, he asked Congress to repeal the Tenure of
Office Act. Johnson was no longer president, and both Grant and Congress
thought similarly about Reconstruction. Instead of completely repealing
the act, Congress rewrote it by deleting the punishments for a president's
violation of the act but preserving the Senate's power to overrule a
493president's dismissal. In 1872, Congress enacted another statute
providing that certain postal officials, including some local postmasters,
486. Turley, supra note 485, at 87 n.412.
487. Id. at 90 n.426.
488. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 126-43; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 227.
489. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 183; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 160.
490. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 160.
491. BENEDICT, supra note 435, at 183; BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 160.
492. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 160.
493. Tenure of Office Act, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6 (1869) (repealed 1887).
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could be dismissed only with the consent of the Senate. 4  In 1887,
Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act in its entirety.
The postal statute remained in place until 1926, when it came before
the Supreme Court in an appeal by a dismissed postmaster in Myers v.
United States.49  The Solicitor General did not defend the statute but
instead argued that it was unconstitutional-a rare event in the history of
the Solicitor General's office.49  Chief Justice Taft wrote the Court's
seventy-two page opinion, which struck down the statute as a violation of
the Separation of Powers doctrine.
E. The Era of Nonpartisanship and Bipartisanship
After 1868 and through the 1980s, most impeachments were
nonpartisan, although beginning in 1968, extremely partisan impeachments
were threatened and occurred.
1. Belknap to Hoover
Secretary of War William Belknap resigned in 1876, "two hours
before the House voted to impeach him" for corruption in office.4'9 By a
vote of thirty-seven to twenty-nine, the Senate concluded that it still had
jurisdiction, despite his resignation.4 99 Belknap refused to defend himself,4
perhaps because his lawyers predicted from the jurisdictional vote that the
two-thirds majority needed for conviction would not materialize. That is
exactly what occurred, though most of the Senate thought him guilty. °° It
is impossible to know from the vote how many of the Senators voting to
acquit did so because Belknap had already resigned."1
In 1872, the House voted to impeach Mark Delahay, a district court
judge in Kansas, for drunkenness and corruption.s°e But he resigned before
494. 17 Stat. 284 (1872), reenacted 19 Stat. 80 (1876).
495. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
496. REHNQUIST, supra note 219, at 265.
497. Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265, 296
(1993); see also VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 12; Turley, supra note 485, at 53-56.
498. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 192.
499. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 177; Turley, supra note 485, at 55.
500. Turley, supra note 485, at 55.
501. BLACK, supra note 67, at 51.
502. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 296; BORKIN, supra note 422, at 201, 229;
3 HINDS, supra note 422, §§ 2504-05; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 71, at 119-23;
Turley, supra note 485, at 58.
the House could present articles of impeachment to the Senate.03 Almost
the same thing happened after the House impeached George English, a
district court judge in Illinois, except that English resigned at the beginning
of his Senate impeachment trial-after the House had presented the
impeachment articles-on charges of corruption, favoritism, and abuse of
power; the House managers withdrew the articles of impeachment.'04
Charles Swayne, a district court judge in Florida, was impeached in
1904, which the Florida state legislature had twice petitioned the House to
do.505 He was a Republican, appointed by Republican President Benjamin
Harrison.'O' Politically, Florida was a Democratic state at the time. The
House that impeached Swayne included 207 Republicans and 178
Democrats, and the initial vote to impeach was 198 to 61, suggesting
bipartisanship.' °7 But after the impeachment vote the House appointed a
committee to draft articles of impeachment-an odd and no longer used
procedure, which has the defect of asking Representatives to vote for an
accusation in principle and then approve the wording of it later5 ° When
the articles of impeachment eventually were submitted to the House, the
votes on each article of impeachment were much closer-165 to 160, 162
to 138, and 159 to 136-and had become partisan, most of the yeas being
Democratic and most of the nays being Republican. In the Senate,
Swayne was acquitted, and none of the articles got even a majority of the
votes, much less the two-thirds required for a conviction.1
The articles accused Swayne of improprieties involving railway travel,
filing false expense accounts, not living inside his judicial district (which
the law, at that time, required), and improperly sentencing people for
503. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 296; BORKIN, supra note 422, at 201, 229;
3 HINDS, supra note 422, §§ 2504-05; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 119-20;
Turley, supra note 485, at 58.
504. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 203-04, 231-32; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES §§ 544-47 (1935) [hereinafter CANNON'S PRECEDENTS]; 3 DESCHLER'S
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 14, § 16 [herinafter DESCHLER'S
PRECEDENTS]; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 144-52; Turley, supra note 485, at 58.
505. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 191; Turley, supra note 485, at 63.
506. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 191-92; Jacobus tenBroek, Partisan Politics and Federal
Judgeship Impeachment since 1903, 23 MINN. L. REV. 185, 188 (1938-1939).
507. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 192-93.
508. As a result of the problems caused by this procedure in the Swayne impeachment, it was
replaced in 1912, during the Archbald impeachment, with the practice of having the committee
report at the same time both a recommendation to impeach, and the draft articles of impeachment
which, if the House were to vote for impeachment, would be forwarded to the Senate. See
LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 114 n.34.
509. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 193.
510. Id. at 212; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 124-25.
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contempt of court.511  These are too insignificant to motivate a state
legislature to petition Congress twice to remove a federal judge. None of
the impeachment scholars who has written about Swayne has fully
considered the position of a Republican federal judge in a Southern state
with a large African-American population512 During the last decade of the
nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. Henry Cabot
Lodge's National Election Bill 13 failed of enactment in 1890, and Southern
whites escalated the disenfranchisement of African-American voters
through intimidation and fraud and eventually through new statutes and
state constitutional provisions that made it extremely difficult if not
impossible for African-Americans to vote in the South 14 until passage of
the Voting Rights Act in 1965.' When African Americans were able to
vote in the South, they largely voted Republican. The closest any
impeachment scholar comes to recognizing this context is a single
comment by Bushnell-not mentioning race or the final loss of rights
gained during Reconstruction-that Harrison had nominated Swayne "to
ensure swift and firm hearing of cases stemming from election frauds in
Florida... allegedly committed by the Democratic party,"5"6 and because
he had enforced the law, "the impeachment of Judge Swayne was made a
party issue by Democrats. 51 7
511. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 193.
512. The Florida population was 42% African-American in the 1890 census and 44%
African-American in the 1900 census. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 439. Only five
states-Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina-had, by percentage,
larger African-American populations. Id. at 1-180 to 1-379.
513. See Henry Cabot Lodge, The Federal Election Bill, 151 N. AM. REV. 257 (1890) "The
Southern Democrats declare that the enforcement of this or any other law will cause social
disturbance and revolutionary outbreaks. As the negroes now disenfranchised certainly will not
revolt because they receive a vote, it is clear, therefore, that this means that the men who now rule
in those States will make social disturbances and revolution in resistance to a law of the United
States." Id. at 259.
514. See V.0. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949); J. MORGAN
KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE
FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908 (2001); THOMAS ADAMS
UPCHURCH, LEGISLATING RACISM: THE BILLION DOLLAR CONGRESS AND THE BIRTH OF JIM
CROW (2004); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955).
The Jim Crow codes deprived Southern African Americans of equal participation in
nearly every aspect of modem life. Until the Civil Rights movement began after World War II,
the Supreme Court held them to be constitutional. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
515. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973i (2007).
516. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 191-92.
517. tenBroek, supra note 506.
In some sense Democrats used impeachment as a political weapon
against Swayne. Democrats had looked hard for pretexts to oust a judge
who had offended them by enforcing the law in political cases. But this
was not of the same character as the impeachments of Blount, Pickering,
Chase, Johnson, or Clinton. Swayne was an obscure trial judge in what
was then almost an entirely rural state. Democrats were trying neither to
wound the Republican Party nationally nor win a national political or
constitutional confrontation.
Robert Archbald of the U.S. Commerce Court (which existed for only
three years)518 was impeached in 1912 and convicted by the Senate in 1913.
"Archbald's case.., followed the modem model of a largely nonpartisan
impeachment" after he was accused of a wide range of corruption.519 In the
1930s, Jacobus tenBroek wrote an article trying to show, among other
things, that the Archbald impeachment was an attempt by President
William Howard Taft's enemies to embarrass Taft because "the Democrats
persistently voted against Archbald, and they were continuously supported
by the Progressives and the adherents of Theodore Roosevelt"'5 2 right after
Taft was defeated for reelection by Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, and
Roosevelt, a third-party candidate. The numbers can be looked at as
tenBroek describes them, but that presents a misleading picture. First, the
Senate trial began on December 3, 1912,521 a month after Taft was soundly
defeated. Second, the votes for conviction were overwhelming. The
Senate convicted Archibald on five articles of impeachment by votes of
sixty-eight to five, sixty to eleven, fifty-two to twenty, sixty-six to six, and
forty-two to twenty, acquitting him of other charges.522 And third, only five
Senators voted on every charge to acquit; one was a Democrat, and two
were the Senators from Archbald's home state.12  Every other Senatorthought he was guilty of at least one of the charges.
518. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 132.
519. Turley, supra note 485, at 64-65; see also BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 217-42; VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 132-52.
520. tenBroek, supra note 506, at 191. TenBroek was an unusual and interesting person. He
was on the political science faculty at the University of California at Berkeley. Although not a
lawyer, he had a deep effect on several aspects of mid-twentieth century constitutional
scholarship, and, at one time, students in law school constitutional law courses would have been
familiar with his work. Perhaps his most valuable book was EQUAL JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1969). He was also the founder of the National Federation of
the Blind and was an early and still cherished advocate for the rights of the disabled. See FLOYD
MATSON, BLIND JUSTICE: JACOBUS TENBROEK AND THE VISION OF EQUALITY (2005).
521. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 220.
522. Id. at 237-38; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 133.
523. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 239.
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Harold Louderback, a district court judge in California, was
impeached in 1932 and acquitted by the Senate in 1933. The House
investigating committee recommended censure rather than impeachment,
524but the House voted to impeach anyway. Of the five articles of
impeachment, four failed to get even a simple majority in the Senate, and
the fifth failed for lack of a two-thirds majority. 5z The San Francisco Bar
Association had asked the House to investigate Louderback for corruption
in the appointment of receivers in bankruptcy cases.12' Democratic
Senators were split between conviction and acquittal, and Republicans
mostly voted for acquittal.527
Several other federal judges resigned during this period to avoid
impeachment. Charles Sherman, an Ohio district court judge, resigned in
1873 during an impeachment investigation in the House on charges of
528corruption. Richard Busteed, a district court judge in Alabama, resigned
in 1875 after the House Judiciary Committee recommended impeachment
for failing to hold court regularly and for manipulating his judgeship for
self-enrichment. 29  Edward Durrell, a Louisiana district court judge,
resigned after the House Judiciary Committee recommended impeachment
in 1875 for irregularities in supervising bankruptcy cases.53 ° Cornelius
Hanford, a district court judge in Washington State, resigned in 1912
during a House investigation into allegations of corruption and
drunkenness. 3' Daniel Wright of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia resigned in 1914 during a House Judiciary Committee
subcommittee impeachment investigation on corruption and miscellaneous
other charges.532 And Francis Winslow, a district court judge in New York,
resigned in 1929 on the day a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee
was to begin impeachment hearings on allegations of corruption.53
In 1921, the House referred to the Judiciary Committee an
impeachment resolution accusing Kenesaw Mountain Landis, a district
judge in Illinois, of "neglecting his official duties for another gainful
524. Id. at 245; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 152.
525. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 152-53.
526. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 246-47.
527. tenBroek, supra note 506, at 198.
528. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 202, 245; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2511.
529. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 202, 226; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, § 2512.
530. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 201-02, 230; 3 HINDS, supra note 422, §§ 2506-09.
531. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 203,232-33; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 526.
532. BORKIN, supra note 422, at 203, 257; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 528.
533. BORKN, supra note 422, at 255-57; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 550.
occupation not connected therewith."'53 In 1920, Landis had accepted a job
as the first Commissioner of baseball-which paid $50,000 a year
compared to a federal judge's $7,500 salary535-and did not think he
needed to resign from the bench. After a public outcry, and after an
impeachment investigation began, Landis rethought that position and
resigned from the less lucrative and, some would say, the less intriguing of
the two jobs. 36
From 1931 until he left office in March 1933, Herbert Hoover was
probably the most reviled of all presidents, and his handling of the Great
Depression was widely felt to have exacerbated a national disaster with
enormous human suffering. Millions of people who had lost their jobs
were reduced to living in shacks or tents in communities of the homeless
called Hoovervilles. At no other point in American history have so many
people felt that they were being personally and directly harmed by the
failures of a single president. The enduring image of the Great Depression
is one of destitute people selling apples on street comers. Hoover was so
isolated from what was happening that he actually believed that these
people were doing well financially, that they had not become unemployed
as factories and other businesses went bankrupt-but instead, in Hoover's
words, had "left their jobs for the more profitable one of selling apples. 537
Even though the economy was in free fall from late 1931 through the
end of Hoover's term, no one seriously thought of impeaching him. He
could not have been convicted. Although the Democrats controlled the
House of Representatives during this period, the Republicans barely held
onto the Senate. 38  There is no evidence that the Democrats even
considered using impeachment as a political tactic to harass and embarrass
Hoover and his party in preparation for the 1932 elections, as the
Republicans in 1998 and 1999 used impeachment to harass and embarrass
Clinton and the Democrats. In December 1932, a lone Congressman
moved for Hoover's impeachment. A month earlier, Franklin D.
Roosevelent had overwhelmingly defeated Hoover, but Hoover's term still
had four months to run because the Twentieth Amendment, shortening the
534. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 535.
535. JONATHAN FRASER LIGHT, THE CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BASEBALL 179 (1997);
DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN
LANDIS 195 (1998). The impeachment resolution alleged that the Commissioner's salary was
$42,500, 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 535, but baseball historians presumably
know more about such things than contemporary Congressmen did.
536. PtETRUSZA, supra note 535, at 196-208; 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 535.
537. 3 HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER: THE GREAT DEPRESSION
195 (1952).
538. See infra tbl.3.
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time between election and inauguration, had not yet been adopted. The
House quickly and overwhelmingly rejected the motion. 9
In the years since 1868, impeachment had largely lost its political
purpose and was used primarily to remove from office deeply
unsatisfactory officials. By the 1930s, impeachment had become so
nonpartisan that its use as a political weapon seemed to have left
everyone's consciousness.
2. 1937
Sometimes, the thing that is most revealing is what did not happen,
like the dog that did not bark,u° or the impeachment that was never
attempted or threatened.
In 1928, Hoover was elected president in a landslide. The Great
Depression began the following year. By November 1932, when Franklin
D. Roosevelt defeated Hoover in an even bigger landslide, the economy
had collapsed. The week before Roosevelt's inauguration in March 1933,
virtually every bank in the United States was closed, and commerce was
being conducted by barter. In Roosevelt's first administration, a massive
amount of legislation was enacted in attempts to restore prosperity and to
stabilize capitalism by adopting the types of social insurance that had long
ago been enacted in nearly every advanced European country.
This New Deal resulted from a massive political realignment. The
Democrats, who had been a minority party since the Civil War, suddenly
became the majority party and remained so for the next two generations.
The size and speed of this political tidal wave can be seen in the results of
Congressional elections from 1928 through 1938.541
539. 6 CANNON'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 541; 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra
note 504, § 14.3; Turley, supra note 485, at 76 n.364.
540. "Is there any other point to which you wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes .... Obviously the midnight visitor
was someone the dog knew well."




Congressional Party Divisions After
the Elections of 1928 Through 1938
1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1938
Senate
542
Democrats 39 47 59 69 76 69
Republicans 56 48 36 25 16 23
Farmer-Labor 1 1 1 1 2 2
Progressive 1 1 1
Independent 1 1
House 43
Democrats 164 216 313 322 334 262
Republicans 270 218 117 103 88 169
Farmer-Labor 1 1 5 3 5 1
Progressive 7 8 2
American-Labor I
The numbers in Table 3 understate Democratic strength because the
third-party Senators and Representatives nearly all voted enthusiastically
for New Deal legislation. At times, political change happened so fast that
party divisions in Congress changed every few weeks. For example, in the
November 1930 elections the Republicans retained the House of
Representatives by two seats. But before the first day the newly elected
Congress convened, nineteen Representatives-elect had died. In special
elections to replace them, fourteen of these seats changed hands, producing
a Democratic majority in the House not reflected in Table 3.
Roosevelt viewed the Supreme Court with suspicion even before he
was elected president. In the 1932 election campaign, he feared that, even
if he won, the Republican Party would continue to control the Court.5"
Republican presidents concerned with property rights had nominated seven
of the nine Justices then on the Court. Although two of those seven had
joined the progressive wing (Harlan Fiske Stone and Benjamin Cardozo),
one of the Justices nominated by a Democratic president had become
viscerally and reflexively right-wing (James McReynolds). The senior
Justice, Willis Van Devanter, had been nominated by William Howard
542. Senate Party Divisions, supra note 198.
543. House Party Divisions, supra note 199.
544. JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 15 (1938).
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Taft. In four years as president, Taft had appointed a total of six Justices-
more than any other president except George Washington, who appointed
the entire first Supreme Court, and Franklin Roosevelt, who was president
for longer than anyone else. 5
Taft had had a profound influence on the entire federal judiciary, and
he would rather have been chief justice than president, as he admitted while
appointing Chief Justice Edward D. White.5 46  At the 1912 Republican
Convention, Taft and his campaign manager had asked Warren Harding to
147make the speech nominating Taft for reelection. After Harding was
himself elected president in 1920, Taft successfully lobbied to be appointed
chief justice. 48 (Taft is the only person to have headed both the executive
and judicial branches of the federal government.) While chief justice, Taft
persuaded Harding to nominate Pierce Butler as associate justice. 49 Butler
"had the distinction of voting to overturn sixty-nine federal statutes after
Franklin D. Roosevelt became president."55 Taft "then strategized with
Butler and the White House staff on how to get Butler confirmed by the
Senate. 551  When the next Supreme Court vacancy appeared, Taft
dissuaded Harding from appointing Learned Hand.552 While chief justice,
he constantly badgered presidents and attorneys general on whom to
appoint to any vacancy on any federal court. 53 His only significant failure
was when, out of office, he opposed Woodrow Wilson's nomination of
Louis Brandeis.
554
Well aware of all this, Roosevelt and the Democrats viewed the
Supreme Court as Jefferson and his allies had viewed the Court and the
federal judiciary of their time: as a fortress into which a party soundly
defeated in elections had retreated. By 1935, four Justices-James
545. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 377-81; C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT
COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937-1947, at 17 (1948).
546. 1 HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT 535 (1939).
547. DAVID H. BURTON, TAFT, HOLMES, AND THE 1920S COURT 113-14 (1998); ROBERT K.
MURRAY, THE HARDING ERA: WARREN G. HARDING AND HIS ADMINISTRATION 12 (1969);
FRANCIS RUSSELL, THE SHADOW OF BLOOMING GROVE: WARREN G. HARDING AND HIS TIMES
229 (1968); PAUL SIMON, ADVICE AND CONSENT: CLARENCE THOMAS, ROBERT BORK, AND THE
INTRIGUING HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NOMINATION BATTLES 225 (1992).
548. PRITCHETT, supra note 545, at 17-18; SIMON, supra note 530, at 227.
549. DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED 41-55, 87 (1964);
RUSSELL, supra note, at 507 n.5; SIMON, supra note 530, at 227; EUGENE P. TRANI & DAVID L.
WILSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF WARREN G. HARDING 49 (1977).
550. TRANI & WILSON, supra note 549.
551. SIMON, supra note 530, at 227.
552. Id..
553. Id at 226-28; see also RUSSELL, supra note at 507 n.5.
554. PRINGLE, supra note 546, at 955.
McReynolds, George Sutherland, Pierce Butler, and Willis Van
Devanter-consistently voted to strike down New Deal statutes as
unconstitutional. Later, they became known collectively as the Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse. 555  Three Justices-Louis Brandeis,
Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske Stone-generally voted to sustain
New Deal legislation. The swing votes belonged to Owen Roberts and
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, both of whom frequently sided with
the Four Horsemen in 1935 and 1936.
More than any other before or since, this was the Supreme Court that
most clearly deserved the designation of "judicial activist." In not much
more than a year, it struck down the Railroad Pension Act,556 the National
Industrial Recovery Act (the NIRA, but more commonly known by the
initials of the agency it authorized, the National Recovery Administration
or NRA), 557 the Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act,558 section five of the
Federal Home Owner's Loan Act,559 the Agricultural Adjustment Act (the
AAA), 560 the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, 561 and the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act.562
The weakest New Deal legislation-both constitutionally, and
logically-were some of the emergency bills written and enacted quickly
555. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 19 (2000).
556. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
557. A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the "sick chicken"
case).
558. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
559. Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935).
560. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Actually, the Court held that the tax at the heart
of the AAA was unconstitutional (rather than the entire statute), but without the tax, the AAA was
an empty shell. Before the AAA was enacted, Brandeis told Administration officials privately that
he thought the bill would be economically destructive. Through Adolf Berle, Brandeis wrote to
Roosevelt and threatened-in Brandeis's words--"to hold the government's control legislation
unconstitutional from now on" if it continued to reward large businesses and farmers at the expense
of smaller economic actors (the NRA case had not yet reached the Supreme Court). MARIAN C.
MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR: THE COURT-
PACKING CRISIS OF 1937, at 128-30 (2002). In the summer of 1934, Administration officials visited
Brandeis on Cape Cod, where he was vacationing, and tried to persuade him that the AAA should be
sustained when eventually litigated in the Supreme Court. Under the conflict-of-interest statute in
effect today, all of this would have required Brandeis's recusal from Butler, the AAA case. See 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). Brandeis was quiet on the bench when Butler was argued and in conference when
it was considered. MCKENNA, supra, at 133. He wrote no opinion, only signing Stone's dissent
from the decision to hold the AAA tax unconstitutional. The only plausible explanation for this
mute about-face would be a realization on Brandeis's part that he had said too much earlier, and that
if he voted with the majority, the Administration would complain that he had been behaving and
thinking unjudicially, which was true. Id.
561. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
562. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
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after Roosevelt's inauguration in 1933. Typically, the Four Horsemen
voted solidly against New Deal legislation and picked up one or both of the
swing votes, although with some of the emergency legislation, like the
NRA, the Justices' vote to nullify was unanimous. The NRA was clearly
beyond the constitutional power of Congress to legislate. It was also
dreadful economic policy. The NRA was designed to raise industrial
wages for those who were employed. At a time of epidemic business
failures and consequent unemployment, its effect-had it been permitted to
continue-would have been to drive even more companies out of business
and put even more people out of work while raising the prices of goods and
services that consumers already could not afford to buy. The AAA had
similar defects in regard to food and agriculture. It is fashionable today
among neoclassical economists to blame Roosevelt for this, but economic
knowledge in the 1930s was so primitive (even the available economic
statistics could not meet modem standards for accuracy), and the Great
Depression was so cataclysmic and unprecedented, that the only thing
Roosevelt could do was to try several different approaches simultaneously
to see which would work. In retrospect, what did work was not regulation
of wages and production but instead simple government spending through
the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and
similar programs, which gave people employment and money to create
demand for goods and services. What finally ended the Depression was the
largest government spending program in history: the Second World War.
But, during the Depression nearly everyone feared that if the government
spent too much, it would collapse into insolvency.
New Deal legislation of a more permanent nature was more
thoroughly thought out than the NRA and the AAA. Much of it had been
proposed before Roosevelt became president and had been refined through
years of vetting by legislators and academics associated with the
Progressive movement that preceded the New Deal. These more carefully
written statutes not only accomplished their goals more effectively, but
were easier to defend constitutionally. An example was the statute
authorizing the Tennessee Valley Authority, which would build dams on
the Tennessee River and generate affordable electricity for the middle
South, and which the Court did sustain. 63
But the distinction between emergency legislation meant to stimulate
the economy and legislation meant to permanently reform and modernize
capitalism is apparent only now in hindsight. Almost nobody understood it
at the time. The first wave of New Deal legislation to reach the Supreme
563. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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Court was made up primarily of emergency statutes, and the Court's
reaction was startling. On Black Monday, May 27, 1935, the Court
unanimously struck down, on constitutional grounds, legislation in three
separate cases. It seemed as though no part of the New Deal was safe.
Every time the Justices took the bench to announce any decision involving
a statute enacted after Roosevelt's inauguration, the country anxiously
waited to find out which part of the New Deal would be struck down or
allowed to survive. When Wall Street "stockbrokers heard that Hughes
was reading the opinion in Ashwander," on the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Valley Authority, "they jumped to the conclusion that it was
adverse to the government and began buying utility stocks as fast as they
could get their orders filled. . . . Later, when it appeared that the
Administration had been sustained, they made frantic efforts to get rid of
the stocks they had bought less than an hour earlier." 564
Roosevelt was convinced that unless something changed drastically
and quickly the entire New Deal-including aspects of government we
take for granted today, such as social security-would be struck down by
the Supreme Court as unconstitutional, making recovery from the
Depression and a modernized capitalism impossible. Essential elements of
the New Deal-such as the Social Security Act,565 the National Labor
Relations Act,566 the Banking Act of 1935,567 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934-were being litigated in the lower courts and had not yet
reached the Supreme Court. After a Cabinet meeting in December 1935,
Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, wrote in his diary,
"Clearly, it is running in the President's mind that substantially all of the
New Deal bills will be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
This will mean that everything that this Administration has done of any
moment will be nullified., 568 Roosevelt considered several options, among
them limiting the Court's jurisdiction by statute, amending the Constitution
to provide the federal government with the powers the Court had held it
lacked, and amending the Constitution to create a procedure through which
Congress could reenact nullified statutes and constitutionalize them.5 69 The
Depression had already brought the National Socialist Party to power in
Germany and had brought Fascist and Communist parties near power
564. MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 189 n.28.
565. ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935).
566. ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
567. ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935).
568. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 95 (1995) (quoting Ickes's diary).
569. Id.; MCKENNA,supra note 560, at 165-75.
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elsewhere in Europe.57 ° When Roosevelt first explained to a meeting of
Cabinet officials and Congressional leaders what he intended to do about
the Supreme Court, he said: "When I retire to private life on January 20,
1941, I do not want to leave the country in the condition Buchanan left it to
Lincoln [on the eve of the Civil War]."57'
On January 20, 1937, Roosevelt was inaugurated for his second term
as president. On February 5, he asked Congress to enact legislation to
make the judiciary generally more efficient, one aspect of which-treated
as a minor one in Roosevelt's message-would be to add an additional
Justice to the Supreme Court whenever an existing Justice passed the age
of 70.572 Roosevelt's slyness in packaging the court-packing plan in a
proposal on judicial efficiency was quickly seen as deceptive. The whole
proposal was really intended to achieve a single goal: Roosevelt needed at
least a three-vote margin in the Supreme Court. If the number of Justices
remained at nine, he would have been satisfied with six-to-three votes in
his favor, but he viewed five-to-four victories as, in his own words, "too
uncertain.,
573
Almost a quarter-century before, McReynolds himself had proposed
the concept on which Roosevelt's court-packing plan was based. In Justice
Department files, Administration lawyers had found a forgotten proposal
drafted by McReynolds in 1913 or 1914, when he was Woodrow Wilson's
Attorney General.574 The McReynolds plan would have applied to the
lower courts and not to the Supreme Court, but the idea was the same:
when a federal judge did not retire at a stipulated age, the president could
appoint another judge to supplement and in some ways supplant the one
who would not retire.575 Homer Cummings, Roosevelt's attorney general,
recommended it to Roosevelt, who loved the irony of using McReynolds'
own idea against the Four Horseman.576 A "seething rage had been
building in Roosevelt for a long time. 577  Even though he had won
massive electoral landslides, everything he had accomplished was being
570. The Fascist government in Italy and the Communist government in the Soviet Union
predated the Depression.
571. LEONARD BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUEL BETWEEN FDR AND THE SUPREME
COURT 10 (1967); LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 109.
572. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. TRANSMITTING A RECOMMENDATION TO
REORGANIZE THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF THE FED. GOv'T, H.R. DOc. NO. 75-142 (1937).
573. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 209.
574. Id. at 33; BAKER, supra note 571, at 134; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 120.
575. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 33.
576. Id. at 33-36; BAKER, supra note 571, at 134; MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 256-57,
268-69; STEPHENSON, supra note 151, at 312.
577. MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 263.
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dismantled by a handful of unelected judges. Perhaps his outrage and the
pleasure of the irony is why neither Roosevelt nor Cummings noticed that
the court-packing plan was crude, impractical, and certain to offend most
people's sense of what is fair and appropriate.578
Rejiggering the number of Supreme Court Justices to gain a partisan
advantage had a great deal of historical precedent. In the Constitution's
first century, politicians continuously fiddled with the size of the Court so
they could pack it:
John Adams, as his Presidency came to an end, had Congress
pass a law to reduce the size of the court from six to five
members, to take effect when the next vacancy occurred, so that
Thomas Jefferson, his successor, would not have an opportunity
to fill a vacancy. When Jefferson was President, he was able to
make appointments by having the Court restored to six justices
and then raised to seven. In 1837, the Court was increased to
nine. In 1863, to prevent the Court from blocking Lincoln's war
policies, the Court was increased to ten, to, in effect, pack the
Court in Lincoln's favor. In 1866, when there were two
vacancies ... , the Congress reduced the Court's membership
from ten to eight so that President Andrew Johnson might not be
able to fill the two empty seats. In 1869, the eight-man Court
had one vacancy. It also [had held] unconstitutional the Legal
Tender Act, by which the Union had financed the Civil War.
Congress increased the Court's size to nine, giving President
Ulysses S. Grant two appointments .... As soon as his two
appointees took their seats on the Court, the Court voted again
on the Legal Tender Act and approved it.
579
The primary difference between all these precedents and Roosevelt's plan
was the formula for increasing the size of the Court, which McReynolds
had unwittingly supplied. But Roosevelt's plan stunned Congress and the
public. After intense political maneuvering, it died through a procedural
vote in the Senate in July 1937-a humiliation for a president who had just
won an historic landslide, and whose party had huge majorities in both
Houses of Congress. Roosevelt personally suffered a loss of public trust
and credibility because the court-packing plan was widely seen as
reflecting bad political judgment, disingenuousness, and an appetite for
power in conflict with the checks and balances inherent in the Constitution.
But Roosevelt ultimately got what he wanted, even if he appeared to
lose. Folklore has it that Hughes and Roberts were so intimidated by the
578. See infra text accompanying notes 600-605.
579. BAKER, supra note 571, at 133-34.
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1936 Democratic landslide, or by the court-packing plan, or both, that they
switched sides and began voting with Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone-the
"switch in time that saved nine." The switch is generally thought to have
begun when Roberts changed his position on whether a government could
constitutionally require employers to pay a minimum wage. In the spring
of 1936, the Court had struck down a New York statute requiring
employers to pay a minimum wage to women. 580 The statute was not part
of the New Deal, but the Court's reasoning replicated the rationale in some
of its decisions striking down New Deal legislation. In the fall, the Court
had granted certiorari to review a nearly identical Washington State statute.
The case was argued in December 1936, and the Justices first discussed it
in conference around the turn of the year. The Court again reconsidered
the case in conference on February 6, the day after Roosevelt's court-
packing proposal was sent to Congress. 581 In both conferences-before
and after the court-packing plan had been announced-Roberts voted to
sustain the Washington statute.582 The decision was announced on March
29.583 More cases quickly followed in which the Court sustained the
580. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
581. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 139-40; BAKER, supra note 571, at 175-76;
MCKENNA, supra note 543, at 414.
582. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 140-41; BAKER, supra note 571, at 176;
MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 414.
583. W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). After Felix Frankfurter was appointed
to the Supreme Court, he heard from Roberts an explanation for this about-face that Frankfurter
urged Roberts to commit to writing. In the resulting memorandum, Roberts claimed that in
Tipaldo, the state of New York had not asked the Court to overrule an earlier case, Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), that held minimum wage legislation unconstitutional,
and that as long as Adkins was good law, Roberts felt compelled to follow it, even though he
thought it should be overruled. Although New York had not done so in its brief or in oral
argument, it did in its certiorari petition take the position that the circumstances prevailing in
1936 "call for a reconsideration of the Adkins case." BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 96 (1998) (quoting the
petition). The New York statute had been enacted during the Depression, but the Washington
State statute dated from 1913. Id. West Coast Hotel was an appeal from a decision of the
Washington State Supreme Court holding that Adkins had been impliedly overruled by later
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. But in the Supreme Court, the State of Washington did not
argue that Adkins should be overruled or treated as though it had already been overruled. Id.
Thus, the explanation Roberts gave in the memorandum is not entirely consistent with the
procedural facts. And, a year after West Coast Hotel, Roberts joined in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), to overrule a much older and more widely followed precedent,
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), even though none of the parties had briefed, argued, or in any
other way raised the issue of whether Swift should be overruled. Moreover, overruling was not
the only way around Adkins. A judge who cannot distinguish into oblivion a precedent he does
not wish to follow has not learned some basic analytical skills taught beginning in the first year of
law school. Cushman argues that Roberts might have been willing to vote to overrule Adkins in
Tipaldo except that he was under the impression that the votes to do so were lacking at the time
because Hughes had not said he would, and that the Tipaldo fiasco, for which the Court was
National Labor Relations Act 584 and the Social Security Act585 in April and
May 1937. From then on, "the Supreme Court upheld every New Deal
statute that came before it."
586
The switch alone would not have been enough to satisfy Roosevelt or
to persuade Congress that the crisis had passed. Van Devanter announced
his retirement in May 1937.587 He was able to do so only because a few
months earlier Congress had enacted a statute guaranteeing retiring Justices
for the rest of their lives their salary at the time of retirement, in lieu of a
pension. 588 The bill had been introduced in 1935 but failed on the floor of
the House. 589 The Administration wanted this bill to pass 590 but failed to
make it a priority. When Roosevelt announced the court-packing plan,
Hatton Sumners, the chair of the House Judiciary Committee, resuscitated
the retirement bill and got it enacted at warp speed. Sumners was joined by
other legislators who opposed packing the Court and wanted a different
solution. 591  The bill cleared the House five days after Roosevelt's
severely criticized at the time, was thus the result of miscommunication between Hughes and
Roberts. CUSHMAN, supra, at 100-03. Although this has a ring of human realism to it,
particularly because Tipaldo was decided "[a]t the end of the most fractious and exhausting term
of Hughes' tenure," id. at 103, it is only a possibility for which there is no direct evidence. The
memorandum Roberts wrote at Frankfurter's suggestion is not persuasive, both because of the
inconsistencies mentioned above and because of general principles of historical analysis. Careful
historians are usually not persuaded by what people say to justify their actions. We learn more
about why people have acted from the nature of their actions and the context in which they acted
and from what they have said in unguarded circumstances. It is not that historical figures should
be assumed to lie about their motivations (though some do lie). The problem is that the urge to
rationalize and justify one's own behavior can cause anyone to lose insight about themselves or
not develop it. This is especially true of people who are worried about how they will be
remembered by history, and it may be even more true of lawyers and judges, whose everyday
business is rationalizing and justifying.
584. Wash., Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937);
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937).
585. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Charles C. Stewart Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1936).
586. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 220.
587. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 208; STEPHENSON, supra note 151, at 160.
588. Act of March 1, 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2007));
see also DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE END 3-4
(1999); CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
302-04 (David J. Danelski & Jos. S. Tulchin eds., 1973); BAKER, supra note 571, at 229;
STEPHENSON, supra note 151, at 160. Previously, Congress had granted pensions to Supreme
Court Justices but could reduce them, as it did with Holmes after he retired, cutting his pension in
half for the sake of economy. HUGHES, supra, at 303; MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 35.
589. CUSHMAN, supra note 583, at 15.
590. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 281.
591. CUSHMAN, supra note 583, at 15; MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 335.
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announcement of the court-packing plan, and the Senate passed it soon
thereafter; Roosevelt signed it into law on March 1592-a little more than
three weeks from resuscitation to presidential signature.
Van Devanter timed his retirement announcement for the morning of
the day on which the Senate Judiciary Committee was to vote on the court-
packing plan. His announcement helped persuade some members of the
committee that the Court need not be packed.593 Whether because of Van
Devanter's retirement or not, the committee voted to recommend that the
Senate not approve the plan. 594  Sutherland's retirement the following
January,595 created a second vacancy for Roosevelt to fill. Eventually,
Roosevelt appointed a total of eight Supreme Court Justices and promoted
a ninth to Chief Justice.596 Supreme Courts that have left their mark on
history are usually known by the name of the Chief Justices who led
them-the Marshall Court, the Taney Court, the Warren Court, the
Rehnquist Court, and so on. The only exception is the one Roosevelt
appointed, which we know as the Roosevelt Court.
Remarkably, in this titanic clash between the Supreme Court and the
most popular president since 1820, no one seems seriously to have
contemplated using impeachment as a partisan political weapon. There is
no evidence that anyone in the Roosevelt Administration or in Congress
looked for impeachable misdeeds in the public acts of Justices, as the
Jeffersonian party did in the first decade of the nineteenth century, or in
their private lives, as the Nixon Administration was to do in 1969 and
1970. 597 None of the leading studies of the court-packing controversy 598 or
of the doctrinal evolution of the Supreme Court in the 1930S599 mention
592. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 77; CUSHMAN, supra note 583, at 15;
MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 335.
593. ATKINSON, supra note 588, at 105; BAKER, supra note 571, at 229; MCKENNA, supra
note 560, at 454-60.
594. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 209.
595. ATKINSON, supra note 588, at 106; HIUGHES, supra note 588, at 302.
596. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 154.
597. See supra text accompanying notes 211-242; infra text accompanying notes 732-781,
811-846. Bills were introduced to alter the jurisdiction of the Court and in other ways limit its
ability to declare statutes unconstitutional, but never passed in either the House or the Senate.
See CUSHMAN, supra note 583, at 12.
598. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544; BAKER, supra note 554; LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 568; MCKENNA, supra note 560. The Leuchtenburg and McKenna studies are more
thoroughly researched than the others.
599. CUSHMAN, supra note 583; LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568; WHITE, supra note 555.
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any interest in impeachment. Nor do any of the standard histories of the
New Deal.600
Nobody was interested in impeaching even McReynolds, who nursed
scores of hatreds and, like Chase, had alienated through his own
intemperate behavior a great many people. If the House had impeached
McReynolds, some would have defended him out of duty or for political
reasons, but none would have done so out of personal loyalty to him or out
of respect for him or his work. It was in his nature to abuse those around
him. During the Harding Administration, Justice Clarke expressed a desire
to resign partly because "McReynolds had made life on the Court almost
unbearable for him by his incessant insolence and personal insults. '6°
McReynolds detested virtually all ethnic groups other than his own.602 He
despised Brandeis and Cardozo because they were Jewish, and "there is no
official photograph of the Court in 1924, because McReynolds would not
sit next to Brandeis as protocol required. 60 3 He especially hated Roosevelt
and vowed, "I'll never resign as long as that crippled son-of-a-bitch is in
the White House., 60 4  But after Roosevelt was reelected in 1940,
McReynolds finally gave up and announced his retirement eleven days
after Roosevelt took the presidential oath of office for an unprecedented
third time.6 °5 No Justice attended McReynold's funeral,60 6 although several
went to the funeral of his messenger, an African-American who for many
years had suffered with great dignity through McReynolds's racist tirades.
Of the four great confrontations among the branches of the federal
government, 60 7 the battle between Roosevelt and the Supreme Court is the
only one in which none of the political branches reached instinctively for
600. See ANTHONY J. BADGER, THE NEW DEAL: THE DEPRESSION YEARS, 1933-1940
(1989); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox (1956); PAUL
CONKLIN, THE NEW DEAL (1967); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 1933-1937,
A HISTORY (1986); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM 1937-1940, A HISTORY (1993);
DANIEL R. FUSFIELD, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE NEW DEAL (1956); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND
HIS LEGACY (1995); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW
DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); JOHN MAJOR, THE NEW DEAL (1967); RONALD A. MULDER, THE
INSURGENT PROGRESSIVES IN THE SENATE AND THE NEW DEAL (1979); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL, 1935-1936 (1960); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL, 1933-1935 (1959).
601. DANELSKI, supra note 549, at 42.
602. Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow, Foreward to JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN
MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX, at xx (Dermis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds. 2002).
603. Id. at xix.
604. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, at 121.
605. ATKINSON, supra note 588, at 113.
606. Id. at 112.
607. See supra text following note 20.
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impeachment as a partisan weapon. One reason was that the events of
1937 occurred deep in the era of almost purely nonpartisan and bipartisan
impeachment. A second was that Roosevelt's personal political style was
not confrontational. He preferred to lead through flanking maneuvers,
goading the public in whatever direction he wanted to go while pretending
to follow the consensus he was building. He believed that winning by
defeating others was costlier and more distasteful than winning by
following an indirect path to his goal. A third reason was that the
Democratic landslide of 1936 was massive, the most lopsided since 1820
both in popular votes and in the composition of Congress; it has not been
equaled since then. A party in so enviable a position can afford to have the
confidence that its problems can be solved without attacking individuals.
In the end, Roosevelt got what he wanted, although historians disagree
about how it happened. Some believe that the election, or the court-
packing plan, or both, influenced Roberts and, to a lesser extent, Hughes in
how they voted, thus causing an abrupt change in constitutional law.
60 8
Others argue that, even before the election in November 1936 and
Roosevelt's presentation of the court-packing plan in February 1937, the
Court had been evolving toward what we now think of New Deal and post-
New Deal jurisprudence.60 9 It is true that some ingredients of the post-
1937 doctrine on government regulatory powers appear in embryonic form
in some pre-1937 cases. But the rationalizations in judicial opinions are
often justifications for what judges want to do rather than their real reasons
for deciding, and one of the more effective methods of justifying a court's
decision is to write the opinion so that it appears to be grounded in past
practice as much as possible. Academically formalistic analysis is thus a
limited and only partially reliable tool for discovering what judges are
really up to. Moreover, Roberts never satisfactorily explained the 180-
degree somersault he made between the two state minimum wage cases,
and even he might not fully have understood why he did what he did.
Perhaps the most we can know is that the timing proves that Roberts could
608. This view is common among the historians cited in note 600, including
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 568, and, to a lesser extent, MCKENNA, supra note 560.
609. CUSHMAN, supra note 583; WHITE, supra note 555; Richard D. Friedman, Switching
Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and the Constitutional Transformation,
142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994). For a debate between the two sides in this controversy, see
Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST. REV.
1052 (2005), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/lI 0.4/kalman.html;
William E. Leuchtenburg, Comment on Laura Kalman 's Article, 110 AM. HIS. REV. 1081 (2005),
available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/110.4/leuchtenburg.html; G. Edward
White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM.
HIST. REv. 1094 (2005), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/joumals/ahr/l10.4/
white.html.
not have been influenced by the court-packing plan, which was announced
after he stated his position in conference, and that he might have been
influenced by the election, which happened before he did so.
It is plain, however, that the effect of the retirement bill has been
underestimated. Van Devanter and Sutherland hinted that they would have
retired immediately after it became law. But to avoid giving the
impression that the court-packing plan had intimidated them, they delayed
their retirements. 610 The Court might have been "nine old men," as it was
pejoratively dismissed at the time,61 but the power the Four Horsemen
exercised had obscured the fact that at least some of them were very
fatigued old men.
3. Ritter
Halsted Ritter, a Republican lawyer in Colorado, moved to Florida in
1925.612 Four years later, Republican Presdient Calvin Coolidge nominated
him for a district court judgeship in Florida.613 A Republican-dominated
Senate confirmed him. Apparently his appointment annoyed Florida
politicians and the Florida Bar. Florida was a predominantly Democratic
state with memories of the Reconstruction. The annoyance stemmed from
having a Republican with no roots to Florida-a "carpetbagger" in
Southern speech-appointed to the federal bench. In 1933, only four years
after Ritter assumed the bench, the House began an impeachment
investigation.61 4 In 1936, Ritter was impeached for allegedly denying a
plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their own lawsuit; awarding excessive fees in
the same case to his former law partner, who immediately gave money to
Ritter; evading income tax; and practicing law while a federal judge.61 5 In
an overwhelmingly Democratic House, the vote to impeach was 181 to
146.616 Almost all the votes for impeachment were Democratic. 617 Sixty-
three Democrats and eighty-one Republicans voted against
impeachment.618  It appears that Republicans were united against
610. BAKER, supra note 571, at 229; CUSHMAN, supra note 583, at 230-31; HUGHES, supra
note 588, at 303.
611. See, e.g., DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN (1936).
612. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 269.
613. Id.
614. Id.
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impeachment, but Democrats were free to vote one way or the other,
though most voted to impeach.
Ritter was acquitted of all the articles of impeachment that charged
him with criminal activity and was convicted only of the article that alleged
that his conduct, as set forth in the other articles, had brought his court
"into scandal and disrepute." 619  On all the articles of which he was
acquitted, at least a simple majority-but not a two-thirds majority-voted
for conviction. 620 On each article, most Republicans voted to acquit.621 On
three articles, almost as many Democrats voted to acquit as to convict.
622
On the other four articles, Democrats voted to convict by sizeable
majorities.623
TenBroek argued that the Ritter impeachment could have been
motivated by partisan political motives because Ritter was acquitted of the
articles charging criminal conduct but convicted of discrediting his court,
and because the Ritter trial preceded by ten months Roosevelt's court-
packing proposal.624 To justify his unsuccessful attempt to get Justice
Douglas impeached,625 Gerald Ford repeated this theory, arguing that in the
Ritter impeachment "the criminal charges were admittedly thin," that Ritter
was a conservative Republican, and that the impeachment occurred "in the
context of F.D.R.'s effort to pack the Supreme Court with Justices more to
his liking.,
626
That theory cannot be substantiated by the facts. First, the Senate vote
to convict on the first and most important article alleging corruption was
fifty-five in favor and twenty-nine againstE7--one vote shy of the two-
thirds needed to convict. The tally on the scandal-and-disrepute article was
fifty-six to twenty-eight to convict, or exactly two-thirds. A single vote
differentiates the two articles of impeachment. On all but one of the other
articles, a majority voted to convict.628 The straightforward explanation is
that one or more Senators thought Ritter was guilty of the corruption
alleged in the other articles, but not of the corruption alleged in the first
article, and joined in voting to convict on the scandal-and-disrepute article.
619. VAN TASSEL & FrNKELMAN, supra note 82, at 158, 165-67.
620. Id. at 158.
621. tenBroek, supra note 506, at 200.
622. Id
623. Id.
624. Id. at 198-204.
625. See infra text accompanying notes 811-846.
626. 116 CONG. REC. 11914 (1970); VAN TASSEL &FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 59.
627. VAN TASSEL & F1NKELMAN, supra note 82, at 158-60.
628. Id. at 158.
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Second, the chronology shows no connection between Ritter and the
controversy over the Supreme Court and the New Deal. The first efforts in
the House to investigate Ritter began in May and June 1933,629 at a time
when the Supreme Court had not (and could not have) decided any New
Deal cases, as Roosevelt and the first New Deal Congress had taken office
only a few months earlier. Ritter was impeached by the House in March
1936,630 and convicted by the Senate in April 1936.631 When the Supreme
Court invalidated the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1935,632
Roosevelt expressed his annoyance to the press, 633 and the reaction to those
comments was so hostile that Roosevelt said virtually nothing else critical
of the Supreme Court until early 1937 634-a period that includes the entire
time during which Ritter was being impeached and tried. Roosevelt
maintained this near silence even from January to June 1936, a time when
the Court delivered a string of decisions attacking the New Deal.6 35 During
the 1936 presidential election campaign, Roosevelt never mentioned the
Supreme Court because he feared that any criticism on his part of the
judiciary would permit the Republicans to convert the core election issue
from economic recovery into preservation of constitutional checks and
balances, which the Republicans were eager to do.636 During a period
when Roosevelt was afraid even to criticize the Supreme Court in public, it
could hardly be true that the Democrats were impeaching and removing an
obscure federal judge to bully the Supreme Court.
Moreover, most of Roosevelt's closest advisors were astounded when
he proposed his court-packing plan in February 1937-ten months after
Ritter had been removed from office.637 Congress reacted similarly. James
MacGregor Bums, one of the most perceptive Roosevelt scholars,
concluded that Roosevelt contemplated doing something about the
629. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 18.1.
630. Id. §§ 18.5-. 10; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 159.
631. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, §§ 18.17-.18.
632. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (the "sick
chicken" case).
633. William E. Leuchtenburg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The Election of
1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077, 2079-81 (1999).
634. Id. at 2081-87.
635. See Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936)
(invalidating the Municipal Bankruptcy Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936)
(comparing the SEC to the Star Chamber); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
636. Leuchtenburg, supra note 633, at 2084-96.
637. BURNS, supra note 600, at 295.
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Supreme Court as early as 1935 but told only those few people needed to
draft the legislation.638 Cummings, Roosevelt's attorney general, drafted
the plan in secret and without the knowledge of Roosevelt's usual
advisors. 639 When Roosevelt announced the court-packing proposal at a
meeting of Cabinet officers and congressional leaders, "the congressional
delegation sat as if stunned., 640 Not only had there been no prior serious
congressional interest in impeaching the judiciary, but Roosevelt's plan
failed mostly because it surprised and appalled many in Congress. The
Senate Judiciary Committee report rejecting the proposal is unique for the
rhetoric with which legislators derogated a measure behind which a
president of their own party had placed his prestige: the court-packing plan
was "an invasion of judicial power such as has never been attempted in this
country" 641 (which was not actually true);642 it would lead to "the very
thing against which the American colonies revolted, and to prevent which
the Constitution was in every particular framed"; 643 and "[i]t is a measure
which should be so emphatically rejected that its parallel will never again
be presented to the free representatives of the free people of America.,
644
These were the same Senators who convicted Ritter.
Third, Roosevelt's troubles were not with the lower judiciary, but with
the Supreme Court, which had been declaring unconstitutional significant
parts of the New Deal. Roosevelt never showed any interest in packing the
lower judiciary, and never needed to because the constitutionality of any
important federal statute would be decided only in the Supreme Court
anyway. Ritter himself never held any New Deal legislation to be
unconstitutional.
Fourth, given the relatively large number, historically, of federal
judges who had resigned in the preceding years during House impeachment
investigations for corruption,645 or who had not resigned and been
impeached,646 there seems to be nothing special or different about Ritter's
situation that would suggest to a Supreme Court Justice that Ritter's
impeachment was aimed at the Supreme Court. Not counting those on
638. Id. at 293.
639. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544, at 25-37; SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 249 (1951); MCKENNA, supra note 560, at 268-69, 281.
640. BURNS, supra note 600, at 294.
641. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REORGANIZATION OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, S. REP. No.
75-711, at 11 (1937) [hereinafter REORGANIZATION OF THE FED. JUDICIARY].
642. See infra text accompanying note 598.
643. REORGANIZATION OF THE FED. JUDICIARY, supra note 641, at 15.
644. Id. at 23.
645. See supra text accompanying notes 505-527.
646. See supra text accompanying notes 528-536.
senior status, there were over two hundred federal judges in 1936,647 and
Ritter was an obscure trial judge in what was in 1936 a backwater rural
state. None of the leading studies of the court-packing controversy 648 even
mentions Ritter.
Finally, the most realistic explanation is that Ritter's appointment
irritated people who were locally important in Florida. that they watched
him carefully for misbehavior, and that he obliged them by misbehaving.
Although the Democrats had a 322 to 103 majority in the House649-- one of
the largest in history-the vote to impeach Ritter was 181 to 146.650 And
although in the Senate the Democrats had a sixty-nine to twenty-five
majority65 '-also one of the largest in history-the vote on the only article
on which Ritter was convicted was fifty-six to twenty-eight.652 On most of
the other six articles, the margin was much closer.
653
4. Judicial Impeachments After Ritter
Several judges resigned during or just before impeachment
investigations. In 1939, Martin T. Manion, Chief Judge of the Second
Circuit, was accused of corruption by Manhattan District Attorney Thomas
E. Dewey, who demanded that the House impeach. Manson resigned
within days, before the House could authorize an investigation.
654
Ferdinand A. Geiger, a district court judge in Wisconsin, resigned in 1939
after House Judiciary Committee hearings on his dismissal of a grand jury
before it could issue findings in a major antitrust case.655 John P. Nields, a
district court judge in Delaware, was the subject of House Judiciary
Committee hearings on unspecified charges in May 1941; he retired in
October of that year.656 Albert W. Johnson, a Pennsylvania district court
judge, resigned in 1945 after a House Judiciary subcommittee
recommended impeachment for bribery.657 The subcommittee found that
his decisions were "commonly sold for all the traffic would bear.,
658
647. See 84 F.2d v-x (1936); 15 F. Supp. v-x (1936).
648. ALSOP & CATLEDGE, supra note 544; BAKER, supra note 571; LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 568; MCKENNA, supra note 560.
649. See supra text accompanying note 543.
650. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 158.
651. See supra text accompanying note 542.
652. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 158.
653. Id.
654. BORKIN, supra note 422 at 27-29, 3 8-82.
655. Id. at 232.
656. Id at 240.
657. Id. at 41-86; 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, § 14.10.
658. H.R. REP. No. 79-1639 (1946).
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Otto Kemer, a court of appeals judge in the Seventh Circuit, was
convicted and sentenced to prison for corrupt activities while he was
Governor of Illinois before his appointment to the federal bench; he
resigned his judgeship before entering prison, avoiding almost certain
impeachment. 659 This was the first time a federal judge had been convicted
while still holding office; he resigned only after he had exhausted all of his
appeals. 660  Robert F. Collins, a district court judge in Louisiana, was
convicted in 1991 of bribery, conspiracy, and obstruction of justice, and
sentenced to six years and ten months in jail.661  Although he was
imprisoned in 1991, Collins did not resign from the bench (and continued
to draw his judicial salary) until 1993. At that point, the chair and the
ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee jointly
introduced a resolution to impeach him.662 On the other hand, Robert P.
Aguilar, a district court judge in California, was convicted in 1990 of
disclosing a wiretap, and obstruction of justice, and sentenced to six
months imprisonment; in 1993, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the wiretap
disclosure conviction, reversed the obstruction of justice conviction, and
remanded for resentencing.663 The House received a resolution to impeach
him in 1993 but did not act upon it.664  Aguilar took senior status in
1996.665
Harry E. Claiborne, a district court judge in Nevada, was convicted in
666a criminal trial of tax evasion. He was sentenced to two years of
imprisonment but refused to resign his judgeship, drew his full salary for
the two years spent in prison, and threatened to sit behind the bench again
and try cases as soon as his imprisonment ended.667 This was the first time
a federal judge had been incarcerated while still holding office. He was
impeached by the House66 8 and convicted by the Senate669 in 1986.670
659. Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265, 326
(1993). "This appears to be the first time a sitting judge was effectively forced from office as the
result of a criminal conviction." Id.
660. Van Tassel, Resignations, supra note 190, at 337, 392.
661. United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1395 (5th Cir. 1992).
662. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 300; Van Tassel, Resignations, supra note
190, at 338.
663. United States v. Aguilar, 994 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1993).
664. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 300.
665. 922 F. Supp. XXIII (1996).
666. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 327.
667. Van Tassel, Resignations, supra note 179, at 337.
668. IMPEACHMENT OF JUDGE HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, H.R. REP. NO. 99-688 (1986).
669. PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY E.
CLAIBORNE, S. Doc. No. 99-48 (1986).
Alcee L. Hastings, a district court judge in Florida was indicted for
bribery but acquitted.671 The Judicial Conference certified to the House
that there might be grounds to impeach Hastings.672  Despite Hastings'
claims that his prosecution and impeachment were motivated by racism,
the House voted 413 to 3 to impeach.673 The Senate committee charged
with examining the evidence was less persuaded. The Democratic
committee chair and Republican vice chair both argued against conviction
because of ambiguities and gaps in the evidence. 674 In 1989, the Senate
convicted Hastings on the impeachment articles that charged him with
conspiring to solicit a bribe, lying under oath, and fabricating evidence.675
Hastings later ran for election to the House of Representatives and won.676
Walter L. Nixon, a district judge in Mississippi, was convicted of
perjury in a criminal trial and sentenced to five years in prison. 677 Like
Claiborne, he refused to resign after his conviction.678 And, like Claiborne,
679he was impeached (in 1988) and convicted (in 1989) while still in prison.
Like Hastings, Nixon had been nominated for the bench by a Democratic
president, impeached by a Democratic House, and convicted by a
Democratic Senate.
680
By 1974, impeachment had become so non-partisan that Raoul Berger
could write that it "has sunk in this country to the ouster of dreary little
judges for squalid misconduct.,
681
5. Nixon and Agnew
On June 17, 1972, a security guard at the Watergate complex in
Washington noticed a burglary in progress and called police, who arrested
670. See BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 289-306.
671. Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. at 326.
672. Id. at 327.
673. MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT 107 (1993); see also IMPEACHMENT OF
JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, H.R. REP. NO. 100-810 (1988).
674. VOLCANSEK, supra note 673, at 114.
675. Id. at 115; see also BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 307-14.
676. VOLCANSEK, supra note 673, at 116.
677. Report of the Nat'l Comm'n on Judicial Discipline & Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265, 327
(1993).
678. Id.
679. Id. at 140; see also IMPEACHMENT OF WALTER L. NIXON, JR., H.R. REP. No. 101-36
(1989); BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 307, 314-18.
680. BUSHNELL, supra note 92, at 318.
681. BERGER, supra note 31, at 3.
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five men inside the offices of the Democratic National Committee. 682 The
Committee to Re-Elect the President, which was coordinating the
reelection campaign of Richard Nixon, had hired them. Six days later,
Nixon and H.R. Haldeman, his principal aide, had a private conversation in
the Oval Office in which they strategized about how to hide White House
involvement in the burglary (this later became known as "the cover-up").
After the burglars were convicted, and before they were to be sentenced,
one of them wrote a letter to the trial judge, John Sirica, saying that the
burglars had been paid off to keep silent about the White House's role ("the
hush money"). Three days later, Sirica read the letter into the record in
court before sentencing the burglars to long prison terms, which he offered
to reduce if they cooperated with a grand jury investigation of the cover-up.
Because of public suspicion that Nixon's Justice Department could
not be relied upon to investigate crimes that might have been committed in
the White House, Attorney General Elliot Richardson appointed Archibald
Cox, a former Solicitor General, as a special prosecutor with his own
independent staff on May 18, 1973. On July 13, Alexander Butterfield,
Nixon's former appointments secretary, testified to a Senate committee
investigating the Watergate burglary and cover-up, that Nixon had ordered
a voice-activation audiotaping system installed in the Oval Office and that
the system recorded every conversation there since 1971.683 On July 23,
1973, Nixon refused to turn over any of these recordings to the Senate
committee or to Cox. Cox later subpoenaed certain recordings from the
White House. Nixon offered instead to let an elderly Senator listen to the
tapes and summarize their contents for Cox. On October 19, 1973, Cox
refused and said that he would seek judicial enforcement of his subpoena.
A day later, on Saturday, October 20, Nixon ordered Richardson to fire
Cox and abolish the office of special prosecutor; Richardson refused and
resigned instead. Within minutes, Nixon ordered Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus to do what Richardson would not, but he, too,
refused and resigned. Solicitor General Robert Bork then became Acting
Attorney General and, obeying Nixon's orders, fired Cox, abolished the
office of special prosecutor, and had the FBI lock up the office and its
records ("the Saturday night massacre").
682. All the published accounts of the Watergate scandal support, without exception, the
narrative in this and the following paragraphs. See MARLYN AYCOCK ET AL., CONG.
QUARTERLY, WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS (1999); FRED EMERY, WATERGATE
(1995); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON
(1992); MICHAEL SCHUDSEN, WATERGATE IN AMERICAN MEMORY: How WE REMEMBER,
FORGET, AND RECONSTRUCT THE PAST (1993).
683. "Nixon Bugged Himself' was the New York Post headline the next day. The headline
alone occupied almost the entire first page of the newspaper.
Public and congressional outrage was so overwhelming ("the
firestorm") that impeachment resolutions were introduced in the House,
and Nixon was forced to back down and appoint another special
prosecutor, Leon Jaworski. By then, the term "Watergate" had expanded
in everyday speech to include allegations about other burglaries, fraudulent
political campaign practices, income tax evasion by Nixon, stealing
government money to improve his private residences in California and
Florida, and the use of the FBI, IRS, and other federal agencies to harrass
political opponents and cover up illegal White House activities. On March
1, 1974, a grand jury supervised by Jaworski's office indicted John
Mitchell, Nixon's Attorney General at the time of the Watergate burglary,
H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, the most important people on
Nixon's White House staff, and other White House aides. In these
indictments, Nixon was named as an unindicted co-conspirator, which did
not become public until later that summer. Jaworski decided not to indict
Nixon because he was not sure he could indict a sitting president.684
On July 24, 1974, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts'
orders commanding Nixon to surrender the tapes sought by Jaworski and
earlier by Cox. 685 On July 27, 29, and 30, the House Judiciary Committee
voted to recommend to the House that it impeach Nixon on three articles of
impeachment. On August 5, the White House released transcripts of the
June 23, 1972, conversation and two others between Nixon and Haldeman
showing that the White House directed the Watergate burglary and that
Nixon directed the cover-up and ordered the FBI not to investigate the
burglary ("the smoking gun"). Nearly all the Republicans on the House
Judiciary Committee who had voted against the obstruction of justice
article of impeachment announced that they would reverse their votes.686
"By early August, Nixon lost almost all Republican support in
Congress ....,,687 On August 7, Republican leaders in the House and
Senate went to the White House, told Nixon that he would certainly be
impeached and would probably be convicted, and implored him to
688resign. On August 9, Nixon resigned, preventing his certain
684. LEON JAWORSKI, THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE
(1976); see also WATERGATE SPECIAL PROSECUTION FORCE, REPORT (1975).
685. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also Philip Allen Lacovara, United
States v. Nixon: The Prelude, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1061 (1991).
686. See IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REP. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP. 93-1305, at 359-528
[hereinafter HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON].
687. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 55 (2d ed. 2000).
688. See id.
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impeachment.689 On September 8, Gerald Ford, who had succeeded to the
presidency on Nixon's resignation, granted a pardon for "all offenses
against the United States" committed by Nixon while he was president.
The first article of impeachment approved by the House Judiciary
Committee charged Nixon with obstruction of justice for lying and making
deceptive statements and causing others to lie and make deceptive
statements to federal law enforcement personnel and in court; withholding
evidence; interfering with federal law enforcement investigations; paying
hush money to witnesses; misusing the CIA to obstruct justice; leaking
information gathered by federal law enforcement personnel to people under
criminal investigation; and deceiving the public about investigations of the
Watergate burglary.690 The committee vote in favor of this article was
twenty-seven to eleven.691 Democrats voted for it, twenty to zero, and
Republicans voted against it, six to eleven692 -although after the smoking
gun tapes became public a few days later, ten of the eleven Republicans
who opposed it announced that they would reverse their positions and vote
to impeach.693
The second article of impeachment charged Nixon with abuse of
power for using the IRS, FBI, Secret Service, CIA, and "a secret
investigative unit within the office of the President, financed in part with
money derived from campaign contributions" to violate the constitutional
and statutory rights of citizens.694 The committee vote in favor of this
article was twenty-eight to ten. 695 Democrats voted for it, twenty-one to
zeron, and Republicans voted against it, seven to ten.696 The Republicans
who reversed their votes on the first article declined to do the same on the
second.697
The third article of impeachment charged Nixon with contempt of
Congress for disobeying Congressional subpoenas.698 The committee vote
689. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, ch. 14, § 15; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN,
supra note 82, at 11.
690. HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 1-3.
691. Id. at 335; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 259.
692. Compare HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 335 (comparing to the
party affiliation listed at ii).
693. Id. at 359-528.
694. Id. at 3-4.
695. Id. at 336; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 259.
696. HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 336 (comparing to the party
affiliation listed at ii).
697. Id. at 359-60.
698. Id. at 4.
in favor was twenty-one to seventeen. 699 Democrats voted for it, nineteen
to two, and Republicans voted against it, two to fifteen.7 °° (The committee
rejected other articles on income tax evasion and the bombing of Cambodia
secretly and without Congressional authorization).0
Separately from all this, in 1973, about two weeks before Vice
President Spiro Agnew resigned and pleaded nolo contendere to criminal
charges of receiving bribes,70 2 he asked the House to begin an
impeachment inquiry against him on the claim that he could not be
prosecuted criminally while still vice president. 70 3 The House ignored this
request, 70 4 which was a tactical feint to delay a criminal indictment.
Although the Nixon near-impeachment may be remembered in some
extremist right-wing circles as a wound, it was non-partisan in every
conceivable sense. Individual members of the House Judiciary Committee
imposed on themselves the extraordinarily high evidentiary burden of clear
and convincing evidence, and in some cases, the higher burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.70 5 In the initial committee votes, a significant
bloc of Republicans voted, with Democrats, for impeachment. After the
smoking gun tape transcripts were released, all but one of the remaining
Republicans deserted Nixon, and Republican leaders of both Houses of
Congress went to the White House, advised Nixon that he would be
impeached by an overwhelming vote in the House, and asked him to
resign, which he did.
F. The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon
By the 1950s, historical memory treated the Andrew Johnson
impeachment as an aberrational abuse of power, regrettable no matter how
badly Johnson himself had behaved. Then-Senator John F. Kennedy's
1955 book Profiles in Courage described Senator Edmund G. Ross's
deciding vote against convicting Johnson as an act of heroism.
70 6
Impeachment had been utilized so long for the sole purpose of ousting
corrupt office holders, that its other use-as a political weapon during
699. Id. at 337; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 259.
700. HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 337 (comparing to to the party
affiliation listed at ii).
701. Id. at 217-26, 338-39; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 259.
702. See RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW (1974).
703. 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, ch. 14, § 14.17.
704. Id.
705. See infra text accompanying notes 982-984, 1071-1092.
706. JOHNF. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 115-38 (1955).
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periods of political crisis-had been forgotten or considered an artifact of
past and less civilized times. In the mid-1950s, billboards urging "Impeach
Earl Warren" began proliferating along rural highways, at least some of
them paid for by the John Birch Society,70 7 and in 1957 the Georgia State
House of Representatives passed a resolution petitioning Congress to
impeach not only Chief Justice Warren, but also Justices Black,
Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, and Reed.7 °8 But these instances were seen at
the time as marginal and irrelevant, rather than as beginnings of the revival
of impeachment as a partisan political weapon.
1. The Fortas and Douglas Investigations: The Beginning of the
Struggle for the Supreme Court
Brown v. Board of Education70 9 began a long process through which
the vacating and filling of seats on the Supreme Court became an
interminable focus of partisan political fighting. At one point, during the
first Nixon Administration, confirmation struggles and attempted
impeachments were joined into a single battlefield. Brown and its progeny
infuriated most of the white South, and in the 1950s and 1960s, it could be
dangerous to be a federal judge in a Southern state enforcing desegregation
law. 710  And the Supreme Court angered other constituencies as well
through a wide range of decisions
711 concerning reapportionment 7
12
criminal procedure,713 obscenity,714 civil rights,715 the relationship between
government and religion,716 and eventually abortion.717 The Republican
707. Bruce H. Kalk, The Carswell Affair: The Politics of a Supreme Court Nomination in the
Nixon Administration, 42 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261, 263 (1998); William G. Ross, Attacks on the
Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements Fail, 50 BUFF.
L. REV. 483, 506 (2002).
708. Ross, supra note 707, at 506 n.1 14.
709. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
710. See FRANK T. READ & LUCY S. McGOUGH, LET THEM BE JUDGED: THE JUDICIAL
INTEGRATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH (1978).
711. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
712. See e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
713. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
714. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
715. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
716. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
717. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Party developed a strategy to build an electoral majority by converting
Southern whites from Democrats into Republicans.718
The first Supreme Court confirmation battle in the style with which
we have now become accustomed-antagonistic interest groups
researching the nominee's background for any conceivable damaging
information, unfriendly Senators cross-examining the nominee while
supporters complain that the nominee is being persecuted, and people on
both sides spinning the facts rather than exploring them with an open
mind--occurred in 1968719 when President Lyndon Johnson nominated
Associate Justice Abe Fortas to replace retiring Chief Justice Earl Warren.
The model for attacking the nominee was set by Republicans and right-
wing Southern Democrats in the 1968 Senate Judiciary Committee.72°
Democrats and interest groups allied with them learned from that
experience and used similar techniques in a muted way in the later
confirmation hearings of Clement Haynsworth, G. Harrold Carswell,
William Rehnquist, and then more aggressively against, Robert Bork and
Clarence Thomas.
The Senate had many times before rejected Supreme Court
nominations. The earliest Senate rejection had been of George
Washington's nomination of John Rutledge. Although Rutledge had
chaired the Committee on Detail, which wrote the first draft of the
Constitution at the Constitutional Convention, the Senate refused to
confirm him as Chief Justice because he had made a speech opposing the
Jay Treaty with France. 721 Jefferson wrote that "[t]he rejection of Rutledge
by the Senate is a bold thing, for they cannot pretend to have any objection
to him"-one of the outstanding lawyers in the country--"but his
disapprobation of the Treaty. It is, of course, a declaration that they will
have none but tories .... 
722
718. See JOSEPH A. AISTRUP, THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY REVISITED: REPUBLICAN TOP-
DOWN ADVANCEMENT IN THE SOUTH 8-9 (1996); NUMAN V. BARTLEY & HUGH D. GRAHAM,
SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1975); REG MURPHY & HAL
GULLIVER, THE SOUTHERN STRATEGY (1971); KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN
MAJORiTY (1970).
719. Before 1968, only one Supreme Court nominee in the twentieth century, John J. Parker
in 1930, had been rejected by the Senate. NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 44-
45 (1998).
720. The parties have realigned since then, and right-wing Southern legislators are now
Republicans.
721. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 54; J. MYRON JACOBSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE
REJECTED: SKETCHES OF THE 26 MEN NOMINATED FOR THE SUPREME COURT BUT NOT
CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE 8-9 (1993).
722. JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 8 (quoting Jefferson's words).
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In all, "33 of the 148 nominees for the highest court [now 150
nominees, including John Roberts and Samuel Alito] have either been
rejected by a vote of the Senate, had the voting on their nomination
repeatedly postponed or filibustered into nonexistence or eventually bowed
out. ' 7 23  In fact, during the nineteenth century over a third of those
nominated to the Court failed to achieve confirmation.724 Among the
casualties was Roger Taney, who was rejected by the Senate when
nominated by Andrew Jackson to be an Associate Justice. The reason was
purely political: as Secretary of the Treasury, Taney had approved
Jackson's withdrawal of federal deposits from the Bank of the United
States725-an issue about which virtually no one at the time had feelings
that could be described as moderate. Actually, the Senate did not reject the
nomination on an up-or-down vote. It moved the nomination off its agenda
and then voted to abolish the vacant seat in a bill that failed enactment in
the House 726 and surely would have been vetoed by Jackson. When Chief
Justice Marshall later died, Jackson nominated Taney again, and he was
confirmed. 727  "[S]enators often admitted to political motives when they
opposed a nominee. 728 President Tyler nominated six men to the Supreme
Court, only one of whom was confirmed.729 Although some nominations in
723. Joshua Spivak, Opinion: Judicial Nomination: Battles Are Not New, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 7,
2005, at col. 1. Different commentators report different numbers because sometimes there is
ambiguity about whether a nomination should be counted as having actually been made or
whether it has been truly rejected. For example, Washington nominated William Paterson for the
Supreme Court in 1793. Paterson co-authored the Judiciary Act of 1789, and "the first nine
sections of the seminal statute, establishing federal district and circuit courts, were in Paterson's
handwriting." ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 57. But when nominated, Paterson was still a
Senator in the Congress that created the positions of Justices on the Supreme Court. The
Constitution established the Court in Article III, section 1, but the Judiciary Act of 1789 created
the individual jobs. And Article 1, section 6, of the Constitution provides that "No Senator or
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created.., during such time."
When Washington realized his mistake, he quickly withdrew Paterson's nomination. Id;
JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 171. Many failed nominations are withdrawn when
the impossibility of their being approved by the Senate becomes clear. A commentator could
reasonably count Paterson's as a failed nomination, or not. As soon as Paterson's Senate term
ended four days after Washington's initial attempt to nominate him, Washington sent his name to
the Senate again, and the Senate immediately approved. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 57;
JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 171.
724. Spivak, supra note 723, at col. 1.
725. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 74; JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 28-29.
726. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 75; JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 30.
727. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 75; JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 30.
728. David Greenberg, Filibustering Judicial Appointments Is Unprecedented?, HIST. NEWS
NET., May 6, 2005, available at http://hnn.us/articles/1 1754.html.
729. JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 35-41.
the twentieth century had been controversial, (most notably Woodrow
Wilson's nomination of Louis Brandeis in 1916)730 at the time of the Fortas
nomination in 1968, the most recent rejection of a nominee by the Senate
had been that of John J. Parker, who was nominated by Herbert Hoover in
1930.7"'
But the events of 1968 started an era of confirmation battles in a long-
running war for control of the Supreme Court. The earlier rejections and
controversies had been episodic, many of them having unique dynamics.
From 1968 on, each nomination became either a battle or a truce in a war
over the Court that sometimes spilled over into impeachment or attempted
impeachment. That is not to say that every impeachment or attempted
impeachment after 1968 was a partisan political attack. The impeachments
of Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Walter Nixon, and the near-
impeachment of President Richard Nixon were all nonpartisan or
bipartisan.732 In 1968, however, the United States entered an era in which
impeachment could be used as a partisan political weapon in a long and
not-yet-ended struggle.
Fortas was considered at the time to have a brilliant legal mind, but he
was not an unblemished nominee. While on the Court, he had advised
President Johnson "on national policy and had even done some behind-the-
scenes lobbying on the president's behalf. 733 Justice Frankfurter, had
done similar things for President Franklin Roosevelt, 734 and later Chief
Justice Warren Burger tried to give advice to President Nixon.735 Only
much later did it become apparent how deeply Fortas's advice had created
conflicts of interest. Fortas had also accepted speaking fees paid by some
prominent businessmen recruited by his former law partner, Paul Porter;
apparently neither Fortas nor Porter worried that the contributors sat on the
boards of a number of corporations which might some day be parties
before the Supreme Court.736 Although this could sound like carelessness
or corruption, it was not; no one told Fortas who the contributors were.
7 37
Moreover, judges must recuse themselves from cases involving former
730. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 136-37.
731. Id. at 30-31.
732. See supra text accompanying notes 666-705.
733. JAMES F. SIMON, IN His OWN IMAGE: THE SUPREME COURT IN RICHARD NIXON'S
AMERICA 102 (1973).
734. Justices Brandeis and Douglas, and Chief Justices Fred Vinson and Roger Taney had
also quietly given advice to Presidents while serving on the Supreme Court. BRUCE ALLEN
MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 593 (1988).
735. JOHN EHRLICHMAN, WITNESS TO POWER: THE NIXON YEARS 131-33 (1982).
736. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 499-500.
737. LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 351 (1990).
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clients and law firms, as well as friends and political allies, 738 and Fortas
did so routinely.739
But the timing of his nomination-a promotion from his Associate
Justice position to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-infuriated
Republicans, who hoped to win the 1968 presidential election and have a
president of their own party choose the next chief justice.74 °  In
confirmation hearings, they cross-examined Fortas in a way that nonstop
television coverage today would make impolitic. "Mallory, Mallory,"
Senator Strom Thurmond shouted at Fortas, referring to a case 741 decided
by the Supreme Court while Fortas was still a lawyer in private practice
and with which he had no connection of any kind, "I want that word to ring
in your ears-Mallory. 742  When Fortas's nomination got to the Senate
floor, the Republicans filibustered it; cloture votes failed; and Fortas asked
that the nomination be withdrawn.743  Two months later, a Republican,
Richard Nixon, was elected president.
When in 2004 and 2005, Senate Democrats considered filibustering a
few nominees to the Courts of Appeals, Republicans claimed that no one
had ever filibustered a judicial nominee in the Senate. But the truth is that,
in 1968, the Republicans filibustered Fortas's nomination, and everyone at
the time considered what was happening to be a filibuster. After the first
day, the headline in the New York Times began "Critics of Fortas Begin
Filibuster .... . and the Washington Post headline read "Fortas Debate
Opens With A Filibuster."745 The first words of the Washington Post story
were: "A full-dress Republican-led filibuster broke out in the Senate
yesterday against a motion to call up the nomination of Justice Abe Fortas
738. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2007).
739. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 352.
740. SIMON, supra note 733; MELVIN SMALL, THE PRESIDENCY OF RICHARD NIXON 166
(1999).
741. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
742. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 426; see also KALMAN, supra note 737, at 340; ROBERT
SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT: THE FORTAS CASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
SUPREME COURT 170 (1972). Thurmond was so excited that the transcript misses some of what
the videotape recorded. Compare the words in the text with those in Nominations ofAbe Fortas
and Homer Thornberry: Hearings Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong. 191 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Strom Thurmond, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.) [hereinafter Nominations of
Fortas and Thornberry].
743. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 522-27.
744. Fred P. Graham, Critics of Fortas Begin Filibuster, Citing 'Propriety,' N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1968, at Al.
745. Robert C. Albright, Fortas Debate Opens With A Filibuster, WASH. POST, Sept. 26,
1968, at A1.
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for Chief Justice of the United States."' 74 6 When the motion to end debate
failed, the New York Times headline began "Senate Bars Move to End
Filibuster .... The historians who have studied the Fortas nomination
uniformly agree that it was filibustered.748 And Senator Robert Griffen, the
Republican floor manager of the opposition to Fortas justified what he was
doing as having historical precedent: "it has not been unusual for the
Senate to indicate its lack of approval for a nomination by just making sure
that it never came up for a vote on the merits. "
749
According to Nixon's own legal counsel, John Dean, Nixon began
looking for ways of creating Supreme Court vacancies in 1969 soon after
being sworn in as president. 750 Nixon was in the same position Roosevelt
had been in 1937. Each wanted a Court that would decide cases
differently, and each wanted to appoint Justices to cause that result. But
Nixon and Roosevelt used very different strategies. Roosevelt chose a
variation of the traditional rejiggering of the number of Justices, which had
occurred several times in the nineteenth century.75 Nixon tried to smear
Justices in an effort to get them to resign or to serve as a basis for
impeachment. According to Dean, Nixon ordered his Justice Department
to use its resources to accomplish that purpose.
752
In the spring of 1969, a Life magazine reporter began looking into a
questionable relationship Fortas had with a businessman named Wolfson.
The reporter approached Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General and
chief of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, who years later told
Bruce Murphy he had been "excited about the prospect. I knew what kind
of potential coup we had. . . we wanted Fortas off the Court., 753 The
Justice Department then began a high priority investigation of its own,754
and secretly gave the magazine essential elements of the story that was
746. Id.
747. Graham, supra note 744.
748. STEPHENSON, supra note 151, at 185; ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE: THE
POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE SUPREME COURT 173 (2003). Even the Senate website says
that the Fortas nomination was filibustered. Supreme Court Nominations, (1789-present),
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2007).
749. George J. Mitchell, The Not-So-Secret History of Filibusters, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2005, at A 17.
750. JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 3-5 (2001).
751. See supra text accompanying note 578.
752. DEAN, supra note 750, at 5-6.
753. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 551; see also KALMAN, supra note 737, at 362; MURPHY,
supra note 734, at 549; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 226.
754. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 551.
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eventually published.755  Nixon was kept informed throughout.756
According to John Ehrlichman, one of his closest aides, "Nixon cleared his
desk of other work to focus on getting Fortas off the Court., 7 57 To get
Fortas to resign without being impeached, John Mitchell, Nixon's Attorney
General, secretly gave Chief Justice Earl Warren evidence not published in
L ife. 
7 5 8
The Justice Department eventually leaked that evidence to the
press. 759 To further intimidate Fortas, the Department convened a grand
jury to investigate whether Fortas's wife, Carol Agger, and Fortas's former
law partner and best friend, Paul Porter, should be indicted for obstruction
of justice over subpoenaed documents that had been mislaid in an unrelated
case years earlier (even though the Department had previously decided that
Agger and Porter were not at fault). 760  Fortas resigned. By that point,
congressional antipathy was building.76 Had Fortas remained on the
bench, impeachment resolutions almost certainly would have been
introduced on the House floor,7 62 and referred to the House Judiciary
Committee for investigation. Senator James 0. Eastland,763 a Mississippi
Democrat and segregationist who was content with the treatment Fortas
received when nominated to be Chief Justice in 1968, chaired the Senate
Judiciary Committee. But, the House Judiciary Committee was chaired by
Representative Emanuel Celler,764 a New York City Democrat who was the
opposite of Eastland in every respect except party affiliation. Although
differences in the membership of the two committees were not as stark as
the differences between their chairs, the House Judiciary Committee, then
as now, is larger, so that the personalities of individual members leave less
of an imprint on its proceedings. Due to its larger size, the House Judiciary
755. Id. at 553; SMALL, supra note 740, at 167. Without the evidence supplied by the Justice
Department, Life did not have enough material to publish a story at all. KALMAN, supra note
737, at 364; MURPHY, supra note 734, at 553, 555.
756. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 554; see also KALMAN, supra note 737, at 362-63.
757. EHRLICHMAN, supra note 735, at 116.
758. ATKINSON, supra note 588, at 141; DEAN, supra note 750, at 9; EHRLICHMAN, supra
note 735, at 116; KALMAN, supra note 737, at 368; MURPHY, supra note 734, at 562-63;
SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 248-49; SIMON, supra note 733; JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT
JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 396 (1980) [hereinafter SIMON, INDEPENDENT
JOURNEY].
759. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 566-75.
760. DEAN, supra note 750, at 10.
761. See MURPHY, supra note 734, at 566.
762. In the short period between the publication of the Life article and Fortas's resignation,
one Congressman "announced that he had [already] prepared articles of impeachment." Id
763. Nominations of Fortas and Thornberry, supra note 742, at ii.
764. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 566; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 262.
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Committee apportions more of its work into subcommittees, which gives
added power to the committee chair to control the flow of business.
The House committee would not have abused Fortas as the Senate
committee had. On the other hand, an investigation involving Fortas would
not have ended as quietly as the one that, a short while later, would involve
Justice Douglas.765 It would have gone on very publicly and painfully for
months while Republicans tried to read nefarious intent into every
ambiguity in the evidence, and while Fortas, who seemed to lack the ability
to make his own case except legalistically, would have looked more and
more disingenuous. The House probably would not have impeached
Fortas, and the Senate certainly would not have convicted him. There was
no evidence of the kind of corruption that had been essential in every other
instance of a Senate conviction. Moreover, Democrats controlled both
Houses of Congress. Although party realignment in the South had only
just begun and a significant bloc within the Democratic majorities was still
made up of right-wing Southerners, it would have been extraordinarily
difficult in the Senate to collect the constitutionally required two-thirds
majority needed to convict. But the humiliation of a public impeachment
investigation would almost certainly have led Fortas to do later what he
actually did earlier: resign.
The Fortas incident must be included among the impeachments that
did not run their full course because they were aborted by the accused's
resignation. And it would be an understatement to say that it must also be
included among instances of impeachment's used as a partisan political
weapon. Throughout, the Republicans were determined to get Fortas off
the Court for partisan political reasons, and they were turning to an
impeachment investigation at the moment when his resignation made it
unnecessary.
Although Fortas's relationship with Wolfson was questionable, it was
not illegal at the time.766 Nixon's own Justice Department could find no
violation of law.767 Wolfson controlled a nonprofit foundation, and Fortas
had accepted a $20,000 consulting fee from the foundation while the SEC
765. See infra text accompanying notes 837-846.
766. ABRAHAM, supra note 430 at 10.
767. SHOGAN, supra note 742,, at 263. In March 2007, Kenneth Starr argued a case before
the Suprene Court even though Starr is the dean of the Pepperdine University School of Law and
Pepperdine employs Justices Antonin Scalia and Samuel Alioto Jr. to teach in the school's
overseas summer programs. Tony Mauro, High Court Advocate Ken Starr Is Justices' Summer
Employer, Legal Times, March 26, 2007. A Justice who accepts even short-term employment
from an entity supervised by a lawyer who appears before the Justice could reasonably be said
not only to have violated the federal judicial conflict-of-interest statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, but also
to have put what Fortas did into perspective.
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was investigating Wolfson.76 8 In compensation for helping the foundation
plan its public service activities, Fortas was to receive the same amount
annually, as long as he or his wife lived.769 But when Wolfson's legal
problems deepened, or, more precisely, when it finally dawned on Fortas
that a Supreme Court Justice should not be accepting money from an entity
controlled by a person being investigated by a law enforcement agency,
770
Fortas returned the $20,000 he had already received and cancelled his
consulting contract with Wolfson's foundation. 771  Moreover, Fortas did
nothing to help Wolfson escape his legal difficulties, which ended in
imprisonment.
772
Although the Republicans did everything they could to force Fortas
off the Court, Fortas, like Chase and Andrew Johnson, had faults that
seemed to conspire with his enemies to do him in. Certainly money
mattered enough to him that he took it when he should not have.773 Fortas
had lived very well on his income as a named partner in one of the
country's leading law firms, 7 74 but, when he became a Supreme Court
Justice, his income shrank to a fraction of what it had been.775
Fortas hurt himself in three ways. First, Fortas never seemed to
understand that judges, unlike lawyers, do not sell their professional time.
Although part of what it takes to succeed as a lawyer is knowing how to
bill clients, leaving the practice of law often means leaving that mentality
behind. Second, like so many lawyers who come to grief in Washington,
Fortas assumed that if a position is legally arguable, it will for that reason
alone satisfy politicians and the public. He never understood that it would
appear corrupt for a Justice earning $39,500 a year to accept a lifetime
income from a private source of an additional $20,000 a year, even if legal
768. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 322-25; SIMON, supra note 733; SIMON, INDEPENDENT
JOURNEY supra note 758, at 395.
769. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 323-24; MURPHY, supra note 734, at 195-97; SIMON,
supra note 733.
770. Fortas's law clerk played a significant role in awakening him to this problem. KALMAN,
supra note 737, at 325; MURPHY, supra note 734, at 208-09.
771. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 209. Fortas waited some time before returning the fee. In
the interim, Wolfson was indicted, and his health and that of his wife deteriorated. KALMAN,
supra note 737, at 360; MURPHY, supra note 734, at 209. Fortas told his law partner, Paul Porter,
that he delayed returning the money because he did not want to "kick this guy in the teeth under
these circumstances .... " MURPHY, supra note 734, at 209. Finally, in December 1966, Fortas
sent Wolfson a check for $20,000 to avoid the income tax liability that would accrue on January
1, 1967. Id.
772. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 369; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 263.
773. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 196.
774. Arnold, Fortas & Porter, now Arnold & Porter.
775. SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 192-93.
devices like recusal were sufficient to avoid any genuine harm.776 He also
never understood that, although the money Wolfson paid him might have
been consistent with his billing rates in private practice, it looked like a
gross overpayment-one intended to secure special treatment for
Wolfson-when compared to Fortas's judicial salary.
And third, although Fortas could strategize with exceptional skill in
the narrow confines of litigation,777 he, like many other lawyers, was a
mediocre strategist in the broader world. Lawyers, especially litigators,
usually feel that they get results by sharing as little information as possible
with adversaries and third parties, and by putting a self-serving spin on the
information they do share. Throughout all of his troubles in 1968 and
1969, Fortas's instinctive reaction was to do exactly that, and it created a
convincing impression that he was hiding something and being
778 idisingenuous. Even in the final days before he resigned, Fortas could
not understand how much he was being hurt in this way. The lifetime
payments feature of the consulting contract was the fact most damaging to
Fortas. When John Mitchell learned of it, he was overjoyed.779 At the time
Fortas resigned, the nature of the consulting contract had not yet become
public knowledge. But the Nixon Administration knew of it, had informed
Chief Justice Warren about it, and could tell the public about it at any
time. 780  Fortas sought Justice Hugo Black's advice, and explained
everything to him. "After he heard about the lifetime nature of the
Wolfson contract, Black recognized what had to be done. Tell the press
yourself, he advised Fortas. After all, the initial payment had been returned
and the agreement had been cancelled., 781  That was Fortas's last
opportunity to appear forthright and honest. He refused.
To fill the vacancy created by Fortas's resignation, Nixon nominated
Clement Haynsworth, Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit.782 The civil rights
and labor movements, initially suspicious, mobilized to oppose the
nomination. 783  "Senators who opposed Haynsworth on ideological
grounds, as well as those Democrats furious about the Fortas affair, could
776. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 197, 593.
777. See, e.g., Richard K. Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 299, 310 n.28
(1990) (explaining how Fortas devised a winning litigation strategy that forestalled a legal
challenge to Lyndon B. Johnson's eighty-seven-vote primary victory in the 1948 Texas election
for the U.S. Senate).
778. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 365; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 236.
779. KALMAN, supra note 737, at 367.
780. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 562-63.
781. Id. at 565.
782. SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 270.
783. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 10-11; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 270.
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point to two cases of apparent conflict of interest," in which Haynsworth,
while on the Court of Appeals, had participated even though he had
undisclosed personal interests and probably should have recused himself.
784
At the time, the ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics required recusal in such
circumstances, but the federal judicial conflict-of-interest statute did not.
(As a result of this and the Fortas and Douglas controversies, the statute
was rewritten later into the form today at 28 U.S.C. § 455.)785 Most federal
judges at the time followed the Canons, although they were stricter, and it
reflected badly on Haynsworth's character that he did not do so.786
Haynsworth, in essence, could not pass the standards that Fortas had been
held to, 787 and the Senate rejected him by a vote of fifty-five to forty-
five.7 88 After the Haynsworth defeat, Nixon told one of his aides, "I want
you to go out this time and find a good federal judge further south and
further to the right" of Haynsworth. 789 The result was the nomination of G.
Harrold Carswell.
Carswell was not qualified for the Supreme Court. He had been a
mediocre district court judge whose annual output of published opinions
averaged less than 16 pages, 790 and who was reversed 58% of the time
when his decisions were appealed.79 1 He had been promoted to the Court
of Appeals only six months before Nixon nominated him for the Supreme
Court.792 Dean Louis Pollack of the Yale Law School told the Senate
Judiciary Committee that Carswell had "more slender credentials than any
Supreme Court nomination put forth in this century." 793 Professor William
784. SMALL, supra note 740, at 168; see also SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 270-71; SIMON,
INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 400-01; VIEIRA & GROSS, supra note 719, at 46.
785. See Richard K. Neumann, Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote
Illegally?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 375, 380-81 (2003).
786. Id. In a law school graduation speech in 1975, which was also published as a law
review article, Haynsworth said that a lawyer "serves his clients without being their servant...
the lawyer must never forget that he is the master... It is for the lawyer to decide what is
morally and legally right ... the lawyer must serve the client's legal needs as the lawyer sees
them, not as the client sees them. During my years in practice, I never had any problem in this
respect, although some lawyers today say they do." Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., Professionalism
in Lawyering, 27 S.C. L. REV. 627, 628 (1976).
787. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 10.
788. Id.; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 271; SMALL, supra note 740, at 168.
789. SMALL, supra note 740, at 168.
790. Ross, supra note 707, at 262.
791. JACOBSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 721, at 152.
792. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 11.
793. NOMINATION OF GEORGE HARROLD CARSWELL TO BE ASSOC. JUSTICE OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S.: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91 ST
CONG. 238-54 (Comm. Print 1970); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 12.
Van Alstyne of Duke, a Haynsworth supporter, told the Judiciary
Committee that "[t]here is, in candor, nothing in the quality of [Carswell's]
work to warrant any expectation whatever that he could serve with
distinction on the Supreme Court., 794 Nixon's own aides felt the same
way.795 Senator Hruska, the floor manager of the Carswell nomination,
made the most memorable-but not the only-argument that Carswell's
mediocrity was a virtue: "there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and
lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little
chance. We can't have all Brandeises and Frankfurters and Cardozos and
stuff like that there.,
796
There was speculation at the time that Nixon nominated Carswell both
out of annoyance over Haynsworth's rejection,797 and as a cynical tactic to
set up a claim, after Carswell's likely rejection, that the Senate, so long as
it was controlled by the Democratic Party, could never be fair to a white
Southern nominee. (Haynsworth was from North Carolina and Carswell
from Florida.) Carswell had helped convert a public golf course into a
private club at which only whites could play.798 And, while running for the
state legislature in 1948, Carswell made a racist speech that included
comments like "I yield to no man.. . in the firm, vigorous belief in the
principles of White Supremacy, and I shall always be so governed, ' 799 and
"I believe that segregation of the races is proper and the only practical and
correct way of life in our states. 8 00 At his confirmation hearings, Carswell
disavowed the speech.8 01 The Senate rejected him by a vote of fifty-one to
forty-five.80 2
A day later, Nixon told the press, "[W]ith the Senate as presently
constituted[,] I cannot successfully nominate to the Supreme Court any
Federal appellate judge from the South who believes as I do in the strict
794. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 12.
795. See, e.g., SMALL, supra note 740, at 169 (quoting William Safire ("[the nomination was]
one of the most ill-advised public acts of the early Nixon Presidency")); Ross, supra note 707, at
282 (quoting Jeb Stuart Magruder ("few of us thought he was qualified") and Clark Mollenhoff
("[I] wouldn't have defended him under any circumstances")).
796. SMALL, supra note 740, at 169; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 11-12; SHOGAN,
supra note 742, at 272.
797. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 11.
798. Id.; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 272; VIEIRA & GROSS, supra note 719, at 47.
799. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 11.
800. SMALL, supra note 740, at 169; see also SHOGAN, supra note 742 at 271-72.
801. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 11.
802. Id. at 12; DEAN, supra note 750, at 21; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758,
at 403; SMALL, supra note 740, at 170; VIEIRA & GROSS, supra note 719, at 47.
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construction of the Constitution." 80 3 These were code words meaning that
Nixon could not successfully nominate a Southerner hostile to Brown and
its progeny. In fact, there were five judges on the Fifth Circuit-Griffin B.
Bell, John R. Brown, Richard T. Rives, Elbert P. Tuttle, and John Minor
Wisdom 04 -whose reputations were so commanding that they could have
been confirmed for the Supreme Court as easily as Lewis Powell later was.
Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General in the Kennedy Administration
and later on the law faculty at Yale, said that Brown, Rives, Tuttle, and
Wisdom "have made as much of an imprint on American society and
American law as any four judges below the Supreme Court have done on
any court.' 80 5 But Nixon would nominate none of them, even though
Brown, Tuttle, and Wisdom were Republicans,80 6 because all five were in
the habit of voting to enforce Brown. Instead, Nixon nominated Harry
Blackmun of the Eighth Circuit,807 a Minnesotan who at the time gave no
indication of the kind of Justice he would later become.80 8 The Senate
confirmed Blackmun unanimously.
80 9
Carswell's nomination was defeated on April 8, 1970.810 On April 12,
Republican House Minority Leader Gerald Ford announced that the House
would investigate Justice William 0. Douglas with a view toward
impeachment.8 ' Of all the Justices on the Supreme Court, Douglas
irritated the Republicans most deeply. He voted against their principles
more regularly than other Justices; he wrote books and articles they
considered offensive; and he had been married four times to successively
younger women.81 2 His most recent book at the time, Points of Rebellion,
contained sentences like "We must realize that today's establishment is the
new George III.
' 813
Douglas's vulnerability was that he had accepted $12,000 a year over
six years for serving as the president of a nonprofit foundation-an
arrangement that Republicans claimed replicated Fortas's. 81 4 Much of the
803. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 12; SMALL, supra note 740, at 170.
804. See READ & McGOUGH, supra note 710.
805. Jack Bass, John Minor Wisdom and the Impact of Law, 69 MIss. L.J. 25, 26-27 (1999)
(quoting Burke Marshall).
806. Id. at 38, 52, 54.
807. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 13; SHOGAN, supra note 742, at 273.
808. MURPHY, supra note 716, at 580; SMALL, supra note 740, at 171.
809. ABRAHAM, supra note 430, at 13; BRANT, supra note 97, at 92.
810. SMALL, supra note 740, at 170.
811. Id.
812. Id.
813. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 402.
814. Id. at 392; SMALL, supra note 740, at 170.
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foundation's income came from a mortgage on a Las Vegas hotel and
casino, and the foundation's primary benefactor owned stock in three Las
Vegas casinos, 815 all of which allowed Republicans to claim falsely that
Douglas was consorting with gamblers and gangsters.816 But there were
fundamental differences between Douglas's situation and Fortas's.
Fortas's consulting contract did not actually seem to require that he do
much work, while "Douglas actually ran the [foundation that paid him] and
took an active role in the implementation of its very tangible and highly
praised programs in the United States and Latin America., 817 Moreover,
the $12,000 salary was not really a salary at all. Originally, the foundation
had offered Douglas a $20,000 salary, which he refused because he did not
want to be paid. 81 8 "He then was voted a salary of $12,000 plus expenses,"
which were to be significant because the work involved travel, "but he
refused to collect expenses and said that he would treat the salary (after
income tax) as an expense account. ' '819 Although the foundation used a
small portion of the salary to purchase an annuity for Douglas, 820 he
worked almost for free, and the foundation's correspondence with him
suggests that the foundation's board felt guilty or embarrassed because of
his generosity. 82' In 1969, because of Fortas's troubles, Douglas resigned
as president of the foundation.
822
With help from the White House and from Will Wilson, the same
Assistant Attorney General who had coordinated building the case against
Fortas,823 Ford "accumulate[d] a mound of information on Douglas. 824
Nixon directly encouraged Ford.825 "From the beginning," according to
John Ehrlichman, one of the president's closest aides, "Nixon was
interested in getting rid of William 0. Douglas. . . . John Mitchell had
815. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 392.
816. See id. at 404.
817. Id. at 397.
818. BRANT, supra note 97, at 95.
819. Id.
820. Assoc. JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS: FINAL REP. OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON
H.R. RES. 920 OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG. 236-49 (Comm. Print 1970)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
821. Id. at245, 248.
822. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 404.
823. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 579.
824. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 398; see also MURPHY, supra note
716, at 579; SMALL, supra note 740, at 170.
825. EHRLICHMAN, supra note 735, at 122; SMALL, supra note 740, at 168. "Ford had been
working privately on the case before the administration asked him to take the lead." SMALL,
supra note 740, at 170.
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begun to gather information about Douglas's nonjudicial sources of
income, and some of it looked hopeful., 826 "A loosely organized impeach-
Douglas effort was organized in the House," led by Ford and two other
senior Republican Congressmen, "with the single goal of filing articles of
impeachment against Douglas during the 1970 congressional term."827 Not
long afterward, Wilson himself resigned over allegations that he helped a
former client who was being investigated by the Justice Department and
the SEC.828 Mitchell was later convicted and imprisoned in the Watergate
scandal.829
Eventually, Ford took the House floor to accuse Douglas of being a
"well-paid moonlighter" as a foundation president;830 of having voted on
the Court in a case where a publisher that had once paid him $350 was a
party; 831 of having done some work for an organization Ford considered
subversive,832 the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 833 (even
though Chief Justice Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee, had worked for
the same organization, as had William Buckley, the conservative writer,
and some Senators and other people whose views were not
controversial 834); of having written Points of Rebellion; and of having
published a chapter of it in a magazine Ford considered pornographic
835
(even though the book's publisher had licensed the magazine to publish the
chapter without telling Douglas about it until after the fact, a common
practice in the publishing industry).836
While Ford was making this speech, he was outmaneuvered
procedurally by Democratic Representative Andrew Jacobs, Jr., a Douglas
supporter, who went into the well of the House and filed a resolution to
impeach Douglas. 837 Ford wanted a select committee designated because
826. EHRLICHMAN, supra note 735, at 116.
827. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 401.
828. Id. at 580.
829. Id.
830. 116 CONG. REc. 11916 (1970). Ford also mentioned Bugsy Siegel, Meyer Lansky, and
Ice Pick Willie Alderman, id., none of whom had any connection with Douglas. FINAL REPORT,
supra note 820, at 176; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 404.
831. 116 CONG. REc. 11915 (1970). The article was on folk singing. Id.; SIMON,
INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 404.
832. 116 CONG. REC. 11918 (1970).
833. BRANT, supra note 97, at 96; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 405.
834. BRANT, supra note 97, at 96.
835. 116 CONG. REc. 11915-16 (1970); SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at
404-05.
836. BRANT, supra note 86, at 98; FINAL REPORT, supra note 820, at 172-74.
837. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 405.
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that would cause his own resolution to be "referred automatically to the
House Rules Committee, chaired by a Mississippi segregationist., 838 But
Jacobs' resolution called for referral to the Judiciary Committee, where
Celler would control procedure. Because Jacobs filed first, his resolution
took priority.839
Celler appointed a subcommittee consisting of himself, two other
Democrats, and two Republicans. 840 The subcommittee produced a 924-
page report that found the allegations against Douglas to be groundless.841
All three Democrats voted to that effect. 842  One of the Republicans
criticized the subcommittee but conceded that Douglas had committed no
impeachable offense.843 The remaining Republican neither joined the
majority nor dissented.844 Ford and his allies later called the subcommittee
investigation a "travesty" and a "whitewash. 845  Will Wilson, who as
Assistant Attorney General had helped assemble the case against Douglas,
remembered things differently. "Ford took the material we gave him and
screwed it up," Wilson said later: "Ford blew it."
846
The Douglas investigation occurred in 1970. In 1973, Spiro Agnew
resigned the vice-presidency and was convicted of taking bribes while a
state official. Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Nixon nominated and
Congress confirmed Ford to replace Agnew as vice president. When
Nixon later resigned in 1974, Ford became president. During all this,
Douglas's health deteriorated, and in 1975 he resigned from the Supreme
Court. 84 7 Ironically, Ford nominated Douglas's successor, John P. Stevens,
then a judge on the Seventh Circuit. Still more ironically, Stevens became
a leader of the liberal bloc on the Supreme Court.
The war in which the Fortas and Douglas incidents were the first
battles continued through the defeated nomination of Robert Bork in
1987,848 and the confirmation of Clarence Thomas in 1991. Eventually, the
838. BRANT, supra note 97, at 90; see also SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758,
at 405.
839. BRANT, supra note 97, at 90; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 405.
840. BRANT, supra note 97, at 90; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 409;
see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 820, at III.
841. FINAL REPORT, supra note 820; see also BRANT, supra note 97, at 89; 3 DESCHLER'S
PRECEDENTS, supra note 504, §§ 14.14-.16; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 409.
842. BRANT, supra note 97, at 91; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 409.
843. FINAL REPORT, supra note 820, at 351-52.
844. BRANT, supra note 97, at 91; SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 409.
845. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY, supra note 758, at 405.
846. MURPHY, supra note 734, at 579.
847. ATKINSON, supra note 588, at 146-49.
848. See VIEIRA & GROSS, supra note 719, at 3-181.
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war broadened, and Republicans used impeachment as part of a partisan
attack on a Democratic president.
2. Clinton
While complicated events are happening, we are least able to
understand what is really going on and why. Only afterward-with
historical distance-does the big picture emerge, and causation can be
discussed meaningfully. History does not merely reconstruct the
knowledge that people in the past had about what they lived through. It
discovers what they could not have realized at the time.
Bill Clinton had sex with Monica Lewinsky and lied about it to the
public and under oath. The question here is not whether that merited
impeachment and conviction. Reasonable people can differ about that.
The argument in favor of the impeachment's appropriateness is that perjury
is a felony, and that a president who commits perjury deserves
impeachment and removal because the known example of a high official
committing perjury corrodes the public's confidence in government as well
as the public's own commitment to honesty.849 As we shall see in Part
IV(A) of this article, this argument has the potential of boomeranging back
onto those who make it.
There are three arguments against the appropriateness of Clinton's
impeachment. First, not every felony is a high crime or misdemeanor,
850
and felonies outside the scope of impeachable offenses include those that
do not damage the integrity of government or the political system in
substantial ways. For example, income tax evasion has not been
considered an impeachable offense. In 1974, the House Judiciary
Committee, including all of its Republican members, voted not to
recommend impeaching Richard Nixon for tax evasion, even though a
taxpayer signs every tax return, at the bottom of Form 1040, "[u]nder
penalties of perjury .... ." A second argument is that other presidents have
told, encouraged, or helped others to tell much more damaging lies that
have not led to impeachment, such as lying to create a basis for a war in
which thousands die and in which the national interest is substantially
harmed.851 According to this argument, the absence of an oath to tell the
849. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE: BILL CLINTON AND THE
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS (1998); ANN COULTER, HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS:
THE CASE AGAINST BILL CLINTON (1998); DAVID P. SCHIPPERS, SELL OUT: THE INSIDE STORY
OF PRESIDENT CLINTON'S IMPEACHMENT (2000).
850. See supra text accompanying notes 74-78.
851. The Iraq War that began in 2003 is not the only set of facts to meet this description.
Congress was deceived into passing the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1965, which was claimed to be
the legal justification for the Vietnam War. ERIC ALTERMAN, WHEN PRESIDENTS LIE: A HISTORY
truth in these situations is more than compensated for by the injury to the
integrity of government and the national interest. A third argument is that
impeachment is not the only method Congress has of sanctioning a
president. One or both Houses of Congress have censured other
presidents,852 and in both Houses attempts were made (and defeated) to
censure Clinton.853 By extension, this argument would also posit that, if
both Houses of Congress had voted to censure Clinton, that would have
been a rebuke more satisfying to the public than to have the House impeach
him and the Senate acquit him.
This Article does not analyze or choose among these arguments. That
has been done amply elsewhere. Instead, the question here is whether the
Republicans merely reacted to the misdeeds of an office holder, or whether
they set Clinton up so they could impeach him to gain political advantages,
or more precisely, whether some Republicans set him up and others
impeached him to gain political advantages.
Richard M. Scaife has a large fortune that he inherited from the
Mellon banking family and from oil interests.854 Over decades, he gave
between $200 million and $300 million to right-wing organizations, and,
though almost unknown to the public, he was considered one of the
essential figures "in building the modem conservative movement. 855
Beginning with Clinton's 1992 campaign for president, and continuing
throughout his first term in office, Scaife and others financed a campaign to
destroy Clinton's political viability. Perhaps the best known person in this
campaign was David Brock, a journalist who had written a book
extraordinarily hostile to Anita Hill, the witness who almost cost Clarence
OF OFFICIAL DECEPTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 160-237 (2004); JOSEPH C. GOULDEN, TRUTH IS
THE FIRST CASUALTY: THE GULF OF TONKIN AFFAIR, ILLUSION AND REALITY (1969); EDWIN
MOISE, TONKIN GULF AND THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1996).
852. Both Houses passed resolutions condemning John Tyler and James Polk-the latter for,
in Congress's words, "a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of the
United States." VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 203. And the Senate censured
Andrew Jackson for removing the government's deposits from the Bank of the United States. Id.
at 201-02, 204-20; see also Michael J. Gerhardt, Putting the Law of Impeachment in Perspective,
43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 905, 927-28 (1999).
853. THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON: THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPTS
FROM THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS TO THE SENATE TRIAL 451, 467 (Merrill
McLoughlin ed., 1999) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON]. When
these motions were made, they were objected to on the grounds that they amounted to
unconstitutional bills of attainder. That is wrong both precedentially and analytically. The
precedents are in the preceding footnote. The analytical reasons are explained at GERHARDT,
IMPEACHMENT PROCESS, supra note 687, at 186-87.
854. DAVID BROCK, BLINDED BY THE RIGHT 79 (2002).
855. Id. at 80; see also JOE CONASON & GENE LYONS, THE HUNTING OF THE PRESIDENT 107
(2000).
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Thomas his confirmation to the Supreme Court.856 Brock later repented his
role in the campaigns against Clinton and Hill, and he apologized to both
of them. 857 "[I]n its secretiveness and in its single-mindedness [and] also in
its lack of fidelity to any standard of proof, principle, and propriety," wrote
Brock in retrospect about the early campaign against Clinton, "there was
no precedent in modem American politics
858
Scaife invested a substantial amount of money in trying to prove that
Bill and Hillary Clinton "were leaders of a criminal syndicate" and had
murdered a White House aide named Vince Foster "to cover up their
crimes in Whitewater, a failed real estate deal. 859 (Investigations by two
different independent counsels later showed that the Clintons had done
none of this.) In 1999, Scaife told a magazine that Clinton "can order
people done away with at his will.., there must be 60 people [associated
with Clinton] who have died mysteriously. 86 ° Over the years, Scaife had
given the right-wing magazine for which Brock wrote, The American
Spectator, about $6 million, and he subsequently used the magazine as a
front to operate something he called the Arkansas Project, which used
private investigators to scour the state for evidence of crimes he believed
Clinton must have committed while governor.
861
Theodore Olson, the second President Bush's Solicitor General from
2001 to 2004, gave legal advice to the Arkansas Project.862 At one point,
Brock asked Olson to read a draft article, written by another journalist, that
argued that Foster had been murdered. Brock opposed publishing the
article because it lacked evidence. He hoped that Olson would back him
up, but was surprised at Olson's response. "Ted... told me bluntly...
that while he believed ... that Foster had committed suicide, raising
questions about the death was a way of turning up the heat on the [Clinton]
administration until another scandal was shaken loose, which was the
Spectator's mission.' ' 863 Olson also wrote articles for the magazine under a
fictitious by-line accusing the Clintons of committing various crimes and
comparing President Clinton to Don Corleone of the Godfather films.
864
856. See DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL: THE UNTOLD STORY (1993); see also infra
text accompanying notes 1049-1056.
857. BROCK, supra note 854, at 295-98, 321-22, 326.
858. Id. at 129.
859. Id. at 189.
860. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Scaife).
861. Id. at 193-214.
862. Id. at 205-07.
863. Id. at 206.
864. Id. at 210.
In 1994, Brock himself wrote the original article portraying Bill
Clinton "as a sexually voracious sociopathic cipher" and Hillary Clinton
"as a foulmouthed, castrating, power-mad harpy, joined together in a sham
power marriage. 865 Brock interviewed some Arkansas state troopers, who
told salacious stories about the Clintons. The stories were later discredited
because some of the troopers wanted and accepted money for talking to
journalists; 866 the troopers retracted much of what they said when put under
oath in depositions; 867 and in Brock's own words later, "[n]one of the
trooper allegations that could be independently checked turned out to be
true."
868
One of the troopers, however, described an incident in which he
accompanied a woman named Paula to Clinton's hotel room, and that she
told the trooper she was willing to be Clinton's "regular girlfriend.,
869
Some time later, a person named Paula Jones announced that she was the
Paula described in Brock's article, and that the article had portrayed her
inaccurately and damaged her reputation. Normally such an accusation
would result in a defamation action against Brock and The American
Spectator. But that did not happen. According to Brock, Jones did not sue
him because "a conniving cadre of right-wing lawyers and operatives was
secretly calling the shots in the Jones case to forward [their] own political
agenda of undermining the Clinton presidency, which meant leaving me
out of it."'870  Jones's original Arkansas lawyer lacked the skills and
resources to litigate her case. He found help in "the Landmark Legal
Foundation, a right-wing public-interest law firm generously funded by
Richard Mellon Scaife.,, 871 The retainer agreement between Jones and her
original lawyer gave the lawyer a share of any royalties Jones might later
gain from a book or movie about her story.872 And Jones's sister told the
media that Jones had told her, "Whichever way it goes, it smells money" or
"Whichever way it goes, it smells big money" (depending on the journalist
reporting).873 Later, Jones was represented by lawyers supplied by the
865. Id. at 151.
866. Id. at 154.
867. Id. at 323-24.
868. Id. at 157.
869. Id at 152.
870. Id. at 179.
871. Id.
872. Id. at 185; MICHAEL ISIKOFF, UNCOVERING CLINTON: A REPORTER'S STORY 49, 179
(1999); JEFFREY TOOBIN, A VAST CONSPIRACY 25 (1999).
873. BROCK, supra note 854, at 185.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 34:2
Winter 2007] IMPEACHMENT AS A PARTISAN POLITICAL WEAPON 277
Rutherford Institute, which also benefited from donations by Scaife.874 In
the background, a small group of lawyers who called themselves "the
elves," did some of the legal work without publicly acknowledging their
involvement; one of them was Ann Coulter.
875
Eventually, Jones's lawsuit was dismissed for lack of evidence on a
summary judgment motion. 876  But the dismissal came only after her
Jones's lawyers deposed Clinton about Monica Lewinsky. "One of the
secret legal strategists for Paula Jones" told David Brock years before that
deposition "that the purpose of the sexual harassment suit was to probe
Clinton's consensual sex life through the deposition process, and then to
question Clinton under oath about it," and thus, according to Brock, "the
Jones case had become a vehicle to create a crime where one may not have
otherwise existed.,
877
In January 1994, after the Independent Counsel Act had expired and
had not yet been reenacted by Congress, Attorney General Janet Reno,
using her inherent authority as chief official in the Department of Justice,
appointed Robert B. Fiske878 as a special prosecutor to investigate
allegations that Clinton had had Vince Foster murdered, and had
committed various kinds of fraud while governor of Arkansas and an
investor in a real estate development called Whitewater. Fiske, a
Republican and a retired federal judge with a national reputation for
nonpartisanship, "was a reviled figure in the conservative movement,
dating back to the days when he sat on an American Bar Association
review panel that gave Robert Bork a low rating and damaged his
confirmation prospects in the Senate. 879  When Fiske, after an
investigation, issued a report concluding that Foster had committed suicide
because of untreated depression, rightists determined to prove that Foster
had been murdered began lobbying for his dismissal. "From the moment
that Fiske issued his findings ... , Republican leaders and influential
874. BROCK, supra note 854, at 184; TOOBN, supra note 872, at 134-36.
875. BROCK, supra note 854, at 180-83; CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 302; TOOBIN,
supra note 872, at xi, 41, 136. At the time, Coulter had just begun to work also as a political
commentator and had not yet published HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS: THE CASE AGAINST
BILL CLINTON (1998); SLANDER: LIBERAL LIES ABOUT THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2002); TREASON:
LIBERAL TREACHERY FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR (2003); How TO TALK TO A
LIBERAL (IF YOU MUST): THE WORLD ACCORDING TO ANN COULTER (2004); and GODLESS: THE
CHURCH OF LIBERALISM (2006).
876. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998), appeal dismissed, 161 F.3d 528
(8th Cir. 1998).
877. BROCK, supra note 854, at 307; see also TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 393.
878. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xvii; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 267.
879. BROCK, supra note 854, at 190.
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conservatives began maneuvering to eliminate him., 880 Shortly afterward,
Congress reauthorized the Independent Counsel Act, which had the effect
of terminating the appointments of special prosecutors who had been
appointed during the period between the Act's expiration and its
reauthorization. Because Fiske had already concluded the Foster matter
and had done a great deal of investigation in the Whitewater matter, the
logical step would have been to appoint Fiske as an independent counsel
under the Act to finish the job. That did not happen. Instead, Kenneth
Starr was appointed in Fiske's place with authority to reopen the Foster
issue.
880. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 132.
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Under the Independent Counsel Act,881 a unique three-judge panel
called the Special Division appointed the independent counsel. In
881. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-99 (West 2007). Although the authority to appoint new independent
counsel expired when the Act was not reauthorized in 1999, the remainder of the Act continued in
effect so that independent counsels already appointed could finish their work. See id § 599.
The Act was adopted in 1978 because the Watergate special prosecutors had gotten their
authority from executive department orders and regulations and hence were vulnerable to being
fired, as Cox was, by the people they were investigating. See supra text accompanying notes
683-684. During the Reagan and Bush Administrations, independent counsels investigated and
prosecuted Republicans in the executive branch. Because of that, Republicans in Congress
"mounted an attack on the statute so fierce that they succeeded in blocking its re-authorization
even though Republicans comprised a minority of Congress." Samuel Dash, Independent
Counsel: No More, No Less a Federal Prosecutor, 86 GEO. L.J. 2077, 2079 (1998). Then, as
soon as an opportunity arose to investigate Clinton, Republicans reversed their position and
"enthusiastically joined with then reluctant Democrats in Congress to pass the independent
counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994... so that an independent counsel would be available to
investigate the President's involvement in the Whitewater matter." Id.
It is an indication of the deterioration of political behavior in the last several decades that the
Independent Counsel Act was originally needed because Republican partisanship had threatened to
overwhelm prosecutorial integrity in the Nixon Administration and that the Act was then destroyed by
the Republican partisanship that infected Kenneth Starr's work as independent counsel. To illustrate
this, it is enough to observe that permanent independent special prosecutors-ready to prosecute
government officials and employees when a regular prosecutor would have a conflict of interest or be
politically suspect-have been in operation in Sweden and Finland for hundreds of years without any
controversy over whether their behavior has been infected by partisanship. The Swedishjustitiekansler
(JK) was created in 1713, and the first Swedishjustitieombudsman (JO) in 1809 (there are now four).
(Finnish law has historically derived from Swedish law and has adopted the same institutions.) The JK
and JO primarily do other work, but when needed, they prosecute or supervise prosecution in situations
where U.S. law has allowed ad hoc appointment of special prosecutors (under the Attorney General's
inherent authority) or independent counsel (under the Independent Counsel Act from 1978 to 1999 and
under the Attorney General's inherent authority since then). The Swedish legislation uses the
terminology that American law has historically used: a special prosecutor (sdrskild klagare). And the
Swedish media use the same term to refer to independent counsel acting as special prosecutors in the
United States, as in this headline in a story about independent counsel Patrick Fitzgerald's investigation
of the Bush Administration's involvement in the Valerie Plame affair: "Sdrskild 6klagare utreder
ldckorfrin Vita huset" ("Special Prosecutor Investigates Leaks from the White House"). Sveriges
Radio, Dec. 31, 2003, http://www.sr.se/ekot/arkiv.aspDagensDatum=2003-12-31&Artikel=345885
(last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
"When acting as a special prosecutor, a Justitieombudsman may prosecute an official
who, in disregard of the obligations of his office or commission, has committed a criminal
offense .... 6 § Lag med instruktion for Riksdagens Ombudsmdn [JO-instruktionen] [Law with
Instructions for the Riksdag's Ombudsmen] [1986:765], available at http://www.jo.se. "A
Justitieombudsman has a duty to commence and prosecute legal proceedings that the Committee
on the Constitution has decided to institute against a Minister pursuant to § 12:3 of the Instrument
of Government .... Id. § 10. "The Justitiekansler may, as a special prosecutor, begin
prosecutions against government employees who have committed criminal acts in disregard of
the obligations of their office or commission." 5 § Lag om justitiekanslems tillsyn [Law on the
Justitiekansler's Authority] [1975:1339], available at http://www.justitiekanslern.se. "No special
prosecutor other than the Justitiekansler or a Justitieombudsman may begin or continue a
prosecution in the Supreme Court." 7 ch. 8 § Lag om andring I rittegfngsbalken [Law Amending
the Procedure Code] [SFS 2001:280], available at http://65.95.69.3/SFSdoc/01/010280.pdf.
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assigning judges to the Special Division, the Act instructed the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court that "priority shall be given to senior circuit
judges and retired justices" of the Supreme Court.882 A senior federal
judge is one who is semi-retired. In 1992, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
ignored this provision and assigned Judge David Sentelle to preside over
the Special Division.883 Not only was Sentelle not semi-retired, he was 48
years old at the time, and had been on the federal bench for only seven
years.884 Before becoming a judge, Sentelle had devoted a great deal of
time and money campaigning and raising money for Republican candidates
for political office, and he was a protdg6 of right-wing Republican Senator
Jesse Helms.885
On June 30, 1994, Fiske issued his report concluding that Foster's
death was a suicide and not murder. 886 On the same day, Clinton signed
into law the reenactment of the Independent Counsel Act.887 The next day,
Janet Reno, filed a motion asking the Special Division to appoint Fiske as
independent counsel so that he could finish the job he started as special
prosecutor.888 That afternoon, Senator Lauch Faircloth spoke on the Senate
floor in favor of replacing Fiske, whom Faircloth believed had been too
lenient with Clinton. 889 Senators Faircloth and Helms both represented
North Carolina, where Sentelle had been active politically in the
Republican Party before accepting an appointment to the D.C. Circuit. On
July 14, Helms, Faircloth, and Sentelle met for lunch.890 When this later
became public, all of them at first denied they discussed whom to appoint
as independent counsel, but Sentelle later admitted that it "may" have come
up in conversation. For years afterward, the three insisted that they talked
mostly about the conditions of their prostates.
891
On August 5, the Special Division replaced Fiske and appointed
Kenneth Starr, a judge on the D.C. Circuit from 1983 to 1989 and the first
882. 28 U.S.C. § 49(c) (expired 1999).
883. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 131.
884. Id. The pathologists Fiske consulted told him that the evidence was so unequivocal that
it was "one of the easiest cases" in their experience. BENJAMIN WITTES, STARR: A
REASSESSMENT 83 (2002) (quoting Fiske).
885. BROCK, supra note 854, at zx; CONASON & LYONS, supra note 837, at 131; see also
TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 70.
886. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 71.
887. Id. at 71-72.
888. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 132.
889. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 73.
890. Id. at 72.
891. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 132-33.
[Vol. 34:2
Winter 2007] IMPEACHMENT AS A PARTISAN POLITICAL WEAPON 281
President Bush's Solicitor General from 1989 to 1993.92 In removing
Fiske, the Special Division stated that he had a conflict of interest because
Reno initially appointed him.893 But Starr's conflicts of interest were much
larger. Starr had been Solicitor General throughout the Administration of
the first President Bush, whom Clinton defeated for reelection (which had
the effect of ousting Starr from the second-most important position in the
Justice Department). Starr had given strategic advice to Paula Jones's
lawyers in her lawsuit against Clinton,894 and his law firm "was negotiating
a highly sensitive legal settlement" with officials of the Resolution Trust
Corporation, whom Starr would later investigate in connection with
Whitewater. 895 The replacement made even less sense given that Fiske, as
a former U.S. Attorney, possessed extensive experience both prosecuting
and defending white-collar criminal cases,896 while Starr had virtually no
criminal litigation experience. The Special Division's objections to Fiske
thus appeared to be contrived.
When the media reported the Sentelle-Helms-Faircloth lunch, there
was an uproar. "The timing of the lunch suggested that the senators were
lobbying Sentelle to dump Fiske-which the judge promptly did., 897 Five
former presidents of the American Bar Association joined in asking Starr to
resign as independent counsel, which he refused to do.898 Because of the
Republican campaign to appoint politically reliable judges, the federal
judiciary has become more politically partisan than at any other time since
the judicial domination by the Federalists at the end of the eighteenth
century and the beginning of the nineteenth.899 According to Michael J.
Luttig, formerly a judge on the Fourth Circuit (appointed by the first
President Bush):
Judges are told, "You're appointed by us to do these things." So
then judges start thinking, Well, how do I interpret the law to get
the result that the people who pushed for me to be here want me
to get? . .. I believe that there's a natural temptation to line up
as political partisans that is reinforced by the political process.
892. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xiii, 72; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 267.
893. In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 94-1, 1994 WL 913274, *1 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 5, 1994).
894. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 357.
895. Id. at 195-96.
896. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 71.
897. Id. at 73.
898. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 132.
899. See supra text accompanying notes 151-371; see also CASS R. SUNSTEI ET AL., ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
And it has to be resisted, by the judiciary and by the
politicians. 900
As a lawyer in the Justice Department, before his own appointment to the
bench, Luttig prepared Clarence Thomas to testify at the hearings on his
nomination to the D.C. Circuit and his later nomination to the Supreme
Court.
9 0 1
Starr reopened the question of how Vince Foster had died, and his
staff investigated everything all over again. In October 1997, he issued a
report finally concluding that Fiske had been right all along, and that Foster
had committed suicide. Later, Starr also reported that there was
insufficient evidence that the Clintons had done anything criminal in the
Arkansas Whitewater development, or in the 1993 firing of White House
travel office employees, or in the mishandling of FBI files. 90 2 But by then,
these accusations were no longer needed because Starr had Monica
Lewinsky instead.
Congressman Bob Barr, a Republican member of the House Judiciary
Committee, campaigned to have Clinton impeached. 90 3 In June 1997, he
wrote a letter to Congressman Henry Hyde, chair of the Judiciary
Committee, insisting that the Committee begin an impeachment
investigation.90 4  On November 5, 1997-at a time when no one in
Congress had ever heard of Monica Lewinsky-Barr, joined by eighteen
other Republican co-sponsors, introduced a resolution in the House that
would direct the House Judiciary Committee to determine whether Clinton
should be impeached for "engag[ing] in a systemic effort to obstruct,
undermine, and compromise the legitimate and proper functions and
processes of the executive branch. '' 90 5 The language was purposefully
elastic. Some Republicans were determined to find a cause to impeach
Clinton, but were not quite sure what that cause would be.
Throughout 1997, right-wing agitation for impeachment built up
based on claims that Clinton had murdered Vince Foster and had won the
1996 election through fraud.90 6  The editorial page of the Wall Street
900. Deborah Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 38; see
also SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 899.
901. ANDREW PEYTON THOMAS, CLARENCE THOMAS: A BIOGRAPHY 319,354-56 (2001).
902. PETER BAKER, THE BREACH: INSIDE THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM
JEFFERSON CLINTON 24, 33, 38, 94, 107-08, 127, 140, 170, 172, 200 (2000); SUSAN SCHMIT-r &
MICHAEL WEISKOPF, TRUTH AT ANY COST: KEN STARR AND THE UNMAKING OF BILL CLINTON
8-12, 94-95, 101,134, 145-48, 153-56, 191, 226-27, 246, 276 (2000).
903. Barr, supra note 168.
904. BROCK, supra note 854, at 299.
905. H.R. Res. 304, 105th Congress (1997).
906. BROCK, supra note 854, at 300-01.
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Journal twice published articles demanding that Clinton be impeached
because, among other things, he had "met with drug dealers... and
mobsters 90 7 and stolen the 1996 election.90 8 Regnery Publishing, the
leading publisher of right-wing political literature, published a novel called
The Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, written by the editor of The
American Spectator. All of this occurred before the name Monica
Lewinsky reached any news source. According to David Brock, the former
right-wing journalist,
the Republican right... continued to maintain that the Clinton
scandals represented a wide pattern of vague criminality by the
first couple, and therefore that it was only a matter of time until
the truth would be revealed, the Clinton administration would be
brought down, and the world would be set right again. They
seemed to believe this, or at least they asserted it, all the more
intensely the more they failed to prove any of it, and they went
around the bend as the promised indictments never came. 90 9
At one point, Brock's home answering machine told callers to leave a
message because "I'm out trying to bring down the president."
910
As a White House intern assigned one day to deliver some papers to
the president, Lewinsky surprised Clinton by showing him her underwear.
This began a series of furtive encounters that reflected poorly on both
participants. Lewinsky confided what was happening to Linda Tripp, a
Pentagon employee, who secretly tape-recorded her telephone
conversations with Lewinsky-itself a crime under Maryland law. Tripp in
turn told Starr's Office of the Independent Counsel about the Clinton-
Lewinsky affair and claimed that Clinton was trying to get Lewinsky a
private industry job as the price of Lewinsky's silence. 911 Tripp needed a
lawyer to assist her in negotiations with Starr and to defend her against a
potential Maryland prosecution. Ann Coulter helped her find one.
912
On January 16, 1998, without Clinton's knowledge, the Special
Division expanded Starr's jurisdiction to include any criminal liability
Clinton might have had because of his behavior with Lewinsky.913 Under
907. Mark Halprin, Impeach, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1997, at A22.
908. Paul Gigot, A Stolen Election, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at A22.
909. BROCK, supra note 854, at 285.
910. Id at 186.
911. SCHMITT & WEISKOPF, supra note 902, at 17-20.
912. SCHMITT & WEISKOPF, supra note 902, at 35-36, 45.
913. OFFICE OF THE INDEP. COUNSEL, APPENDICES TO THE REFERRAL TO THE U.S. HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES PURSUANT TO TITLE 28, U.S. CODE, SECTION 595(c), PART 1, H.R. DOc.
No. 105-311, at 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter INDEP. COUNSEL APPENDECIES]; TOOBIN, supra note
872, at xx.
the statute, an independent counsel who wanted expanded jurisdiction had
to request it from the Attorney General, who was required to "give great
weight to" the independent counsel's recommendation, and if the Attorney
General, so deferring to the independent counsel, "determine[d] that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted,"
the Special Division was required to ("shall") grant the request. 914 This
deference, both direct and indirect, to the independent counsel meant that
any arguable request for expanded jurisdiction was likely to be granted.
Nothing in the public record suggests that Starr informed the Attorney
General or the Special Division that he had simultaneously been working
with Paula Jones's lawyers to set a trap for Clinton at his January 17th
deposition, before his jurisdiction had been expanded to include the
Lewinsky matter.
In fact, Starr had been looking for sexual misbehavior by Clinton long
before his jurisdiction was expanded to include Lewinsky, and before any
of the perjury and alleged evidence tampering that later formed the basis
for the impeachment had even happened. 915  In other words, Starr was
using the law enforcement power of his office to try to produce material
that could be used politically to embarrass Clinton even if Clinton had not
yet violated the law. Starr also did not tell the Special Division that, as a
private lawyer, he gave strategic advice to Paula Jones's lawyers, one of
whom "had billed Jones $975 [in lawyer time] for consultations with
[Starr] on six occasions in 1994.
" 916
Whoever drafted the Special Division's order-whether it was Starr's office or the
Special Division itself-tried to hide the fact that the real target was Clinton. The order
expanded Starr's jurisdiction to "whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned perjury,
obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses, or otherwise violated federal law ...." INDEP.
COUNSEL APPENDECIES, supra, at 6 (emphasis added). Starr later admitted that it was unwise for
him to have asked for an enlarged jurisdiction. John Rogers, Starr Has Mixed Feelings for
Clinton, AP ONLINE, Sept. 16, 1999; Kenneth Starr, What We've Accomplished, WALL. ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 1999, at A26. He did not admit that his own partisanship undermined the credibility of
his investigation, or that he had collaborated with Paul Jones's lawyers to set a trap for Clinton.
914. 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (1994); see also Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the
Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH. L. REv. 601, 662-65 (1998); Karen A. Popp, The
Impeachment of President Clinton: An Ugly Mix of Three Powerful Forces, 63 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 223, 228-31 (2000).
915. See Bob Woodward & Susan Schmidt, Starr Probes Clinton Personal Life, WASH.
POST., June 25, 1997, at Al (Starr's office and FBI agents working under the office's direction
"have questioned Arkansas state troopers in recent months about their knowledge of any
extramarital relations Bill Clinton may have had while he was Arkansas governor.., including
Paula Corbin Jones.").
916. CONASON & LYONS, supra note 855, at 357.
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On January 17, 1998, a day after the Special Division expanded
Starr's jurisdiction, Clinton testified at a deposition in Jones's lawsuit.
917
Linda Tripp had told Jones's lawyers about Monica Lewinsky, and they
asked Clinton whether he had sex with Lewinsky or been alone with her;
Clinton answered in the negative.918 That was a lie. Because Clinton was
under oath, it was also perjury. Lewinsky had previously signed an
affidavit denying that she had had sex with Clinton. Clinton's lawyers,
unaware of its falsity, put the affidavit into evidence at the deposition,
while Clinton, who knew the falsity of its contents, watched silently.
919
This was later to form part of the basis for the impeachment articles
alleging obstruction of justice. The issue of whether Clinton had had sex
with someone other than Jones, however, was not naturally part of the
Jones lawsuit, although the right-wing backers of Jones's lawsuit had paid
money and supplied lawyers so they could put Clinton under oath and ask
exactly these kinds of questions.92°
On August 17, 1998, Clinton testified again, this time to Starr's grand
jury:
92 1
[Starr] called the President to testify before the grand jury to ask
him whether he had lied in his deposition. The aim was to put
him in the position of having to confess to possible perjury, or to
commit a fresh perjury by denying he had lied. The tactic
ingeniously created a more formal and imposing setting than a
discovery deposition in a defunct civil case, one in which the
President's denials of wrongdoing would seem more grave and
culpable. Ordinary defendants sidestep traps like the one the
OIC set for Clinton by invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege
not to incriminate themselves: but for political reasons, as [Starr]
knew, the President could not "take the Fifth."
[Thus,] the point of calling Clinton to the grand jury was
not to investigate an ordinary crime: it was... to produce a
public spectacle of a president defying the rule of law by
testifying falsely under oath.922
917. TOOBN, supra note 872, at xx.
918. SCHMITT & WEISKOPF, supra note 902, at 35-36, 45, 48.
919. Id. at 47-48.
920. See supra text accompanying notes 869-877.
921. BAKER, supra note 902, at 427; TOOBIN, supra note 854, at xxi; VAN TASSEL &
FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 270. Clinton testified at the White House, and on videotape,
which was later shown to the grand jury. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 270.
922. Robert W. Gordon, Legalizing Outrage, in AFTERMATH: THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT
AND THE PRESIDENCY IN THE AGE OF PUBLIC SPECTACLE 97, 105 (Leonard V. Kaplan &
Beverly I. Moran eds., 2001).
On September 9, Starr delivered two van loads of evidence to the
House along with what he called a "referral ' 923 alleging that Clinton
"obstructed justice in the Clinton v. Jones lawsuit by lying under oath and
concealing evidence of his relationship with Lewinsky [and] lied under
oath and obstructed justice during the grand jury investigation. '924 The
referral then listed what it called "eleven possible grounds for
impeachment." Starr thus asked the House to impeach Clinton.925 Neither
Cox nor Jaworski had done that with Nixon. Cox was fired before he could
do anything, and Jaworski turned his evidence over to the House Judiciary
Committee without any recommendation.926 The referral's description of
the events between Clinton and Lewinsky was widely reprinted in the press
and on the Internet.
Clinton came across not as a cunning seducer and monster of
predation but as an awkward and guilt-stricken overgrown
adolescent, Lewinsky as a sexually aggressive and experienced
but also touchingly insecure young woman. Starr meanwhile
came across as a Puritan pornographer, obsessed with sex and
the destruction of the President. Most readers were horrified at
the brutal invasion of the lovers' privacy, and the dumping of the
details into the public domain. Their horror grew as it became
apparent [that Starr] had subpoenaed family members to inform
on their sources; bookstores to inform on their customer's
reading habits; the Clinton's lawyers, closest aides, and even
their Secret Service guards to reveal the most intimate aspects of
their personal lives; Lewinsky's family, closest friends, and
former lovers to reveal what she had told them, and her
psychiatric records and personal computer files. ... Not to
catch a master terrorist, a drug boss, or a Mafia chieftain, but a
hapless schmo with a sexual secret.
927
In October, investigators from the House Judiciary Committee started
searching through the files physically located in Starr's office looking for
evidence that Starr's staff might have inadvertently not sent to the House
along with Starr's referral.
923. BAKER, supra note 902, at 427; TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xxi; see also REFERRAL
FROM INDEP. COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR IN CONFORMITY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
TITLE 28, U.S. CODE, SECTION 595(c), H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310 (1998).
924. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 272.
925. TOOB1N, supra note 872, at 328-29; VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 273.
926. TOOBN, supra note 872, at 328.
927. Gordon, supra note 922, at 106-07.
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Rummaging through Starr's file cabinets, the House lawyers
discovered interviews with Monica Lewinsky's hairdressers,
childhood friends, and college lovers. There were files [on]
Kathleen Willey's dentist [Clinton was alleged to have made a
pass at Willey], her mail carrier, the woman who had bought her
house, and the funeral home director who had buried her late
husband. Starr's investigators had tracked down Vernon
Jordan's chauffeur [Jordan was alleged to have tried to get a job
for Lewinsky in exchange for her silence] and at least three
people who worked at a Parcel Plus store near the Watergate
where Lewinsky would go to log onto the Internet. They had
scanned Lewinsky's library records at the Pentagon (where she
had checked out just one book) and seemingly quizzed almost
everyone who had ever worked in the Clinton White House,
including the painters, the custodians, the men who washed the
Oval Office windows, and the doorman who talked about the
weather with the president every day.
None of this Starr had included in the ... boxes of evidence
he had shipped to Congress .... House investigators counted
more than 320 grand jury transcripts or FBI interviews... that
never made their way to Capitol Hill. There seemed to be
virtually no tip, lead, or rumor that had not found its way to the
prosecutors, and they had wandered down numerous undisclosed
rabbit trails searching for misconduct by Clinton and his allies.
The Democratic lawyers finally concluded that Starr must not
have sent all this because it would prove to be powerful evidence
of how overzealous his pursuit of the president had become.
928
Starr's staff investigated a total of twenty-one women whom the staff
suspected might have been connected with Clinton sexually. 929 But there
was no real evidence that Clinton, or anyone acting on his behalf, had tried
to tamper with Lewinsky as a witness. "No one ever asked me to lie," she
testified, "and I was never promised a job for my silence.,
930
On November 19, Starr testified at a House Judiciary Committee
hearing and argued that Clinton should be impeached. 931 Although the
Committee had not yet examined the evidence-at the time they had only
read Starr's referral and heard his arguments in favor of impeachment-the
Republican members of the Committee, including Chairman Henry Hyde,
928. BAKER, supra note 902, at 137.
929. Id. at 138.
930. Id. at 325.
931. Id. at 429; TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xxii.
gave Starr a standing ovation at the end of his testimony.932 The
spontaneity of this gesture revealed not only the depth of the Republicans'
partisanship but also their obliviousness to the impression of partisanship
that their behavior was creating in the public mind.
Clinton's standing in the polls took a dip in August,933 when he
testified before Starr's grand jury and immediately afterward made a
statement on national television that many thought insincere. But from that
point on, as the partisanship of the Republicans alienated portions of the
public, Clinton's approval ratings were nearly always favorable and
continually grew stronger,934 in spite of (or perhaps because of) what the
public saw the Republicans doing in the House Judiciary Committee, on
the floor of the House, and in the Senate. On December 15, four days
before the House impeached Clinton, a Washington Post/ABC News poll
found 60% of the public against impeachment and 39% in favor, while by
57% to 36% the public favored a congressional resolution censuring
Clinton.
935
The public seemed to take a sophisticated view of impeachment, close
to that of the drafters of the Constitution.936 The polls revealed that the
public saw what Clinton had done-both adultery and perjury-as wrongs
committed by Clinton as a private person, not as an officeholder, and
certainly not involving the abuse of official power. Though Clinton
deserved some type of punishment, removal from office seemed to the
public to be unrelated to the offense. Republican arguments interpreting
the phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors" came off as formalistic and
appeared to ignore the policy purposes behind the impeachment provisions
in the Constitution, which the public seemed to sense intuitively. That is
why part of former Senator Dale Bumpers's argument to the Senate on
Clinton's behalf during the impeachment trial resonated so thoroughly.
Before entering politics, Bumpers had litigated hundreds of divorce cases
in rural Arkansas. "In all those divorce cases," he told the Senate:
932. BAKER, supra note 902, at 174.
933. Polling data from the period are compiled on the Polling Report website at
http://www.pollingreport.com/wh-hstry.htm. See Molly W. Andolina & Clyde Wilcox, Public
Opinion: The Paradoxes of Clinton's Popularity, in THE CLINTON SCANDAL AND THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 171 (Mark J. Rozell & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2000).
934. Id. The only serious exception was the polls taken for Fox News, which purported to
show the public disapproved of Clinton in virtually every poll Fox took from August 1998 until
the end of Clinton's Presidency, even though every other organization's polls, except in August
1998, showed the exact opposite. See infra note 941.
935. BAKER, supra note 902, at 224.
936. See supra text accompanying notes 62-78.
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I would guess that in eighty percent of contested cases, perjury
was committed. . . . Do you know what it was about? Sex.
Extramarital affairs. But there is a very big difference between
perjury about whether there was marital infidelity in a divorce
case and perjury about whether I bought the murder weapon....
And to charge somebody with the first and punish them as
though it were the second stands our sense of justice on its
head.
93 7
At the center of the effort in the House to impeach Clinton had been
Tom DeLay, then the Republican House Whip and later the House
Majority Leader. Beginning in August 1998, before Starr delivered his
referral to the House, DeLay organized an effort, which he and his staff
called "The Campaign," to get Clinton impeached.
In a conference room in the Capitol... [DeLay's staff] flood[ed]
House Republicans with information and provid[ed] a central
booking agency for members who shared DeLay's conviction
and were willing to go public with calls for Clinton to resign....
A "message of the day" would be sent to every Republican
member's office to keep up the pressure. Sample press releases
would be written for other Congressmen to release in their own
names ....
... DeLay [used] a network of conservative talk shows and
party fund-raisers to generate pressure within the GOP. He
would go on as many as ten radio talk shows a day, and his staff
would blast-fax talking points and tip sheets to perhaps two
hundred such programs at a time, revving up the conservative
audiences that would then turn up the heat on their local
congressmen.
938
That pressure could be substantial because most Republican
Representatives were out of touch with the mainstream of public sentiment.
From the time the Republicans took control of the House after the
1994 elections, their majorities had been among the smallest in American
history. In fact, the Democratic majorities in the House for nearly all of the
period from 1932 through 1994 were enormous compared to the tiny
margins available to the Republicans after 1994 .939 The Republicans ran
the House as though they had massive public support, which they did not.
937. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 381.
938. BAKER, supra note 902, at 45, 179.
939. See infra text accompanying notes 1093-1106.
They tended to get their news from The Washington Times940 and Fox
News. 941 Exposed to a narrow range of opinion, they expected the world to
conform to their views, and did not feel obligated, as generations of
politicians before them had, to find practical solutions that worked and
could satisfy a broad political consensus. They were not afraid of losing
general elections because their districts had been gerrymandered to have
Republican majorities, even if there were more Democrats than
Republicans in the national population. What a Republican incumbent
could be afraid of was losing a primary election to an even more right-wing
challenger who might be supported and bankrolled by the very constituents
that DeLay had aroused to badger their Representatives into voting for
impeachment.
942
Before Starr testified, the Committee sent Clinton a demand that he
answer eighty-one questions that the Republicans claimed were necessary
to the Committee's investigation. Few, if any, of the questions were
940. The Washington Times was created in 1982 by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, and has been
heavily subsidized by his organizations, to present right-wing views in competition with The
Washington Post. A typical Washington Times story on the Clintons claimed that Hillary Clinton
is bisexual, and that Bill and Hillary Clinton "have had a pact for decades: He gets to fool around
with women, and she gets to fool around with women (plus the occasional man like Vince
Foster)." Jack Wheeler, Harry Potter and Bill Clinton, WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A17.
The Washington Times has frequently been challenged as deliberately inaccurate for political
purposes, distorting facts to favor Republicans and harm Democrats. See Dante Chinni, The
Other Paper: The Washington Times's Role, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept.-Oct. 2002; Allen
Freedman, Washington 's Other Paper: Is the Time Right for the Times?, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1995.
941. The Fox News Channel was created by Rupert Murdoch, who owns the largest media
empire in the world. Murdoch hired as Fox News's chief executive officer Roger Ailes, a media
strategist to the presidential campaigns of Richard Nixon (1968), Ronald Reagan (1984), and
George Bush (1988). Ken Auletta, Vox Fox: How Roger Ailes and Fox News Are Changing
Cable News, THE NEW YORKER, May 26, 2003, at 58. According to former employees of Fox
News, news writers and reporters receive a daily memo instructing them on what to say about
particular stories, often before the staff has investigated those stories. OUTFOXED: RUPERT
MURDOCH'S WAR ON JOURNALISM (Carolina Productions 2004). "I've never heard of any other
network or any legitimate news organization doing that," said Walter Cronkite, the anchor for
CBS Evening News from 1962 to 1981, who believes Fox News is "a far right-wing
organization." Id. A former Fox News reporter told Greenwald that his supervisors made it clear
to him that Fox is not "a news gathering organization so much as a proponent of a point of view,"
and that "any ad-lib that made the Democrats look stupid or made the Republicans look smart
would get an 'attaboy,' a pat on the back, a wink and a nod." Id. According to another former
Fox News staffer, "[w]atching Fox News at the end of [the] Clinton [administration], where it
was all attack mode... and then Bush takes power" in January 2001 "and they're like lap dogs.
It was like night and day. It was a party line shift." Id. Although Fox News adopted a
deferential tone toward the White House after Bush's inauguration, the network's attitude toward
the Clintons did not change. "Guess who's giving sympathy to illegal immigrants linked to
terrorists," said a Fox News announcer in a typical story on Feb. 11, 2003, as footage of Hillary
Clinton appeared on the screen: "You're looking at her." Auletta, supra.
942. BAKER, supra note 902, at 225.
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investigatory. The first was: "Do you admit or deny that you are the chief
law enforcement officer of the United States?
943
No congressional judiciary committee could have been in any doubt
about the answer to this question (and a number of the others). Its purpose
was to taunt Clinton and to generate an answer that would enable
Republicans to proclaim that Clinton admitted being the chief law
enforcement officer of the land but still himself committed a felony. In
1974, if the Democratic majority on the House Judiciary Committee had
tried to send similar questions to Richard Nixon, the Republican minority
would have erupted in protests that the majority was behaving in a partisan
manner. It was to avoid any conceivable appearance of partisanship that
the 1974 committee majority treated Nixon and his advocates with
solicitous respect and treated the idea of impeachment as a regrettable duty,
to be undertaken only if absolutely unavoidable.
Throughout the proceedings in the House Judiciary Committee and on
the floor of both the Senate and the House, Republicans refused to call the
subject of the proceedings "President Clinton" or "the President" or "Bill
Clinton"-which was the only name by which the public knew him.
Instead, Republicans referred to him as "William Jefferson Clinton,"
enunciating each syllable in the tone that a bailiff might use while reading
aloud an indictment during an arraignment in a criminal courtroom. The
purpose was to de-legitimize Clinton by treating him as though he were
nearly already convicted and not a real president. This tactic appeared to
have an opposite effect on those of the public who noticed it. The
Republicans, carried away with their own partisanship, appeared to be the
ones treating the office of the presidency with disrespect.
On almost entirely party-line votes, the House Judiciary Committee
recommended four articles of impeachment on December 11 and 12.944 On
December 19, 1998, the House adopted two of the four articles, charging
Clinton with perjury before the grand jury, and with obstruction of justice
by concealing evidence in the Paula Jones litigation. 945 The perjury article
was adopted 228 to 206946 on a nearly party-line vote, with only 5
Democrats voting yea and only 5 Republicans voting nay.947 The
943. Id. at 251,443.
944. IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., REP. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY TO ACCOMPANY H.R. RES. 611, H.R. REP. 105-830, at 2, 128-134;
BAKER, supra note 902, at 430.
945. BAKER, supra note 902, at 430, 438-42; Turley, supra note 485, at 96-98.
946. 144 CONG. REC. H12040 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998).
947. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 367; Turley, supra note 485, at 97 n.463.
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obstruction of justice article was adopted by a vote of 221 to 21 2948-an
extraordinarily close vote and again nearly party-line, only 5 Democrats
voting yea and 12 Republicans voting nay. 949  During the debate,
Democrats protested that the impeachment was a "partisan railroad job,"950
and that it was hypocrisy to impeach a Democratic president for perjury
after a Republican secretary of defense had been indicted for perjury and
then pardoned by the first President Bush.95'
Some in the House Republican leadership, especially Tom DeLay,
believed that impeachment would enable them to make large gains in the
November 1998 congressional elections, because the elections would occur
after the initial House Judiciary Committee meetings on impeachment were
nationally televised. In congressional elections occurring in a president's
sixth year, the party not in control of the White House has traditionally
gained House seats-often in large numbers. At that point in a presidency,
an Administration's mistakes could look bigger than they did earlier while
the president himself could appear less attractive than he once was. This
happened to Woodrow Wilson (whose party lost twenty-two House seats in
1918), Franklin Roosevelt (seventy-two seats in 1938), the
Roosevelt/Harry Truman Administration (fifty-four seats in 1946), Dwight
Eisenhower (forty-eight seats in 1958), the John F. Kennedy/Lyndon
Johnson Administration (forty-five seats in 1966), and the Richard
Nixon/Gerald Ford Administration (forty-eight seats in 1974), though
sometimes the damage could be lighter as with Warren Harding/Calvin
Coolidge (eight seats in 1926) and Ronald Reagan (five seats in 1986).952
In 1998, Republican ambitions were not as big as the historical average,
but Republicans were nevertheless confident nonetheless of gains. On the
day of the election, Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich predicted
his party would pick up twenty seats at the expense of the Democrats.
953
Instead, the Republicans lost five seats because the Republican
campaign to impeach Clinton had alienated voters.954 The Republicans
retained control of the House, but more people actually voted for
Democratic House candidates than for Republican House candidates. This
was the only time since Baker v. Carr rationalized House voting in 1962 by
948. 144 CONG. REC. H12041-12042 (daily ed. Dec. 19,1998).
949. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 367; Turley, supra note 485, at 98 n.464.
950. IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, supra note 853, at 174 (quoting
Congressman Jerrold Nadler).
951. Id. at 170, 175.
952. House Party Divisions, supra note 199.
953. BAKER, supra note 902, at 435.
954. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at 344.
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requiring that legislative districts be of equal size955 that the party that lost
the popular vote won a majority of the seats in the House.956  The
Republicans won a majority only because of intense gerrymandering that
was not possible before the invention of computers.
Table 4
Congressional Party Divisions after
the Elections of 1996 and 1998
Together with Popular Vote for House














When the articles of impeachment were considered by the House on
December 19, the Republican leadership refused to allow a vote on a
motion that would express the sense of Congress that Clinton had
"dishonored" the Presidency and "deserves[] the censure and
condemnation of the American people and the Congress," which Clinton
would have had to acknowledge by his signature on the resolution. 960 Peter
Baker, who published the most exhaustive history of the Clinton
impeachment, wrote that "DeLay ... crushed the possibility of a censure
vote on the floor."961 On February 12, a few minutes after the Senate
acquitted Clinton, a Democratic Senator and a Republican Senator moved a
similar censure resolution in the Senate. Even though a fifty-six to forty-
955. 369 U.S. 186, 192-95, 237 (1962).
956. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 439, at 5-193.
957. Senate Party Divisions, supra note 198.
958. House Party Divisions, supra note 199.
959. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 439, at 5-193.
960. BAKER, supra note 902, at 251, 443.
961. Id. at 229.
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three majority voted to consider the resolution, it failed because it was
made outside the process for ordinary business, which requires a two-thirds
majority to suspend temporarily the Senate rules.962 If it had not been
necessary to suspend the rules, the resolution obviously would have been
adopted.
Everything changed when the House managers appeared in the Senate
to present their case. After the mob psychology that dominated their party
in the House, the impeachment managers were stunned by the calm
skepticism of a number of Republican Senators, who could not be
disciplined by their party leadership the way that House Members could, as
well as by the imperviousness to persuasion on the part of every single
Democratic Senator. This should not have been a surprise to the House
managers. Conviction in an impeachment trial requires a two-thirds
majority in the Senate. Nothing about the Senate of 1998 and 1999, and
nothing about the articles of impeachment, or the evidence behind them,
could have supported any rational hope that Senators would have been
more enthusiastic about convicting Clinton than the House of
Representatives had been about impeaching him.
On January 7, 1999, the Senate trial began.963 Moderate Republican
and Democratic Senators, with support from Senate Republican Majority
Leader Trent Lott, proposed that after four days of hearing arguments and
debate, the Senate would take a straw vote, and if that vote showed that the
two-thirds majority needed to convict was unreachable, the Senate would
table the impeachment articles and instead consider censuring Clinton.
964
"However, a powerful backlash from strongly conservative Republicans
forced Lott to abandon the plan."
965
On January 27, Senator Robert Byrd made the impeachment
equivalent of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted, and forty-four Senators (all Democrats) voted to dismiss
the articles of impeachment.966 A Senator who believes that neither article
states an impeachable offense will not later vote to convict, no matter how
amply later evidence supports the allegations in that article. If forty-four
Senators take the position that the allegations in the impeachment articles,
962. Id. at411-12,444-45.
963. Id at 431; TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xxii; Turley, supra note 485, at 101.
964. Charles Tiefer, The Senate Impeachment Trial for President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 407, 414 (1999).
965. Id.
966. BAKER, supra note 902, at 360; Susan Low Bloch, A Report Card on the Impeachment:
Judging the Institutions That Judged President Clinton, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 143-155
(2000); Tiefer, supra note 964, at 415.
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even if they are later proved with evidence, would not constitute grounds
for conviction, then the largest number who could vote to convict after
hearing the evidence would be fifty-six-far less than the sixty-seven votes
needed for a conviction. It thus became clear that Clinton could not be
convicted.967
Between February 1 st and 3rd, Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan, and Sidney
Blumenthal968 were deposed, so that any Senator who wanted to could
watch their testimony on videotape. 969 This produced nothing new. The
House impeachment managers wanted Lewinsky to testify on the Senate
floor, but the Senate rejected that plan by a thirty to seventy vote. The
thirty aye votes were all Republican but included virtually no senior
Republicans. 970  Throughout the trial, it was the Republican House
managers who wanted to put as much testimony as possible before the
Senate (and national television audiences), while Clinton's lawyers and
Senate Democrats argued that little or no evidence was necessary because
the House had not alleged grounds for conviction. This was the inverse of
what happened in past impeachments, where the defendant has usually
insisted that the House prove its case factually.
971
On February 12, the Senate acquitted Clinton. 972 On neither article
did even a simple majority of the Senate vote to convict. On the perjury
article, forty-five Senators voted to convict, and fifty-five voted to
acquit. 973 On the obstruction of justice article, the Senate split evenly, fifty
Senators voting to convict and fifty to acquit.974 Of the three high-profile
partisan impeachments to go to a Senate trial--Chase, Johnson, and
Clinton-here the prosecution from the House fared the worst. In the
Chase trial, 56% of the Senate voted to convict on one of the articles. 975 In
the Johnson trial, 65% of the Senate voted to convict.976 By contrast, the
best the House managers could get in the Clinton impeachment was 50%
on one article and 45% on the other.
967. BAKER, supra note 902, at 361; Turley, supra note 485, at 106.
968. Blumenthal was a Clinton advisor accused of trying to smear Lewinsky.
969. BAKER, supra note 902, at 432; Tiefer, supra note 964, at 416.
970. Tiefer, supra note 964, at 416.
971. Id. at 425-26.
972. TOOBIN, supra note 872, at xxii.
973. 145 CONG. REC. S 1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); BAKER, supra note 902, at 438-42.
974. 145 CONG. REC. S 1458-1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999); BAKER, supra note 902, at 438-42.
975. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 102.
976. Id. at 226.
On June 30, 1999, the Independent Counsel Act expired. It has not
been reenacted.
977
Michael Gerhardt, the leading legal scholar on impeachment, wrote
shortly after the Clinton trial:
[I]f a majority vote by the Senate to convict both Chase and
Johnson could not save either's impeachment from being
regarded as illegitimate, the absence of a majority vote in the
Senate [against] Clinton (coupled with other criticisms of it)
could be viewed as an even rounder rejection of the legitimacy
of the House's case.978
That may be evidence of the House Republicans' partisanship, but it may
also be evidence of how much their partisanship blinded them to political
realities. In both the Chase and Johnson impeachments, the impeaching
political party started with more than a two-thirds majority in the Senate-
ample votes, in other words, to convict. In the Chase impeachment, all the
Federalists voted to acquit on the important articles, but that would not
have been enough: Chase was saved by defections among Jeffersonians
who knew their party had overreached.979 The same thing happened in the
Johnson trial. There, Republicans in the Senate had more than a two-thirds
majority, the Democrats all voted against impeachment, and Johnson was
acquitted only because of the defections of Republicans troubled by what
their party was doing. 980 In 1999, Republicans started with only fifty-five
of one hundred Senators. To win, they would have to keep all of those
votes and persuade at least twelve Democrats to join them. But the
partisanship of the House not only failed to persuade a single Democrat to
vote to convict, but it also, as in the Chase and Johnson trials, caused
defections from their own party.
Elsewhere, Gerhardt has written that "[i]t is tempting but misguided to
dismiss President Clinton's impeachment and acquittal as having been
driven largely by partisanship., 981 His reasoning appears to have been that
"Democrats arguably acted throughout the proceeding in at least as partisan
a fashion as their Republican counterparts. '' 982 But nonpartisanship and
bipartisanship are possible only when the party with greater legislative
power makes room for it. In 1974, many, though not all, Republicans were
977. See supra note 881.
978. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Historical and Constitutional Significance of the Impeachment
and Trial of President Clinton, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 349, 368 (1999).
979. See supra text accompanying notes 227-242.
980. See supra text accompanying notes 482-488.
981. GERHARDT, supra note 687, at 175.
982. Id. at 176.
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eventually able to see that their own president should be removed from
office only because the Democratic majority conducted the impeachment
inquiry in a nonpartisan manner. Because in 1998 and 1999, the majority
Republicans acted in a highly partisan manner from the start, and because
the impeachment was the culmination of many years of campaigning to de-
legitimize Clinton and smear him and his family, it is not surprising that
Democrats did not approach the issues with completely open minds. The
record actually demonstrates that many Democrats did seek to
compromise, which the Republicans rejected-for example the Democratic
proposals to censure Clinton. In both the House and Senate, a very large
proportion of Democrats made it clear that they were disgusted both with
Clinton's behavior and with the Republican impeachment movement.
Individual members of the House Judiciary Committee did not impose
on themselves in 1998 an evidentiary burden,983 such as the clear and
convincing evidence standard used by most Committee members during
the Nixon impeachment hearings in 1974.984 The 1998 Committee did not
form a bipartisan impeachment staff, which the 1974 Committee did when
investigating Nixon. In 1974, the "staff conducted a neutral, behind-
closed-doors investigation and then presented Committee members in
closed sessions with evidence and legal analysis in a nonjudgmental
fashion," while in 1998, the Committee's "deliberations were marked from
the outset by open partisan conflict. 985 In 1974, Leon Jaworski, as special
prosecutor, merely turned his evidence over to the Committee. 986 Because
the evidence was so massive, Jaworski had to add a report that summarized
it, but he first showed the report to the federal judge who tried all the
Watergate criminal cases to make sure that it did nothing other than
summarize the evidence and was devoid of conclusions and
recommendations.987 But in 1998, Starr "actively participated in the
Committee's impeachment hearings, strongly advocating President
Clinton's impeachment. '" 988  Unlike Cox and Jaworski, who "[w]hile
investigating Nixon... avoided any partisan political activities," Starr and
his investigation "acquired overtones of political motivation. ,
989
983. Gerhardt, supra note 978, at 369.
984. See supra text accompanying note 705; infra text accompanying note 1077.
985. Fred H. Altshuler, Comparing the Nixon and Clinton Impeachments, 51 HASTINGS L.J.
745, 746 (2000); see also id. at 747-48.
986. Id. at 747.
987. BAKER, supra note 902, at 62.
988. Altshuler, supra note 985, at 746-47; see also id. at 748.
989. VAN TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 268.
Benjamin Wittes, a journalist, interviewed Starr at length after he
resigned as independent counsel. 990  Primarily on the basis of these
interviews, Wittes concluded that Starr had not set out to destroy Clinton's
Presidency but instead had conceived of his role as that of a "truth
commission." 991  Starr told Wittes that the Independent Counsel Act
required him to assume that role. But the statute assigned to an
independent counsel the responsibilities of determining whether evidence
would support a criminal conviction and, if it would, prosecuting to obtain
that conviction; these are the functions of a prosecutor, not a grand
inquisitor. The principal author of the Act, Samuel Dash, has written that
"an independent counsel ... is no more and no less than a federal
prosecutor in the U.S. Department of Justice," with the sole exception that
an independent counsel makes prosecutorial decisions without answering
to the Attorney General.992 Starr actually hired Dash to advise him and his
staff about the Act. But when Starr appeared before the House Judiciary
Committee and advocated impeachment, Dash resigned in a letter that told
Starr "you have violated your obligations under the independent counsel
statute and have unlawfully intruded on the power of impeachment, which
the Constitution gives solely to the House."
993
What Starr said to Wittes has a very low degree of historical
probativeness. It is part of the historical method that we view with
relentless skepticism what people say to justify their actions, and that we
instead draw inferences primarily from what people do and from what they
say when they are not trying to justify themselves. 994 Starr initially was
appointed to investigate whether the Clintons had committed crimes in
connection with the Whitewater real estate investment. In 1997, Starr had
his office draft a 100-page referral recommending that Clinton be
impeached over Whitewater, but he decided not to send it to the House
because he was not confident of his evidence. 995  Starr also (re)-
investigated the death of Vince Foster, allegations about personnel
practices in the White House travel office, the disposition of FBI files, and
every conceivable allegation about Clinton's sex life. Each investigation
lasted years, either because of an inability on the part of Starr and his staff
990. WTrEs, supra note 884, at viii.
991. Id. at xi-xii, 26-28. The phrase "truth commission" is Wittes's, but Starr agreed with the
concept and did not disagree with the phrase. Id. at 212 n.69.
992. Dash, supra note 881, at 2081; see also WR=TES, supra note 884, at 46-47, 66.
993. The Testing of a President; Letter of Resignation From Ethics Adviser, and Starr's
Letter in Response, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998; see also WllTES, supra note 884, at 164-65.
994. See supra last five sentences of note 566.
995. WITTES, supra note 884, at 171-172, 207 n.27.
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to reach closure on anything or because the real purpose was to keep
Starr's office in operation until something impeachable could be found.
Then, when Clinton finally perjured himself about Lewinsky in the Jones
deposition, Starr and his staff suddenly gained speed that they had never
shown before. From the date of the deposition to the date Starr referred the
matter to the House, his investigation of the Lewinsky matter was
completed in by far the shortest period of time for anything he investigated
as independent counsel.
In 1974, individual members of the House Judiciary Committee
worked hard and earnestly to develop an evidentiary standard that would
identify behavior justifying impeachment. Members disagreed with each
other about what that test would be, but nearly all focused on some version
of a profound abuse of presidential power that damages the country. For
example, the ten Republicans on the 1974 Judiciary Committee who
initially voted against impeachment but reversed themselves after the
smoking gun tapes were released signed a joint statement in which they
said, among other things, that "the Framers... intended that the President
should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious misconduct
dangerous to the system of government established by the Constitution.
'" 996
One of those ten was Trent Lott. But in 1998, as Senate Majority Leader,
he took the position that impeachment would be justified if a president's
"bad conduct" put the presidency in "disrepute. 997 And in 1998, many
other Republicans reverted to the formula used by Ford when he tried to
have Douglas impeached-that "an impeachable offense is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given
moment in history" 998-which is not how Republicans insisted that Nixon
be judged.
One of the leading scholars of the Johnson impeachment, Hans
Trefousse, considers the Clinton and Johnson impeachments to be
essentially parallel:
In both cases, tremendous party pressure brought about the
indictment; in both cases, the real cause of the impeachment did
not appear to be the ostensible one [recited in the impeachment
articles]; and in both cases, the President's bitter opponents...
996. HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 365.
997. Juliet Eilperin & John F. Harris, House GOP Pushes Wide Clinton Probe; President
Wants Time and Subject Limits, WASH. POST., Sept. 30, 1998, at Al.
998. 116 CONG. REC. 11913-11914 (1970); VAN TASSSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 82, at 9,
59.
particularly Kenneth W. Starr and his supporters in 1998, had
been pursuing the President for a long time.
999
Even Richard Posner called it part of "the Republicans' war against
Clinton."'000
IV. The Future of Partisan Impeachments
and Threats of Impeachment
Certainly, nonpartisan and bipartisan impeachments will continue.
Occasionally, though infrequently, it will be necessary to impeach a
corrupt official who refuses to resign. Will impeachments and threats of
impeachment continue to be used in partisan political manner, as they have
since 1969? To explore that question, it is helpful to consider the relevance
of the rhetoric on perjury used during the Clinton impeachment to another
dispute involving testimony by a federal official. In so doing, it will be
helpful to look at the rules (or lack thereof) on evidentiary burdens in
impeachments in the House and Senate and the effect of party insecurity on
the use of impeachment and threats to impeach.
A. Thomas
"There is no excuse for perjury. Never, never, never," Kenneth Starr
told Diane Sawyer in a television interview during the Clinton
impeachment.1001 Before the House Judiciary Committee, Starr argued
that:
[N]o one is entitled to lie under oath simply because he or she
does not like the questions or because he believes the case is
frivolous, or that it is financially motivated or politically
motivated....
History and practice support the conclusion that perjury is a
high crime and misdemeanor. Perjury has been the basis, as the
committee knows, for the removal of several judges. As far as
we know, no one has questioned whether perjury was a high
crime or misdemeanor in those cases. . . . And the House
manager's report in the impeachment of Judge Walter Nixon, for
perjury, stated, "It is difficult to imagine an act more subversive
to the legal process than lying from the witness stand."
999. TREFOUSSE, supra note 447, at x.
1000. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND
TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 260 (1999).
1001. Gordon, supra note 922, at 108.
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Witnesses tell the truth. It doesn't matter what the
underlying subject matter is. Once you are in court under oath,
you tell the truth. That is the way judges look at the world, and
perhaps that is why no judge being subjected to an impeachment
for perjury has dared suggest don't worry about it, it's not an
impeachable offense.1
00 2
During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on his nomination to
the Supreme Court, Clarence Thomas made numerous statements of fact,
under oath, that were viewed by many as not believable. For example, he
testified that he did not know until shortly before the hearings that a friend
of his, Jay Parker, represented the South African government by lobbying
against sanctions that had been imposed because of that government's
racist practices known as apartheid. 1003 The media immediately afterward
reported that when Thomas was Chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission he argued with employees there and defended
Parker's lobbying on behalf of the South African government, and one of
those employees contacted the Judiciary Committee to give the same
account. 1 004
Thomas denied under oath that he had prepared for the hearings in the
manner customary for nominees to high-stakes positions, with extensive
coaching on what to say and how to say it. °°5 Given the importance of this
nomination to the first President Bush's administration, many saw
Thomas's claim as inherently incredible. Before the hearings, according to
Andrew Peyton Thomas, who has written the only full-length biography of
Clarence Thomas:
Thomas... spent large blocs of time viewing videotapes of the
Bork and Souter hearings, studying them and taking notes....
[Thomas also prepared extensively through] "murder boards."
Held in Room 180 of the Old Executive Office Building, the
mock hearings featured lawyers from the White House and
Justice Department seated around a large, horseshoe-shaped
conference table. Thomas held the seat of honor in the middle.
1002. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY: WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.,
HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM. PURSUANT TO H.R. RES. 581, APPEARANCE OF
INDEP. COUNSEL, 105TH CONG. 18, 30, 113 (Comm. Print 1998).
1003. NOMINATION OF JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS TO BE ASSOC. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 102D CONG., PART 1
253-54, 381-82, 481 [hereinafter THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 1].
1004. Id. at 381-82, 481; see also TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL
GAMES: CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND THE STORY OF A SUPREME COURT NOMINATION
68, 82-84, 89-90, 116-17, 146 (1992).
1005. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 1, supra note 1003, at 260-61, 610-11.
The panel bombarded him with hostile questions, mining his
writings for the most offensive passages. . . . These verbal
sparring matches were intended not only to help him anticipate
likely questions, but to deaden the pain that these assaults would
inflict on his pride and, possibly, to his reputation.'
0 0 6
On the issue of abortion and the precedential value of Roe v. Wade,
100 7
Thomas testified as follows:
SENATOR HATCH: Have you made up your mind, Judge
Thomas, on how you will vote when abortion issues are before
the Court as a Justice on the Court?
JUDGE THOMAS: ... I don't sit on any issues, on any cases,
that I have prejudged'oo
SENATOR METZENBAUM: [Do] you believe that the
Constitution protects a woman's right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy[?]
JUDGE THOMAS: ... I have no reason or agenda to
prejudge the issue....' 
009
SENATOR LEAHY: So it would be safe to assume that when
[Roe] came down-you were in law school, you were in law
school, where recent case law is often discussed-that Roe v.
Wade would have been discussed in the law school while you
were there.
JUDGE THOMAS: ... Because I was a married student and I
worked, I did not spend a lot of time around the law school doing
what the other students enjoyed so much, and that is debating all
the current cases and all of the slip opinions. My schedule was
such that I went to classes and generally went to work and went
home.
SENATOR LEAHY: Judge Thomas, I was a married law
student who also worked, but I also found, at least between
classes, that we did discuss some of the law, and I am sure you
are not suggesting that there wasn't any discussion at any time of
Roe v. Wade?
JUDGE THOMAS: Senator, I cannot remember personally
engaging in those discussions.
1006. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 354-55.
1007. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
1008. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 1, supra note 1003, at 172-73 (emphases added).
1009. Id. at 180 (emphases added).
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SENATOR LEAHY: Have you ever had discussion of Roe v.
Wade, other than in this room, in the 17 or 18 years it has been
there?
JUDGE THOMAS: Only, I guess, Senator, in the fact in the
most general sense that other individuals express concerns one
way or the other, and you listen and you try to be thoughtful. If
you are asking me whether or not I have debated the contents of
it, that answer to that is no, Senator.
SENATOR LEAHY: ... Have you made any decision in your
own mind whether you feel Roe v. Wade was properly decided or
not, without stating what that decision is?
JUDGE THOMAS: I have not made, Senator, a decision one
way or the other with respect to that important decision. 1010
SENATOR BROWN: I would be interested to know if in your
own mind you have come to a decision on the right to terminate
a pregnancy. I am not asking what that decision is, but I would
like to know within your own mind if you are at a point where
you have decided that.
JUDGE THOMAS: ... I have no agenda. I am open about
that important case .... 1011
"No one believes that," wrote one author in a typical response to Thomas's
testimony1012 When Administration lawyers prepared Thomas for his
testimony, 101 3 he told them that he had no position on abortion and had
never discussed it with anyone, even his wife.10 14 Even the Administration
lawyers did not believe him.10 15 Roe has been, by far, the most divisive
Supreme Court case, and abortion the most divisive constitutional issue, in
recent decades, and it seemed that a Supreme Court nominee who claimed
to have no position on Roe or abortion and further claimed not to have
discussed the case or the issue was either unqualified for the Court or lying.
The format of a congressional hearing is not conducive to determining
specific facts such as whether Thomas was telling the truth. Investigation
before a hearing often does not reveal issues that arise for the first time
during the hearing-a process that, compared with discovery in civil
1010. Id. at 222-23 (emphases added).
1011. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
1012. JAMES M. WALL, HIDDEN TREASURES: SEARCHING FOR GOD IN MODERN CULTURE
109 (1997).
1013. See supra text accompanying note 999.
1014. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 355.
1015. Id.
litigation, is inadequate. Statements made during a hearing are not fully
investigated afterward or before the committee makes a decision.
Witnesses are questioned by politicians who lack questioning skills, are
often unprepared, and frequently engage in rhetorical posturing rather than
a methodical search for truth. Each questioner is limited to a short time,
such as ten minutes, which prevents any searching inquiry. Witnesses are
allowed to testify to any "fact" they please, even if they have no first-hand
knowledge of it and are only guessing-or hoping-that it is true. And
questioners are allowed to ask questions designed to elicit such testimony.
In general, in a congressional hearing the rules of evidence that govern
every trial court are ignored.
Despite all this, some evidence immediately began to appear
suggesting that Thomas did have a position on Roe and abortion, and had
previously expressed it. Much more evidence might exist, but the
committee did not conduct an exhaustive inquiry to locate it. The evidence
that appeared during the hearings included a report, signed by Thomas,
recommending, among other things, that the Administration nominate
Supreme Court Justices who would vote to overrule Roe,10 16 as well as a
speech in which Thomas praised an article that argued that the natural law
philosophy Thomas subscribes to creates a constitutional right to life and
that all abortion is unconstitutional. 10 17 Thomas testified that he had not
read the passages in the report that discussed Roe. 1018 He also testified that
he did not intend to endorse the article's position on abortion, even though
the article was titled The Declaration of Independence and the Right to
Life: One Leads Naturally to the Other, and even though Thomas said in
the speech that the article, "on the Declaration of Independence and the
meaning of the right to life[,] is a splendid example of applying" natural
law. 1019
After the hearings, it was reported that "Paul Weyrich [the founder of
the Heritage Foundation and an influential right-wing activist] remembered
that Thomas had expressed an opinion on... abortion in prior meetings
with him. He found Thomas's lack of candor 'disingenuous' and
'nauseating.' A man of probity... , Weyrich seriously considered
withdrawing his support of Thomas [but was talked out of it on the
argument] that Thomas's responses were cagey but not false."'10 20 Even
1016. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 1, supra note 1003, at 129-131.
1017. Id. at 127-129, 146
1018. Id. at 129-130.
1019. Id. at 128, 146, 389.
1020, THOMAS, sUpra note 901, at 376-77.
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Thomas's own mother told reporters that he had told her he was opposed to
abortion.
10 21
Nine months after being sworn in as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas
joined a concurring and dissenting opinion by Rehnquist, 1022 as well as a
concurring and dissenting opinion by Scalia in the same case,'0 23 both of
which argued that Roe was wrongly decided. "We think," the Rehnquist
opinion posited, "that the Court was mistaken in Roe .... In our view,
authentic principles of stare decisis do not require that any portion of the
reasoning in Roe be kept intact." 10 24  The Scalia opinion derided the
majority's reaffirmation of the essence of Roe as "outrageous."''0 25 These
positions, taken so soon after Thomas's confirmation hearings, created
further doubts about his testimony's truthfulness. In another case,'
0 26
Thomas wrote a dissent filling forty pages in the official reporter. 10 27 The
first sentence, speaking of Roe, stated: "In 1973, this Court struck down an
Act of the Texas Legislature that had been in effect since 1857, thereby
rendering unconstitutional abortion statutes in dozens of States. ... As
some of my colleagues on the Court, past and present, ably demonstrated,
that decision was grievously wrong."'' 0 28  He then cited to then-Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Roe'0 29 and to Justice White's dissent in a
companion case, decided the same day as Roe.'0 30 In every other case in
which the constitutional right established in Roe, or the parameters of that
right, has been at issue, Thomas has voted against it.' 1 The uniformity
and comprehensiveness of these views, and the unqualified language with
which Thomas has expressed them, and subscribed to others' expression of
them, suggest that they were not arrived at after Thomas's confirmation
testimony.
1021. JANE MEYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 55 (1994).
1022. Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1023. Id. at 979 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1024. Id. at 953-54 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1025. Id. at 981 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
1026. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
1027. Id. at 980-1020 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1028. Id. at 980.
1029. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 at 171-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
1030. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-23 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
1031. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006); Voinovich
v. Women's Med. Prof I Corp., 523 U.S. 1036 (1998) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996);
Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
joining Justice Scalia's dissent to denial of certiorari).
After these hearings ended, a separate controversy arose, and the
committee held a second round of hearings. Anita Hill had been a lawyer
supervised by Thomas first at the Department of Education and then at the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Hill testified that at the
Department of Education Thomas pressured her to date him, which she
refused to do because he was her supervisor. She further testified that
during conversations ostensibly about her work assignments he subjected
her to sexual monologues.
Ms. HILL: He spoke about acts that he had seen in
pornographic films involving such matters as women having sex
with animals, and films showing group sex or rape scenes. He
talked about pornographic materials depicting individuals with
large penises, or large breasts involved in various sex acts.
On several occasions, Thomas told me graphically of his
own sexual prowess. Because I was extremely uncomfortable
talking about sex with him at all, and particularly in such a
graphic way, I told him that I did not want to talk about these
subjects. . . .My efforts to change the subject were rarely
successful. 1
032
Hill testified that after some time at the Department of Education Thomas's
behavior seemed to end. However, when Thomas became Chairman of the
EEOC, she transferred to a job there, which Thomas offered to her. After
some time at the EEOC, Thomas's discussions of sex "began again:
10 0
33
Ms. HILL: The comments... ranged from pressing me
about why I didn't go out with him, to remarks about my
personal appearance....
He commented on what I was wearing in terms of whether
it made me more or less sexually attractive. The incidents
occurred in his inner office at the EEOC.
One of the oddest episodes I remember was an occasion in
which Thomas was drinking a Coke in his office, he got up from
the table, at which we were working, went over to his desk to get
the Coke, looked at the can and asked, "Who has put pubic hair
in my Coke?"
On other occasions, he referred to the size of his own penis
as being larger than normal and he also spoke on some occasions
1032. NOMINATION OF JUDGE CLARENCE THOMAS TO BE ASSOC. JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE U.S., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 102D CONG., PART 4
38 [hereinafter THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 4].
1033. Id. at 38-39.
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of the pleasures he had given women with oral sex.... I began
to feel severe stress on the job.
In February 1983, I was hospitalized for 5 days on an
emergency basis with acute stomach pain which I attributed to
stress on the job.
In the spring of 1983, an opportunity to teach at Oral
Roberts University opened up. ... I agreed to take the job, in
large part, because of my desire to escape the pressures I felt at
the EEOC due to Judge Thomas.
When I informed him that I was leaving in July, I recall that
his response was that now, I would no longer have an excuse for
not going out with him. ... 1034
Thomas then testified:
JUDGE THOMAS: I would like to start by saying
unequivocally, uncategorically that I deny each and every single
allegation against me today that suggested in any way that I had
conversations of a sexual nature or about pornographic material
with Anita Hill, that I ever attempted to date her, that I ever had
any personal sexual interest in her, or that I in any way ever
harassed her. 1
035
Several employees and former employees of the EEOC testified on
Thomas's behalf. The heart of their testimony would not have been
admissible in a court of law. Some were allowed to testify that they had
never seen Thomas behave as Hill had described and believed him
incapable of it.'0 36 Others testified to their own speculation that Hill was
merely projecting her feelings onto Thomas and that she only testified as
she did because her supposed sexual interest in him had not been
reciprocated.
0 37
The Republicans claimed the Hill could not have been telling the truth
because she did not file a complaint against Thomas; she followed him to a
second job; and she spoke with him by telephone several times after
leaving that job. Hill responded that she did those things because she
1034. Id. at 39.
1035. Id. at 157. Thomas repeated the denials at other points in his testimony. See, e.g., id. at
6, 162-63, 185, 201, 218.
1036. Id. at 337-515; see also FED. R. EVID. 404 ("Evidence of a person's character or a trait
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a
particular occasion," with exceptions not relevant here).
1037. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 4, supra note 1032, at 354-56; see also FED. R. EVID. 602
("A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.").
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"hoped to maintain a professional relationship, for a variety of reasons. '' 038
She claimed that she "could not afford to antagonize a person in such a
high position.' ' 10 39  Virtually all the empirical research on the question
shows that large numbers of victims of sexual harassment react just as
Anita Hill said she did.
10 40
Three witnesses testified that, during the time when Thomas
supervised her, Hill told them she was being sexually harassed, and a
fourth testified that Hill had told him the same thing after she left the
EEOC. 10 4 1 One of these witnesses was a partner in a Wall Street law firm,
another was an administrative law judge, and a third was a law school
professor. Although one of the witnesses appeared somewhat shaken
during cross-examination, collectively the four of them established that,
before Thomas was nominated to the Supreme Court, Hill had told others
that he had harassed her.
The media had already begun to report Thomas's interest in
pornography,'0 42 and later journalists documented it thoroughly, together
1038. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 4, supra note 1032, at 105.
1039. Id.
1040. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE:
TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING CHALLENGES 29 (1995) ("The single most common
response of employees who are targets of sexual harassing behaviors.., has been, and continues
to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing"); Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking
the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms, 75 A.B.A. J. 46, 48, 51 (1989) ("[O]ne of the
reasons women lawyers don't report harassment is that they feel inadequate for not being able to
cope with it on their own. ... A lot of women won't object to harassment because they're afraid
of alienating their mentors."); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just Report Him? The
Psychological and Legal Implications of Women 's Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC.
ISSUES 117 (1995); Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence
Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1399 (1992); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 23-26, 51-57 (2003); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 723-28 (2000); James F. Gruber &
Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC
& APPLIED PSYCH. 543 (1995); James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A
Literature Review, 74 SOC. SCI. RES. 3 (1989); James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's
Responses to Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal
Resource Models, 67 SOC. SCI. Q. 814 (1986); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment-Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors
Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 175-84 (2001); David E.
Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions to Sexual
Harassment, 10 J. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 12 (1989). For the reasons the Republicans argued, Andrew
Peyton Thomas, however, believes that Hill was not credible; although his citations are confused,
it appears that he was relying in part on David Brock's book, which Brock later repudiated, and
on rumor disseminated by the Republicans. See THOMAS, supra note 901, at 392, 447, 634.
1041. THOMAS HEARINGS, PART 4, supra note 1032, at 273-333.
1042. Steven Roberts, The Crowning Thomas Affair, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 16,
1991 (describing how he liked to watch "x-rated movies").
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with Thomas's habit of talking about sex in ways that were entirely
consistent with the conversations Hill had described. 10 43 About two years
before Thomas was nominated to the Supreme Court, for example, the
former corporation counsel of the District of Columbia had seen Thomas
"checking out pornographic videos." 1044
Two other people offered to testify in corroboration of Hill's story.
One "was willing to testify that [Thomas] had virtually auditioned female
employees to play the role of a potential mate."'' 0 45 The other, Angela
Wright, was willing to testify that Thomas had behaved similarly to her,
discussing her anatomy and making comments like: "You need to be dating
me., 10 46 A third person was willing to testify that Wright had told her of
the harassment contemporaneously with the time Wright claimed it
happened, "which on occasion had reduced Wright to tears."'10 47 Wright,
employed at the EEOC as a publicist, had been fired because she neglected
to invite a key person to a press conference. 10 48 But Thomas and his
backers implied that she had been fired because of character defects
instead. 0 49 Although Wright had been previously fired from other jobs and
had a reputation for tempestuousness,10 50 that alone does not mean that
Thomas did not harass her. The committee, under intense Republican
pressure, decided not to call either Wright or her corroborating witness,
although Republicans implied publicly that Wright had backed out.'0 5' The
corroborating witness, who would have testified that Wright
contemporaneously told her of the harassment, later said, "These people
didn't want to hear from us. ... Thomas's supporters didn't want another
woman, especially one with some of the same looks, age, and brains,
telling a similar story as Anita Hill.' 0 52
The committee rushed through the sexual harassment hearings in three
days, October 11 through 13, 1991-a Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. The
1043. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 55 ("By the time he reached Yale Law
School, Thomas was known for not only for the extreme crudity of sexual banter, but also for
avidly watching pornographic films and reading pornographic magazines, which he would
describe to friends in lurid detail."). See BROCK, supra note 854, at 237-38, 242-45.
1044. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 330, 335 (1994); see also id. at 327-31.
1045. Id. at 333.
1046. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 402.
1047. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 330, 335; see also id. at 327-31.
1048. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 266.
1049. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 321-27; THOMAS, supra note 901, at 438.
1050. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 265.
1051. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 342-43. Contra THOMAS, supra note 901, at
442.
1052. MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021, at 343.
Senate voted two days later, on October 15, to confirm Thomas's
nomination by a vote of fifty-two to forty-eight. 153 Of the 115 Justices
who have served on the Supreme Court, only one was confirmed by a
closer vote: Stanley Matthews, by a 24-23 vote, in 1861.1054 Many of the
Senators who voted against Thomas believed that he lied under oath during
the Judiciary Committee hearings. Garry Wills, normally the soberest and
least excitable of commentators, wrote: "Now we have a perjurer on the
bench."1055
To salvage Thomas's reputation, David Brock was commissioned to
write an article portraying Hill as emotionally unstable for The American
Spectator'056 -the same magazine that later acted as a front for Richard
Scaife's Arkansas Project. 10 57 The article grew into a book called The Real
Anita Hill.'058 The public perception of Hill was substantially influenced
by what Brock wrote, although all of his claims have since been refuted,
10 59
and Brock later confessed that-in his own words-"I was a liar and a
fraud in a dubious cause"; that "Hill's testimony was more truthful than
Thomas's flat denials"; that to protect Thomas he and others engaged in
"smears, falsehoods, and cover-ups"; and that he had "falsified the
historical record.', 10 60 "I no longer believed in my own book," he wrote in
2002.1061 He found reading Hill's own book about the Thomas hearings
106 2
to be "too painful" because he finally understood how, having "attacked
her, wrongly, as a liar[,] I made this woman's life a living hell.
10 63
Perjury is a fertile field for future impeachments because of the
opportunities to put ambitious people under oath. In part, this is because of
the increased use of litigation as a weapon of partisan politics. And in part
it is because of the confirmation battles that have come to accompany
Supreme Court nominations, where a nominee testifies under oath and can
be put to a choice between fudging the truth and risking a seat on the
Supreme Court. Because there is no statute of limitations on
impeachments, no official confirmed after testifying about disputed facts at
1053. Id. at 348.
1054. Supreme Court Nominations (1789-present), supra note 748.
1055. SIMON, supra note 530, at 142 (quoting Garry Wills).
1056. BROCK, supra note 854, at 87-120.
1057. See supra text accompanying notes 861-862.
1058. BROCK, supra note 856.
1059. See MEYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 1021.
1060. BROCK, supra note 854, at 247-48.
1061. Id. at 295.
1062. ANITA HILL, SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER (1997).
1063. BROCK, supra note 854, at 295.
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a confirmation can feel immune from a later impeachment inquiry. And
because of the Clinton impeachment, the perjury issues raised by the
Thomas confirmation hearings will not fade from memory for a very long
time.
After Robert Bork's 1987 Supreme Court nomination failed in the
Senate, and after Anthony Kennedy and David Souter were confirmed
without having built reputations among right-wing interest groups, and
then started evolving into, respectively, a swing vote and a liberal on the
Court, it became clear to the lawyers who screened judicial nominations in
the first President Bush's administration that to get the kind of Supreme
Court nominee they wanted through the Senate of 1991, they needed a
"black Bork" who would divide Democrats in general and African-
Americans in particular. 10 64  According to David Brock, "as early as
1981-ten years before he was appointed, when he was scarcely thirty-a
number of colleagues recalled [Thomas] setting his sights on" the Supreme
Court seat to which he was eventually nominated. 10 65  Others also
recounted similar conversations in which the young Clarence Thomas
described an ambition to sit on the Supreme Court.1066  According to
Brock, Clarence Thomas worked with administration lawyers to develop
the "black Bork" strategy and "was really the only" nominee who had the
basic qualifications of race and ideology to fulfill it.
10 67
Justice Thomas has since then been inseparably associated with the
impression that he was nominated only because he satisfied this unique
political strategy, and with the suspicion that he committed perjury l0 68 in
order to gain his confirmation. Electoral fortunes swing from one side of
the political spectrum to the other inevitably and unpredictably, while
competition between political parties often leads one party to adopt the
other's tactics. Just as the Jeffersonian party adopted the impeachment
tactics of the Federalists and the modem Democrats adopted the
1064. Id. at 89.
1065. Id. at 18, 151.
1066. THOMAS, supra note 901, at 179-80, 208, 316, 318-19.
1067. BROCK, supra note 854, at 89.
1068. Under the federal perjury statute, "[w]hoever... having taken an oath before a
competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes
an oath to be administered, that he will testify... truly... willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true... is guilty of
perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2007). Any congressional
committee, and "[a]ny member of either House of Congress" is authorized to administer oaths to
witness testifying before any body of Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 191 (2007). Lying under oath before
a congressional committee will support a conviction for perjury. United States v. Debrow, 346
U.S. 374 (1953); United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937).
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confirmation hearing tactics pioneered by the Republicans, nothing other
than self-restraint can prevent the Democratic Party from using
impeachment, or the threat of impeachment, as a partisan political weapon
in the way Republicans have. If the Democrats ever adopt the Republican
strategy of threatening to impeach and, on occasion impeaching, to gain
political advantage, the suspicion of perjury would make Justice Thomas,
at least in the abstract, vulnerable indefinitely. If the Democrats feel they
must be able to fill his seat, as the Republicans felt they must be able to fill
the seats of Justices Fortas and Douglas, the suspicion of perjury may again
become a public issue, all the more so because the Republicans built an
association of impeachment with perjury through the Clinton impeachment.
Can a person be impeached for private acts not committed in any
official capacity? That issue was settled, at least in part, through the
impeachment trial of Judge Claiborne in 1986. Claiborne had earlier been
criminally convicted for filing false tax returns. The House then
impeached him and the Senate convicted him of the purely private acts of
making false statements on tax returns and of the mixed, private and
public, act of bringing his court into disrepute through his own criminal
conviction. 1069
Can a person be impeached for acts committed before taking the oath
of office? In his Treatise on Federal Impeachments, Simpson considered
this question and concluded that "if the offense is directly connected with
the attainment of the office he occupies while impeached, as a violation of
the Corrupt Practices Act in relation to his nomination or election..., the
impeachment ought to prevail."'' 0 70  But Simpson also proposed the
corollary that, "if the offense were the subject of consideration, and the
facts in regard to it were substantially known at the time of his election, or
appointment and confirmation, it should not again be brought forward."
10 71
However, the reason Simpson offered for the corollary shows that it was
not intended to limit the original conclusion:
It is within the memory of all of us [or was within memory in
1916, when Simpson wrote these words] that a candidate for
president was charged with and admitted during the campaign
the commission by him of a grave moral offence in his early life,
yet, because during the years thereafter, he lived a life "void of
1069. See supra text accompanying notes 666-670.
1070. SIMPSON, supra note 67, at 60.
1071. Id.at6l.
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offence towards God and towards man," he was wisely elected
by the people, and became one of the best of our presidents. 1
072
The issue did arise in the Archbald impeachment in 1912, although
Simpson believed that "the matter cannot be said ... to have been decided
in that case., 10 73  Among other things, Archbald was "charged with
offences alleged to have been committed while a district judge, though at
the time of his impeachment he was a circuit judge.' 0 74  The Senate
acquitted him of those charges but convicted him of others. On the charges
that pre-dated Archbald's appointment to the Circuit bench, "some of the
votes for acquittal were because the offences were not deemed serious
enough; some because the Senators were not certain" that he could be
convicted for acts pre-dating his current office and did not feel it necessary
to settle the question "in view of the respondent's conviction on other
articles; and some of the Senators did not think he could properly be tried
upon such charges. ' 1075 In any event, all the acts alleged to have occurred
before Archbald became a circuit judge involved financial corruption as a
district judge, and none of them helped him obtain, or could have helped
him obtain, the position he had when impeached."076
It is that aspect of the Thomas perjury controversy that will keep it
alive. Because of the closeness of his confirmation vote-fifty-two to
forty-eight-there will always be a suspicion that Thomas obtained his seat
on the Supreme Court through perjury that swung the balance. Perjury
during a Supreme Court confirmation hearing, especially perjury by the
nominee himself, corrupts government far more than perjury in a
deposition in a private lawsuit.
10 77
B. Evidentiary Burdens in the House and Senate
Not only has impeachment been used as a partisan political weapon in
times of great conflict between branches of the federal government (except
in 1937) but members of the House and Senate have refused to adopt
evidentiary rules applicable to impeachment that would inhibit its partisan
use. The common law mind cannot manage fact-finding without assigning
1072. Id. This kind of circumlocution was a Victorian device for avoiding mentioning sex.
Simpson was referring to Grover Cleveland, who was accused of having fathered a child out of
wedlock but was nevertheless twice elected President. His political opponents chanted, "Pa! Pa!




1076. Id. at 207-13 (emphasis added).
1077. See Gerhardt, supra note 231, at 120 n. 134.
burdens requiring parties to introduce evidence of a specified degree of
persuasiveness. In fact-finding throughout the common law world, a party
that does not carry its evidentiary burden loses. Both the House and the
Senate have refused to adopt these kinds of evidentiary burdens for
impeachment.
How much evidence is needed to justify a decision to act? In courts,
that depends on the nature of the decision under consideration. To justify
requiring a person to defend against a criminal accusation, the evidentiary
burden is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the
crime specified in an indictment or information. This is a comparatively
light burden equaling "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt."' 1078 At trial,
however, the defendant can be convicted only if the evidence rises to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the highest evidentiary burden known
to the law, but it is notoriously difficult to define. One of the better
attempts appears in a typical jury instruction:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in
this world that we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal
cases the law does not require proof that overcomes every
possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence,
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you
think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must
give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.'
0 79
Between these two are the evidentiary burdens used in civil cases. On
most issues, a plaintiff will prevail at trial if the finder of fact is persuaded
by a preponderance of the evidence, which means "the greater weight of
evidence, evidence which is more convincing than the evidence which is
offered in opposition to it.' ' ' 08 A few civil issues, however, require clear
and convincing evidence, which the Supreme Court has defined as
evidence that makes a factual proposition "highly likely."'0' The law
tends to require clear and convincing evidence in a few non-criminal
situations, where the consequences can be particularly grave, such as
involuntary commitments 0 82 and disbarments.
The House of Representatives has never adopted an evidentiary
standard that must be satisfied before the House will impeach. Because
1078. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
1079. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, at Instruction 21.
1080. Hale v. Dep't of Transp., FAA, 772 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1081. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984).
1082. Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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impeachment by the House is an accusation, vaguely analogous to a grand
jury's indictment in a criminal case, the lower evidentiary burdens of
probable cause and preponderance of the evidence might seem at least
superficially attractive in the House. However, an impeachment ties up
both the House and the Senate, distracting them enormously from
legislative business. Additionally, if the person ifnpeached is an elected
president (one who did not succeed to the office through the death,
resignation, or disability of a prior President), an impeachment is an
attempt to nullify a democratically held election. For these reasons, when
voting on the articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon,
most of the members of the House Judiciary Committee individually
announced that they adhered to the burden of clear and convincing
evidence. 0 83 Some even thought they should not impeach a President
unless persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt.1084 But those sentiments are
not binding on future judiciary committees or on the House, and they were
ignored when the House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend
impeachment and the House voted to impeach Bill Clinton.
The Supreme Court has held that the Senate has unlimited discretion
to try an impeachment case any way it pleases. 0 85 When the Senate
chooses to invoke it, Senate Impeachment Rule XI permits testimony to be
heard and evidence received by a committee of Senators, "who shall report
to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings
and testimony had and given before such committee."' 86  The rule's
purpose is to make it possible for the Senate to dispose of impeachments
without allowing them to dominate the Senate chamber for weeks at a time
while evidence is being taken.
After having been convicted based on a transcript generated in this
way, Walter Nixon, the third of the trio of judges impeached in the 1980s,
challenged his conviction in federal court. On the theory that the concept
of a trial necessarily involves direct observation of witnesses by the trier of
fact, Nixon argued that Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial
Clause's 10 87 provision that "[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments."'' 0 88 After dismissing this theory based on its interpretation
1083. LABOVITZ, supra note 74, at 192-93; Stanley N. Futterman, The Rules of Impeachment,
24 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, 136 (1975); Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitutional
Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L.J. 707, 719 (1987-88).
1084. HOUSE JUD. COMM. RPT. ON NIXON, supra note 686, at 359, 377, 380-81.
1085. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993).
1086. Senate Impeachment Rule XI, in SENATE MANUAL, S. DOc. No. 101-1, 186 (1989).
1087. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
1088. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
of the provision in the Impeachment Clause,'08 9 the Supreme Court held
that conduct of an impeachment trial is beyond judicial review.'0 90  An
inevitable corollary is that the House has unlimited discretion to conduct an
impeachment inquiry in any way it pleases, and that this too is beyond
judicial review.
The Senate has never held itself to any particular evidentiary burden
of persuasion, 0 9 1 and the result is that each Senator applies whatever
burden of persuasion the Senator prefers-or no burden at all. Harry
Claiborne, the first of the trio of judges impeached in the 1980s, moved in
his Senate trial for a determination that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
the standard of persuasion in an impeachment trial. 10 92  The Senate had
never imposed this requirement on itself before, and the only authorities
Claiborne was able to offer in support of his position were individual and
personal statements made by four Senators while the House was
considering impeaching President Nixon. 10 93  The House managers
prosecuting Claiborne in the Senate opposed the motion and took the
position that the appropriate burden of persuasion in an impeachment trial
is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 0 94 But the House managers
made no motion to that effect, and so the only question before the Senate
was whether the burden of persuasion was proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, which Claibome's motion had put into issue. By a vote of seventy-
1089. Id. at 229-33. The Impeachment Trial Clause does impose three requirements on the
Senate. First, each Senator must take an oath or affirmation to try the case faithfully. Second, the
Impeachment Trial Clause requires that "[w]hen the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside .... " And third, a super-majority of two-thirds is required to convict.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
1090. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
1091. See GERHARDT, supra note 687, at 40-42, 112-13.
1092. PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF HARRY E.
CLAIBORNE, A JUDGE OF THE U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF NEV., S. Doc. NO. 99-48, at
47, 105-08 (1986).
1093. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr.: "In a case of this kind, if we are called upon to try an
impeachment, I would not hope for conviction on any charge unless I was satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the truth of the charges." Id. Senator Strom Thurmond: "The penalty of
impeachment is severe. It is not a criminal penalty, but I know of no penalty that would be more
severe than to remove once again a President from office. And therefore I believe the evidence
should be beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Senator John C. Stennis: "Where any party is charged
with an impeachable offense, and is tried by the Senate .... be it a so-called minor official on up
to the highest official under our Constitution, then I think the proof required ought to be beyond a
reasonable doubt .. " Id. The fourth Senator, Robert A. Taft, Jr., was quoted only indirectly
and only in a somewhat confusing way in oral argument. Id. at 107. Citations for these
statements were not provided in the motion or in oral argument, and it is impossible to tell
whether they were made on the Senate floor, to reporters, or in some other setting.
1094. Id. at 107-08.
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five to seventeen, the Senate denied the motion. 0 95 Of the four Senators
quoted by Claiborne's lawyers, two were still in the Senate at the time.
10 96
One voted against Claiborne's motion, and the other did not vote.
0 97
At various other times, individual Senators and House managers
prosecuting impeachments in the Senate have argued in favor of using each
of the evidentiary burdens that could be used in court to support a
judgment: preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence,
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 98 Because the Senate has never
adopted an evidentiary standard in impeachment proceedings, each Senator
is free to use any standard he or she wants. Even the denial of Claiborne's
motion does not prevent a Senator from adhering to a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, or from persuading other Senators to do so in a
future impeachment trial. The burden of proof, as Senator Rudman said in
the Hastings trial, "is what is in the mind of every Senator. If you want to
use clear and convincing, preponderance, if you want to use beyond a
reasonable doubt, I think it is what everybody decides themselves."'
1 99
Courts use evidentiary burdens to regulate decision-making-to
reduce the chances of arbitrary and inconsistent judgments and to subject
all litigants with similar types of issues to the same rules. Without uniform
evidentiary requirements, analysis of the evidence in an impeachment trial
becomes nothing better than rhetoric. A Republican Representative or
Senator who wants to oust a Democratic office holder, for example, will
argue for impeachment or conviction because the evidence satisfies a
preponderance standard. When the situation is reversed, and the office
holder under attack is a Republican, that same Representative or Senator
may insist that impeachment requires clear and convincing evidence and
that conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nothing in the Constitution requires either the House or the Senate to
consider evidence at all, much less subject it to burdens of persuasion. The
Senate, however, has generally expected an impeachment to be supported
by evidence. Similarly, with three exceptions, the House has always
received sworn testimony and other evidence, and made findings of fact on
that evidence before impeaching." 0 0 One of the exceptions occurred
because the person being impeached (Claibome) preferred for tactical
1095. Id. at 150.
1096. Id. (Thurmond and Stennis).
1097. Id. (Thurmond voted nay, and Stennis did not vote.)
1098. GERHARDT, supra note 687, at 42.
1099. Id. at 209 n.69.
1100. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Impeachment and Acquittal of William Jefferson Clinton, in THE
CLINTON SCANDAL AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 933, at 142, 146.
reasons, to get to a Senate trial as quickly as possible. 1  Another
exception (Johnson) came about because there was no dispute about
whether the core fact-his firing of Stanton-had occurred. The third
exception arose in the Clinton impeachment, where the "failure of the
House to undertake any independent fact-finding.., provided a basis upon
which the House's impeachment judgment could be attacked as partisan or
unfair."' 102
C. The Effect of Party Insecurity on the Partisan Use of Impeachment
When the Jeffersonians impeached Chase and when the Radical
Republicans impeached Johnson, both were insecure political
movements-new to power, not certain how long they would be able to
hold on to it, and driven to use what power they had while they had it. In
1937, the Democrats neither considered, nor threatened impeachment for
several reasons, one of which was that the Democratic landslide of 1936
was the most lopsided since 1820, both in popular votes and in the
composition of Congress, and it has not been equaled since then."0 3 A
party in that situation is less impatient about winning its victories as fast as
possible. It can look toward its future with confidence that problems can
be solved with the passage of time rather than by assaults on individual
office holders, fueled by impatience to get quick results.
Even though the Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress
almost continuously from 1995 to 2007 and have controlled the executive
branch since 2001, their margin of power throughout that period, measured
by seats held in Congress and by the popular vote in congressional and
presidential elections, has been the thinnest in American history over any
comparable period.
The Senate that confirmed the nominations of Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito consisted of fifty-five Republicans, forty-
four Democrats, and one Independent who caucused with the Democrats.
The Republicans claimed that the will of the people gave them the power to
1101. Id.
1102. Id.
1103. Popular votes for President were not tabulated before 1824. Since then, only one
presidential candidate has won a larger percentage of the popular vote than Roosevelt's 60.80%.
In 1964, Lyndon Johnson received 61.05%. But Roosevelt carried more states and received more
electoral votes than Johnson did. (The most respected and accessible source of presidential
election statistics is Dave Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections,
http://www.uselectionatlas.org (last visited Apr. 21, 2007)). More importantly, as a result of the
1936 elections, the Democrats controlled the Senate and House by much greater margins than
after the 1964 elections, or at any other time since the early 1820s, when there was only one real
political party.
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confirm these nominations. But measured by total popular vote, the
Democrats actually won the elections that produced that Senate.
110 4
(Because Senators serve six-year staggered terms and only one-third of the
Senate is selected in an election, it takes three elections to produce any
given Senate.)
Table 5
Popular Vote Through Which
the 100 Senators in the
109th Congress Were Elected 10 5
Popular Vote Senators Elected
Election Democratic Republican Democrats Republicans
2000 35,773,958 35,773,720 17 14
2002 19,873,164 21,566,016 12 22
2004 44,010,807 39,920,562 15 19
Totals 99,657,929 97,260,298 44 55
The public thus voted for a Democratic Senate but got a Republican
one. In individual elections, the disparity can be especially deceptive. In
2004, the Republicans gained four Senate seats, from fifty-one to fifty-five,
and 2004 was thus considered a Republican victory. But in that year, as
Table 5 shows, the Democrats received over four million more votes than
the Republicans did. That was possible because the Senate is
constitutionally gerrymandered: each state, regardless of size, sends two
Senators to Washington. And Republicans have an advantage, though not
a commanding one, in small states. Wyoming and California, for example,
are equally represented in the Senate, even though California's population
1104. See infra tbl. 5.
1105. CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF Nov. 2, 2004, at 38, 65 (2005) (including, in New York, minor
party votes for major party candidates) [herinafter Nov. 2, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL STATISTICS];
CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF Nov. 5, 2002, at 53 (2003); CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF Nov.
7, 2000, at 43, 76 (2001) [herinafter Nov. 7, 2000 PRESIDENTIAL STATISTICS] (including, in New
York, minor party votes for major party candidates, but not including the Missouri vote because
the successful 2000 candidate was deceased on election day, resulting in an appointed Senator
who was defeated in a 2002 special election).
is sixty-nine times the size of Wyoming's. 1106 Wyoming's Senator Enzi, a
Republican, got 133,710 votes in his last election, while California's
Senator Boxer, a Democrat, got 6,955,728 votes.
The Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 until 19871107 as a
result of a 1980 electoral fluke in which, despite getting nearly three
million fewer votes than the Democrats," 0 8 they gained twelve seats by
winning an unusually large number of extremely close races. Most of the
Republicans who won those races were defeated when they came up for
reelection in 1986, and the Senate then reverted to the Democrats. The
Republicans controlled the Senate from 1995 to 2007, except for a year and
a half in 2001-2002.11°9 During those periods, they never had more than
fifty-five seats and, at times, had to get by with only fifty seats (out of one
hundred), relying upon the Republican vice president to cast tie-breaking
votes."' 10 By contrast, from 1959 to 1981 and from 1987 to 1995, when the
Democrats controlled the Senate, they never had fewer than fifty-four
seats, and their average during those periods was sixty seats. For ten years,
from 1959 to 1969, they never had fewer than sixty-four seats, a huge
difference in a legislative body of one hundred members. Viewed thus in
historical perspective, Republican control of the Senate has been by thin
margins-sometimes extraordinarily thin ones.
That is even truer in the House, as Table 6 shows. The Republicans
controlled the House from 1995 to 2007 but never during that time had
more than 232 seats, while the Democrats never had less than 203 seats.
1106. Population by State based on 2000 Census, at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/
GCTTable?_bm=y&-geo id=O1000US&-_box head nbr=GCT-PH1-R&-dsname=DEC_2000_
SF1_U&-format=-US-9S (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
In a state legislature, this would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (unconstitutional for a voter in one Tennessee
county to have 23 times as much power in choosing legislators as a voter in another county). The
Senate is exempt from the Equal Protection Clause in this respect because of a compromise at
the Constitutional Convention that created an upper house of Congress, the Senate, as an
assembly of states in which all states were equal, regardless of size. This compromise was
considered necessary to induce the smaller of the original thirteen states to ratify the Constitution.
But of those original small states, only three are still small. The others have since become
medium-sized states and are now hurt by the compromise intended to benefit them. The states
that now benefit from it were almost entirely admitted to the Union later, most of them more than
a century after the Constitutional Convention. A Senate apportioned this way is not an essential
feature of a federal form of government. In Canada, provinces are more autonomous than U.S.
states are, but in the Canadian Senate provinces are represented in proportion to their populations.
To a lesser extent, so are German states in the German federal parliament.
1107. Senate Party Divisions, supra note 198.
1108. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 439, at 5-194.
1109. Senate Party Divisions, supra note 198.
1110. Id.
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(The Independent listed under "other" in Table 6 caucuses with the
Democrats.) Never before in American history has a party controlled the
House continually through six consecutive elections by such razor-line
margins, without ever achieving numerical dominance. In contrast, when
the Democrats controlled the House from the 1954 election to the 1994
election, they never had less than 232 seats, and had as many as 291, 292,
and 295 seats (which constitutes two-thirds of the House) at times when the
Republicans had only 144, 143, and 140 seats."'1
1111. House Party Divisions, supra note 199.
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Table 6
Party Divisions in the House of Representatives After
the Elections of 1970 Through 2004 Together with





1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
255 242 291 292 277 242 269 253 258
180 192 144 143 158 192 166 182 177
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When the Republicans took over the House in the 1994 election, they
received a majority of the popular vote for House candidates. But in the
1112. Id.
1113. 1 HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 439, at 5-193 (for 1970 through 2000 elections);
CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF Nov. 5, 2002, at 31-33, 51-52 (2003) (for 2002 election)
(including, in New York, minor party votes for major party candidates); CLERK OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF
Nov. 2, 2004, at 39-41, 66-67 (2005) (for 2004 election) (including, in New York, minor party
votes for major party candidates).
For elections before the late 1960s, aggregating popular votes nationally for the House is
of limited statistical validity because most affected states were not yet in compliance with the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973i, which greatly increased voting in the
South, and with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which required legislative districts (other
than those of the.U.S. Senate) to be of equal size.
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five elections since then, the Republicans have been unable to get as much
as 50% of the popular vote. They actually lost the popular vote while
retaining the House in 1998-the only time that has happened since Baker
v. Carr rationalized House popular voting by requiring that legislative
districts be of equal size.1114 In 1996 and 2000, the House popular vote
was nearly a tie, the parties being separated by less than half a percentage
point. In contrast, when the Democrats controlled the House during the
period shown in Table 6, they routinely won between 50% and 58% of the
popular vote, and never less than 50%.
The Republicans have been able to pick up and hold seats through
relentless computer-aided gerrymandering. For example, in 2004 the
Democratic popular vote grew by nearly two percentage points and the
Republican popular vote fell very slightly. This should have translated into
an increase in the Democratic seats in the House. But the opposite
happened. 1115 The Republican gains, however, were achieved entirely in
Texas, where a court had drawn the congressional districts after the 2000
census because the legislature and the Governor could not agree on a
redistricting plan. After taking control of the Texas legislature in 2002, the
Republicans redrew the congressional districts again through a plan
conceived of and coordinated by the House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay. 1116  Because of the DeLay redistricting plan, the Republicans
picked up five House seats in Texas alone, while in the other forty-nine
states together the Republicans lost two seats. 1117
From 1995 to 2007, Congress was more rightist, but not much more so
than it has been in the past. Until the 1980s a significant number of
Democrats were right-wing and a smaller but substantial group of
Republicans were, by current standards, liberal. For example, the Congress
with which John F. Kennedy began his presidency in 19611118 was on many
issues controlled by right-wing Democrats, several of whom chaired key
committees and subcommittees through seniority. Many of them had
opinions about African Americans that could be described in family
newspapers only through euphemisms. They" 19 and others like them have
1114. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1115. See supra tbl. 6.
1116. Ralph Blumenthal, After Bitter Fight, Texas Senate Redraws Congressional Districts,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2003, at Al.
1117. GRACE YORK, COMPARISON OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 109TH AND 108TH
CONGRESSES (2004), http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/congress/hou05c.pdf.
1118. 87th Congress, 1st Session.
1119. Senators Harry Byrd (Virginia), James Eastland (Mississippi), Allen Ellender
(Louisiana), Spessard Holland (Florida), Olin Johnston (South Carolina), Everett Jordan (North
Carolina), John McClellan (Arkansas), Willis Robertson (South Carolina), Richard Russell
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disappeared from the Democratic Party. In the same Congress were a
number of Republicans who were so committed to civil rights,
environmental protection, and measures to help the poor that they would be
considered liberal today. They" 120 and others like them have virtually
disappeared from the Republican Party. Consolidating all right-wing
legislators in the Republican Party has created a coherent and disciplined
bloc. But even with that advantage, the Republicans have not been able to
produce a commanding majority when they have won elections.
In three of the four presidential elections since and including 1992, the
Republican candidate got fewer popular votes than the Democratic
candidate, even though the Republicans won one of the elections in which
they lost the popular vote. 121
(Georgia), George Smathers (Florida), John Sparkman (Alabama), John Stennis (Mississippi),
Herman Talmadge (Georgia), and Strom Thurmond (South Carolina). If the Representatives who
fit this description were listed here, this footnote would fill the page and continue onto the next
one.
1120. Senators George Aiken (Vermont), J. Glenn Beall (Maryland), J. Caleb Boggs
(Delaware), John Butler (Maryland), Clifford Case (New Jersey), John Cooper (Kentucky), Jacob
Javits (New York), Kenneth Keating (New York), Thomas Kuchel (California), Winston Prouty
(Vermont), Leverett Saltonstall (Massachusetts), Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania), and Margaret Chase
Smith (Maine). For why it is impractical to list here the Representatives who fit this description,
see the last sentence of the preceding note. After long careers in elective office, Case, Javits, and
Kuchel were defeated not in general elections, but in Republican primaries by right-wing
opponents as their party shifted to the right.
1121. See infra tbl. 7.
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Table 7
Popular Vote in Presidential Elections
1992 Through 2004 112z
Election Democratic Republican Others
1992 44,857,747 38,798,913 20,943,706
1996 47,401,898 39,198,482 9,789,438
2000 50,996,062 50,465,169 4,141,789
2004 58,894,584 61,872,711 1,451,863
Never has the post-New Deal Republican Party won a decisive
popular mandate or achieved the status of a permanent majority party,
which the Democrats enjoyed for so long and which, if they had it, would
allow the Republicans to govern with a confident view of the future. This
is a deeply frustrated party that has not achieved its goals. That
frustration-combined with the insecurity of governing with such thin
margins-appears to have produced a party psychology similar to that of
the Radical Republicans of 1868, in which some elements of the party
instinctively look for reasons to impeach or threaten to impeach.
V. Conclusion
Impeachment will be suspect as long as politicians are able to use it as
a partisan weapon. Certainly, impeachment must exist because there is no
other way to remove an unfit president, vice president, or federal judge.
And certainly it will always have political ramifications because removal
of a president, a vice president, or a justice of the Supreme Court has
political implications-and sometimes removal of a lower federal judge
does as well. It is a political issue, for example, whether the country would
suffer more from the continuation in office of a given official or from that
official's removal. But because even that seemingly neutral question is so
easily distorted by partisanship, it will be possible to manipulate
impeachment for partisan political ends unless Congress imposes on itself
the self-discipline inherent in burdens of production and persuasion.
Michael Gerhardt has pointed out that the Clinton impeachment
illustrates "the vulnerability of the federal judiciary to political retaliation"
1122. Nov. 2, 2004 PRESIDENTIAL STATICS, supra note 1105, at 64; NOv. 7, 2000
PRESIDENTIAL STATISTICS, supra note 1105, at 74 (2001); CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF NOV.
5, 1996, at 79 (1997); CLERK OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STATISTICS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION OF Nov. 3, 1992, at 83 (1993).
because "some of the most important factors that helped Clinton survive
the threat of removal (i.e., public support and media scrutiny) are absent
from lower federal judges' impeachment proceedings... about which the
public is largely indifferent."'1 123 That might or might not be true if the
impeachment is motivated by widely reported cases such as the Ninth
Circuit's decision in the Pledge of Allegiance case or the decisions of
several federal judges not to order the reinsertion of Terri Schiavo's
feeding tube. 
124
Is the partisan use of impeachment or impeachment threats an
effective political strategy? Of the four great confrontations between or
among branches of the federal government-from 1801 to 1808, from 1865
to 1868, in 1937, and since 1968-partisan political impeachment and
impeachment threats played an important role in three of them. However,
despite the appeal of a strategy that attempts to drive political opponents
from office through an accusatory procedure, or threatens to do so in order
to intimidate them, partisan political impeachment and impeachment
threats generally fail to produce results.
Military people sometimes say that the long way around is often the
shortest way there. Frontal assaults-attacks directly on an adversary's
position, like Picket's charge at Gettysburg-tend to succeed only when
the attacker has overwhelming superiority of force. The long way around
might be envelopment through an adversary's rear, for example, or slow
attrition from the sides. An impeachment, or a threat of impeachment, is a
frontal assault. The Chase, Johnson, and Clinton impeachments all failed
for lack of an overwhelming superiority of force, and in each of them the
attackers overestimated their forces in part because they underestimated the
extent to which moderates of their own party would desert them. In a
strategic sense, the Clinton impeachment was particularly unproductive
because even if moderates had not defected, the necessary two-thirds to
convict in the Senate would still have been impossible, and the House
leadership could have foreseen that even before the House voted to
impeach.
When the Federalists impeached Blount, they succeeded only in
teaching the Jeffersonians how to use impeachment as a political weapon
against Chase. When the Jeffersonians then impeached Chase, they made
themselves look like extremists. The judiciary eventually became at least
nominally Jeffersonian primarily because the short life expectancy of the
era offered frequent opportunities to replace Federalists through death and
new appointments, although the Jeffersonian party itself became less
1123. Gerhardt, supra note 1100, at 144.
1124. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
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Jeffersonian as time passed, absorbing some of the sensibilities of the
moderate branch of the Federalist Party. The Radical Republican
impeachment of Andrew Johnson also accomplished virtually nothing.
Within a year, Grant, who shared Congress's view of Reconstruction,
replaced Johnson through the electoral process. In historical memory, the
Johnson impeachment allowed the enemies of the Radical Republicans to
portray them as oppressive and power-obsessed, rather than as principled
politicians whose goal was to complete the liberation of African-
Americans. In both instances, the long way around would have been to
take advantage of other forces already in motion. After 1937, when no one
considered impeachment, Roosevelt got a New Deal Supreme Court
despite the failure of his court-packing plan. There, the long way around
was deceptively simple and involved taking advantage of the fact that two
of the Four Horsemen wanted to retire, and routine legislation let them do
it with a reasonable income. As for the Republicans, all their impeachment
tactics and strategies have produced only a single gain-a Supreme Court
vacancy (Fortas's), in 1969. Everything since then has damaged their
credibility.
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